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ABSTRACT

This summary of the Fourth Annual Conference on Major Transitions in the Human Life Cycle contains a preface, introductory section on adolescence and young adulthood (ages 14 through 24 years), and the following presentations, complete with discussion text: (1) "Historical Treatment of the Age Group" (John Demos); (2) "Demographic Considerations" (Arthur J. Norton); (3) "Young People as Individuals and as Family Members: The Implications for Public Policy" (Sheila B. Kamerman); (4) "Youth: Stage or Problem?" (Alfred J. Kahn); (5) "The Challenge of Shaping a Personal Identity" (Edmund D. Pellegrino); (6) "The Evolution of Human Genders" (A. J. Kelso); (7) "Chemical Dependence and Drugs" (Donald West King); (8) "Psychiatric Factors" (Leonard Duhl); (9) "Socio-Psychological Approaches" (June Jackson Christmas); (10) "School Counseling as an Intervention" (Helen R. Washburn); (11) "Counseling and Intervention in Colleges" (John G. Darley); (12) "Shaping and Mentoring Influences in Adolescence" (Sidney Werkman); (13) "Heterosexual and Homosexual Relationships" (Philip Blumstein); (14) "Young People and Religion" (John Cannon); (15) "Cults" (Harold Visotsky); (16) "Juvenile Crime" (William E. Threlkeld); (17) "Careers and Vocations" (Williard Wirtz); (18) "Meeting the Educational Needs of Young People" (Alvin C. Eurich); (19) "Ferment and Experimentation in Education" (Ernest J. Bartell); (20) "Third World Perspective" (Aklilu Habte); and (21) "Priorities for the Future" (John Scanlon). A list of conference participants and a selected bibliography are appended. (NB)

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The Turbulent Years

Edited by John Scanlon

The Turbulent Years

A Summary of the Fourth Annual Conference
on Major Transitions in the Human Life Cycle
Sponsored by the Schweppe Research and
Education Fund

Edited by John Scanlon

**Academy for
Educational Development, Inc.**

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Preface

This is the fourth in a series of reports on the human life cycle prepared by the Academy for Educational Development with grant support from the Schweppe Research and Education Fund, of which I am president.

Like its predecessors, this report is the outgrowth of a conference at which scholars and practitioners from many different disciplines came together for five days to discuss a complex and many-faceted subject. In this instance, the subject was that stage of the life cycle between puberty and maturity, the turbulent years from 14 to 24.

Much has been written about adolescence, but to my knowledge this was the first time so many people from so many disciplines shared their ideas, beliefs, and insights on that subject. The charge laid upon them was to examine the age span from 14 to 24 from a multidisciplinary point of view, to identify its special problems and concerns, to explore its relationships with earlier and later stages in the human life cycle, to shed more light on its social, biological, and psychological aspects. How do they interact in influencing youthful behavior? Finally the conferees were asked to recommend programs of action and research that might help young people cope more effectively with the stresses and strains of becoming an adult.

The conference participants performed all of these tasks with wit and wisdom. Fortunately, all of the proceedings were recorded and transcribed. It was possible for the conference reporter to recapture not only the words that were said, but the liveliness of the interdisciplinary byplay, the humor of some of the exchanges, and the air of informality that characterized the entire conference.

I am grateful to the Academy for Educational Development for sponsoring these Conferences, to the steering committee that planned them, and to the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies for making its conference facilities available to us. I am especially grateful to all of the people who participated in the Conferences. Their ideas and insights have made a substantial contribution to a better understanding of the human life cycle, and I hope their recommendations will lead to action of a legislative, social or educational type and possibly stimulate research that will be of some help to this and future generations of young people about to embark on the great adventure of life. It really can be rewarding.

John S. Schweppe, M.D.

Introduction

There are now more than 45 million young people in the United States between the ages of 14 and 24. They are the second largest comparable age group, comprising more than a fifth of the total population. They are really made up of two subgroups, those born toward the end of the unprecedented baby boom that followed World War II, and those born during the "baby bust" period that began in 1961 when the birthrate started to decline.

The life experiences of the two subgroups have been significantly different. The members of the baby boom cohort, by virtue of their sheer numbers, have been in fierce competition with one another for college admission, jobs, housing, and career advancement. The younger members of the age group, those in the "baby bust" cohort, are far fewer in number. They are finding it much easier to get into college, and when they get older, the competition among them for other social and economic benefits will continue to be milder than it has been for the "baby boom" cohort.

The life experiences have also been different in other ways. Many of the older members of the age group were in their teens during the turbulent decade of the 1960's. They were the generation that protested, often violently, against racial prejudice, the depersonalizing aspects of mass education, and the war in Vietnam. Many became disillusioned with their elders and with society. They rebelled against all forms of authority. They turned away from the religions they were brought up in, tuned in on rock music, and "turned on" with drugs and sexual promiscuity. Some of them joined cults in search of the feeling of belonging that they could not find in traditional groups of young people.

Venereal disease is not a new problem among young people in the 14-to-24 age group, but in the 70's it became acute. For example, between 1970 and 1978, the incidence of gonorrhea among female members of the age group more than doubled. The trend is shown in Table 1 on the following page.

Table 1
Venereal Disease Among Young People
(1970 to 1978)

Gonorrhea

	Rates per 100,000 People		
Age Group 15 to 19:	Male	Female	Total
1970	960.1	609.5	782.2
1978	977.6	1,481.7	1,228.9
Age Group 20 to 24:			
1970	2,514.5	740.9	1,541.5
1978	2,409.9	1,568.7	1,977.6

Primary and Secondary Syphilis

	Male	Female	Total
Age Group 15 to 19:			
1970	18.8	19.8	19.3
1978	16.5	12.7	14.6
Age Group 20 to 24:			
1970	55.6	27.1	40.0
1978	46.0	16.4	30.8

Source: Center for Disease Control, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

As a result of some of their bizarre behavior, young people were constantly in the news, and the word "teenager" became a symbol of what seemed to be wrong with the younger generation. (It is interesting to note that the term "teenager" did not come into general use until after World War II. It was not included in Webster's Collegiate Dictionary until 1956.) Hundreds of articles were written about young people in the popular magazines, many of them addressed to perplexed parents. One, for example, was entitled "Everything You Want to Know About Teenagers (but Are Afraid to Ask)". The perplexity of parents in dealing with adolescent children is illustrated by the quotation on the following page, and the perplexity of adolescents in coping with the problems of growing up is portrayed in the cartoon on page 4.

In recent years there has been a lively interest among scholars from many disciplines in the problems, concerns, and behavior of youth. Scores of books and journal articles were devoted to such matters.

It cannot be said, therefore, that the participants in the conference on which this report is based were plowing new ground. What made the

Aspen conference different from most other approaches to the subject was its multidisciplinary focus. Scholars and practitioners from more than twenty different disciplines brought their own individual knowledge and experience to bear on the subject, and engaged in a lively discourse that frequently crossed disciplinary lines.

At the outset, the participants were asked to consider the interaction between biomedical, psychological, economic, and social factors on the lives of young people between the ages of puberty and 25. Since most of the Census Bureau data on that stage of the human life cycle covers the age groups 15 to 19 and 20 to 24, these were considered to be the parameters of the demographic data on the age group under discussion, but when some of the participants pointed out that the age of puberty now occurs earlier than it used to, it was agreed that the problems and concerns of 14-year-olds would not be excluded from the discussion.

Adolescents

- They are said to be "uncommunicative" but it costs me $52 a month for calls on the telephone used by my daughter.
- They complain that they can't get a job if they have long hair. (They should know how hard it is to get one if you have grey hair.)
- They complain and complain even though they can't remember what prices were 20 years ago.
- They are going to have a serious problem some day when they want to tell their children what they had to do without.
- They reject all the older generation's values, beginning with spinach.
- They can't wait to reach the age when they can do as they please, and when they do, they get married.
- There are adolescents so naive that they believe they will never be as naive as they believe their parents to be.
- Adolescents get to be unbearable when they reach 50.

Aldo Cammarota in *Vision*, 16/30 June 1979, p. 60
(translated from the Spanish)

The overall goal of the conference was to advance continuing communication between disciplines on youth as a stage in the human life cycle. The specific objectives were:

- To identify the major characteristics of, and relationships between,



"You'd think school would have a required course on how to deal with reality!"

(Reprinted by permission.)

family, education, work, health, and leisure as these aspects of living affect young people in the age group.

- To identify and gain greater understanding of sex differences, and of important biomedical and socio-behavioral factors that are especially evident in young people, and the relationships between these and other factors evidenced in earlier and later stages of the life cycle.
- To consider and clarify the policy implications arising from a better understanding of the biomedical and social aspects of growing up.
- To suggest programs of action by government agencies, organizations, institutions, individuals, and support systems, that will help young people to cope more effectively with this transitional adolescent period.

The conference opened on Monday, August 6, and continued through Friday, August 10. Some of the speakers came with prepared texts, but others spoke from notes or outlines. At the end of each presentation there was a discussion. All of the proceedings were recorded and transcribed. What follows is an edited version of the transcript, supplemented by the conference reporter's own notes.

—John Scanlon

Historical Treatment of the Age Group

John Demos
Professor of History, Brandeis University

On occasions such as this one, I think history is supposed to provide a sort of running start, and that's what I will try to do.

At the outset I'd like to make one or two remarks of a prefatory and perhaps even slightly apologetic nature.

First, in trying to range through fifteen centuries of history and covering what is a substantial age group, I will necessarily have to oversimplify along the way. There are many individual experiences of passage through the years 14 to 24 and perhaps many group experiences which I will scarcely be able to touch on at all, and I apologize for that. I think what I'll be trying to do is to trace a kind of mainstream line of change over time even though admittedly the mainstream itself is rather vague and ill-defined at many points along the way.

The second prefatory remark — and it's a kind of apology, I guess — is that I have before me a prepared text which may lend a greater degree of formality to my remarks than I might otherwise wish. This is not my regular mode of operating. However, I think it may prove more economical and efficient and expeditious for me to speak to you from a set of prepared comments, partly because of the enormous scope and diffuseness of this subject and its historical aspect.

Nonetheless, I hope you'll bear with me as I go along in this set piece and I do hope and trust that there will be sufficient time left after I'm done for a good deal of comment and discussion around the table about what it all means.

One more thing. I won't really try to make any significant approach to the present-day situation. I'm assuming that that's what the rest of the conference will be about, but what I am offering will throw some interesting light on the current-day situation.

Okay. Psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, sociologists and all kinds of other ologists, not to mention many among you who are representative of the world of policy and action, have all been accustomed for a long time to take careful account of the factor of age in the stages of life, of developmental patterns and sequences.

Historians like me by contrast have come to appreciate such things only quite recently. Twenty years ago I doubt that you could have found a single certified working historian to talk to you on the subject of adolescence. Indeed, the very suggestion would have seemed bizarre if not ludicrous to all of my historical brethren.

Now you could certainly find quite a number of likely candidates, some of them I would confess better than I. The study of the life course and its constituent parts like adolescence has actually become a rather hot number in contemporary historical scholarship.

The trend was begun with the appearance in 1960 of an extraordinary book by the French cultural historian, Philippe Aries, published in English under the title of *Centuries of Childhood*. I expect some of you know it.

There is no doubt that in terms of popular usage and also in terms of its substantive meaning and connotation, adolescence is peculiarly a twentieth century term. One might even call it a twentieth century discovery.

Aries's work quickly raised up a host of followers among historians on both sides of the Atlantic. By now histories of childhood also have accumulated in fairly large quantities. There is even a journal by the name of *The History of Childhood Quarterly,* and the tide is still flowing.

Meanwhile, some scholars have moved out from childhood to other sectors of the life course. For example, I can alert you to a new and still building miniwave of studies on old age in history. Even the terminal points in life are coming into scholarly vogue. Aries, among others, has written recently on the history of death and just last year there appeared the first full-scale history of childbirth under the catchy title *Lying In*.

Seriously, the one part of this territory which remains largely uncharted is the history of middle age, and I think perhaps that has something to do with where most historians are in their own life course.

If I sound a little ironic in describing these scholarly trends, I don't really mean to disparage them. In fact, I am myself very much caught up in them and more than that I think they do constitute one of the most exciting and challenging branches of current historical scholarship.

One might well say, and I suspect that many of you might well say, it's about time historians noticed the importance of age in human experience.

Our focus today is, of course, not age in general but the age of adolescence in particular. Now I'd like to begin the main part of my remarks with a fragment of a professional autobiography.

I wrote one of my first graduate school seminar papers on the subject of adolescence in American history. That was, I think, 1963. I made one central discovery then that seemed fairly earth-shattering to me at the time, although now it looks obvious, namely the discovery that adolescence as we know it is a relatively new kind of experience.

Correction — I should say that it is a relatively new idea because, in fact, my research up to that point was largely about ideas. Briefly stated, my conclusions were the following: The modern currency of the idea of adolescence owes much to the efforts of one man, Professor Granville Stanley Hall. Hall's work is now largely outdated and forgotten. If he is remembered at all, it's probably for his role as host to Sigmund Freud during Freud's one and only visit to America.

Freud, as some of you may know, came in 1909 to deliver a series of lectures at Clark University in Massachusetts. Hall was the university's president and the person directly responsible for getting up the invitation.

In his own time, Hall was something of an eminence among American psychologists albeit a controversial eminence. Indeed, his reputation went considerably beyond academic circles for he was among other things a remarkably successful popularizer of psychological ideas.

His magnum opus was a vast two-volume study published in 1904 under the imposing title *Adolescence, Its Psychology and Its Relations to Anthropology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education*.

The title sounds a bit eccentric and the book reads rather strangely today, but at the time it was a blockbuster. It's not too much to say, I think, that the term adolescence and the ideas which Hall and his disciples subsumed under that term achieved a kind of instant celebrity.

It was almost as if Hall's account of adolescence had filled a gap or a need in social experience, so widely and eagerly was it taken up. It's true, of course, that the word itself was not new. One finds scattered—really very scattered—use of it in earlier writings, and I guess it has a certifiable Latin root.

However, there is no doubt that in terms of popular usage and also in terms of its substantive meaning and connotation adolescence is peculiarly a twentieth-century term. One might even call it a twentieth-century discovery.

> **Adolescence is, first of all, a matter of biology—an intrinsic development process in a physiologic sense. It is also a matter of psychology insofar as it involves the resolution of internal issues around self and others. Finally, it's a matter of social experience, or rather of social context and cultural definition.**

I contented myself in my initial study fifteen or sixteen years ago with trying to unravel the main threads of intellectual development in and around the concept, the various influences on Hall and his students, the way their work was understood and so forth.

Subsequently, I went a bit further in an article I wrote together with my wife, in which we proposed a rough little model of social experience to account for the impact of the idea of adolescence during that particular historical moment around the turn of the century.

Looking back it's easy to see the limitations in that early preliminary effort. Like most such models, I guess, ours has proved much too simple to encompass the full range of pertinent facts. Very recent scholarship has greatly extended information about youthful experience in past times. I hasten to add that the newer work is not by and large my own, and what I'll be doing here involves a certain amount of ripping off of professional friends and colleagues.

I think I should particularly acknowledge a new book entitled *Rites of Passage*, by Professor Joseph Kett of the University of Virginia.

In fact, we don't, any of us, have the last word on this subject yet. Puzzles definitely remain and I would be pleased to hear from any and all of you about trying to clear up the cloudier points.

The task as I see it is to understand the changing nature of adolescent experience through three centuries of American history — and let me emphasize the word "experience." The area of ideas — or more broadly, of perceptions — is relatively easy to run through and has, I think, largely now been done.

What is harder to understand is the situation which lies behind the ideas — which even in a sense generates the ideas. More particularly, we would like to know why Americans of our own century have depended so conspicuously on the concept of adolescence as a way of ordering their personal and social experience.

Did earlier generations have roughly the same experience of adolescence, while calling it perhaps by different names? Or is there something intrinsically new and different about modern experience in this connection? Might it even be possible to speak of the creation of a new developmental stage?

One eminent social scientist recently made the prediction that a couple of centuries in the future our young people will be sexually active and reproductively fecund by the age of eight or nine. I'll bet my own scholarly badge that it doesn't happen.

Let me propose, before going any further, that we regard our investigation as having three component strands and as requiring three different analytic perspectives. Adolescence is, first of all, a matter of biology — that is, an intrinsic developmental process in a physiologic sense.

It is also a matter of psychology insofar as it involves the resolution of internal issues around self and others. Finally, it's a matter of social experience or rather of social context and cultural definition. But in a sense, I suppose these three aspects comprise a kind of spectrum from the most nearly universal and unchanging — that is, the biological ones — to the most highly variable and flexible — that is, the sociocultural ones.

Psychology, I think, lies somewhere in between. However, even biology is not entirely impervious to changing historical circumstances.

There is, for example, some reason to think that the attainment of full physical stature comes at a considerably earlier age now than it did in pre-modern times.

According to one estimate, young men in early 19th century America were not fully grown until they were about 25 years old, whereas most of our young people nowadays reach this point by or even before 20.

Similarly, we do have some fairly good data about the age of *menarche* in girls since the middle of the nineteenth century and this material suggests that *menarche*, first menstruation, has been coming along nearly one year earlier with each succeeding generation. That is, from about 15 or 16 in 1850 to somewhere between 12 and 13, I think, nowadays.

For boys, there seems to have been evidence of a parallel decline in the age of puberty from about 16 to about 13 or 14. From this apparent trend, incidentally, one eminent social scientist recently made the prediction that a couple of centuries in the future our young people will be sexually active and reproductively fecund by the age of 8 or 9. I don't know what this would do to the various kinds of work in which many of you are involved, but anyway — I'll bet my own scholarly badge that it doesn't happen.

In Colonial days, the typical little boy was a sort of miniature model of his farmer father, and likewise the girl in relation to her mother.

The point is, of course, that the data on age of puberty covers only a little more than a century—dating back to the middle of the nineteenth century—and that century happens to have been a time of particularly dramatic improvement in nutrition, in health care and in other factors directly related to physical maturation.

If we try to take the story farther back in time, admittedly the data becomes very fragmentary, but I feel quite certain that the age of puberty in, say, 1650, in most of Europe and America anyway, was not appreciably higher than it was in 1850.

These are matters of some consequence to the history of adolescence, and there may now be other elements of human biology that deserve attention within the same general context.

If so, however, I am not the person to draw them out and the remainder of my comments will involve the second and third of the perspectives which I tried to identify a few minutes ago.

Actually, I shall concentrate largely on the socio-cultural picture with occasional glances toward the changing psychology of adolescence. Without further ado, then, let me crank up my time machine and invite you to join in a little journey into the past, seeking at the outset to evaluate the experience of young people during the first century and a half of American history.

This is a period bounded by the settlement of the continent by Europeans at one end and a movement toward national independence at the other. Say—the period from 1620 to 1735. The single most widely salient fact about society in this period was its pre-modern, pre-industrial character.

The population was distributed through hundreds of village communities and in some cases more isolated homesteads. For a good 90 percent of these so-called colonists, day-to-day experience was shaped by the requirements of small-scale agriculture, and the experience specifically of young people embraced themes and tendencies typical of pre-modern farm youth almost everywhere.

It's clear, for example, that children began from an early age to participate in the work routines of their individual households. Seven- or eight-year-old boys and girls would assume simple responsibilities in the care of domestic animals, in gardening, and for such in-house tasks as spinning, candlemaking and food preparation.

As they grew older, the scope of these responsibilities widened, and presumably the details of the process were as variable as the individuals and families directly involved. But the larger meaning for our purposes seems clear. Children moved toward maturity along a smoothly-surfaced path. Their introduction to adult roles began early, and culturally appropriate adult models were present and visible from the start.

Under these conditions the typical little boy was a sort of miniature model of his farmer father and likewise the little girl in relation to her mother.

As I've already suggested, the key to this pattern was the economic organization of the household, but other factors like demographic ones also played a part. Families were very large by our standards — eight to ten children per married couple born over a period of as much as twenty years.

This meant an implicit blurring of intergenerational lines. Many children could envision their own progress toward adulthood by reference to older siblings variously situated along the way.

These patterns were expressed and reinforced in the values, beliefs, laws and social customs of the culture at large. Social and ceremonial activities no less than work ignored distinctions of age. Church-going, family visiting, even education regularly mixed children and adults together.

Legal usage established no single age of majority. Inheritance came most often at age 21 but might also be arranged within individual families across a wide spectrum from, say, 15 to 25. In some communities orphans could choose their own guardians if they were over 12, in others not until 14 or 16.

Youth was seen as a long period of gradual preparation for adult responsibility. There were few sharp twists and turns along the way. The only sort of personal crisis particularly associated with youth was religious conversion.

The age of criminal responsibility was also variously determined. Moreover, the significance of all numerical benchmarks is unclear, since many people in this culture did not know how old they were and others seemed not to have cared.

Now these circumstances imply a rather loose and flexible view of the maturation process, and furthermore, when one looks to literary and documentary materials the same impression holds. When authors considered the life course they did so most often in terms of a four-stage model.

Childhood was customarily understood as lasting from birth to seven or eight years. Youth, which was next, ended at about thirty. Old age began at sixty. Middle age was rarely even mentioned, apparently because the years between thirty and sixty seemed simply the full realization of personhood, rather than another stage of life.

In a sense, childhood and youth on one side, and old age on the other, were deviations from what was seen as the mid-life norm. It is, of course, youth which primarily concerns us here, but the picture of youth which emerges from the literature is short on specifics and vague and lukewarm in tone.

By and large, youth was seen as a long period of gradual preparation for adult responsibility. There were few sharp twists and turns along the way. The only sort of personal crisis particularly associated with youth was religious conversion. Occasionally conversion came around the transition from childhood to youth, as young as seven or eight years old. More commonly it came near the end of youth — that is, in the mid-to-late twenties.

But these connections were very loosely established and the experience of conversion itself was rather hard to pin down. Puberty was not especially noticed, and its connotations were those of gradual accession to power and effectiveness. Nowhere was there any clear sense of youth as an awkward age with its own special confusions and vulnerabilities.

Please consider what has been said so far as a rough overall sketch of young people's experience in the Colonial area and as a backdrop against which to set off the increasingly different experience of nineteenth-century American youth.

After 1800 the time of life previously characterized as youth became increasingly disjunctive and problematic. Social circumstances and I think psychological ones, too, combined to surround the passage from childhood to adult status with new elements of stress.

The nineteenth century can be seen as a time of general confusion or at least of reshuffling in social expectations as to age-appropriate behavior.

The adolescent world of our own times was still some distance off, but it was more and more difficult to sustain the old attitudes of equanimity toward youthful experience. One trend of central importance involved the movement of young persons, especially boys in their teens, in and out of their parental homes.

If we look at autobiographical documents from that period, we find a sequence of comings and goings most often on a seasonal basis. Boys of all ages were expected to be at home during the summers in order to help their families with the heavy work of farming. But in winter and spring they might well go off to look for work elsewhere in activities such as lumbering, fishing, or clerking in the commercial towns that were growing so rapidly during this period.

Sometimes too they would go to school for a while, though education was for most people a very irregular process.

The result of all this was a new and complex web of youthful experience — in part autonomous and self-contained and in part still bound by taut cords of blood and community.

One scholar has recently characterized this trend by the term "semi-dependency." From the standpoint of the youth themselves the change must have been very unsettling. For a long period, a young man was virtually on his own, obliged simply to send back money to his family. Yet, the old lines of familial subordination still applied. The young were expected, in all things, to defer to their elders and especially to their parents.

Let me illustrate the substance of these norms with a single quotation taken from a letter by a father in a small town in Maine to his twenty-five-year-old son who was then living temporarily in Boston:

> I am afraid that you do not exercise enough to keep you in good health and spirits, and to remedy that difficulty as much as possible I should like to have you retire to rest by nine and rise certainly by five in the morning, and take a long walk in the morning air at least one hour every morning when it is suitable weather.
>
> Don't neglect this because I think this is most important.

Such instructions might, I think, have been quite plausible in a different cultural setting, basically an earlier one, even for twenty-five-year-old sons. But in this case, the young man had been living on his own for a good long time.

In fact, the period of the nineteenth century can be seen as a time of general confusion or at least of reshuffling in social expectations as to age-appropriate behavior.

In some respects there were new elements of youthful precocity. The average age of religious conversion, for example, seems now to have begun a steep decline. In the excitement of recurrent religious revival there was pressure on the young, especially on boys and girls in their teens, to declare a personal experience of salvation.

Politics was another form of excitement in the life of the new nation. By the 1820's and '30's, political debate and struggle had become major preoccupations for Americans everywhere, and if we look to political activity on the local level we often find children and teenagers present as spectators or even as participants in limited ways.

Moreover, we know that the young continued to be exposed to the emotional concerns of their elders. Autobiographical accounts show their attendance, for example, at various deathbed scenes, and here is a brief representative case.

> Then my kind uncle opened up one of the coffins and let me see how decayed the body had become, and told me that my brother Edward's body

> was going to decay in a similar manner and at last become like the dust of the earth.

This may seem shocking to us but, in fact, I think it serves vividly to measure the distance in certain respects between their world and our own.

Now in a setting where four-year-olds were encouraged to examine decaying corpses while twenty-five-year-olds were advised by their fathers as to the minute particulars of their daily experience — in such a setting we may feel that age norms of all kinds were rather loosely maintained, and this impression certainly has much truth in it.

It was in education that the tensions and conflicts around issues of authority over youth revealed themselves most fully. In schools and colleges there was a minute concern with rules and regulations.

The pattern — or rather the non-pattern — can be seen with particular clarity in the records of school attendance. In virtually all the schools of the period students of widely different ages were mixed up together, usually in a single classroom. For example, a little academy in Massachusetts in 1831 reported a total enrollment of 20 pupils and gave their ages as follows: One student each of 12, 13, 14 and 15 years old. Two of 16, three of 17, one each of 18 and 19, two each of 20 and 21, one of 23 and one of 25.

There is no record of the teacher's age in this case but given what is known of similar schools it could well have been as low as 20. We can imagine that the regular maintenance of order and authority might have become quite problematic under such conditions.

In fact, it was in the field of education that the tensions and conflicts around issues of authority over youth revealed themselves most fully. On the one hand we find in the schools, and especially in the colleges, of this period a minute concern with rules and regulations. Most colleges put out elaborate manuals of conduct which students were expected to learn by heart.

These manuals covered a broad range of topics: study hours, dress, forms and places of recreation and above all, attitudes of deference towards authority.

At Yale, for example, the rules said that students must not wear hats within five rods distance of tutors and eight rods of professors.

Everywhere there was an elaborate system of punishment. Yet, it was one thing to declare the rules and even to punish infractions of them, but it was quite another thing to secure from the students underlying attitudes of compliance. And, when we look at the record of student life and behavior in these colleges, we gain a very different impression.

The early nineteenth century was the great age of student rebellions — the tumultuous events of the 1960's notwithstanding. Fistfights between students and professors, riots over food and lodging conditions, not to mention frequent duels among the students themselves — such troubles became a commonplace of nineteenth century college life.

In fact, as early as the 1760's, Yale had been wracked by years of continuous rebellion which eventually forced the college president to resign. At Brown University in the 1820's students were given to stoning the president's house on a nightly basis.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, urban youth was increasingly characterized by the not young as a social problem.

At the University of Virginia in the 1830's there was a particularly long and violent insurrection culminating in the murder by students of a senior professor. The list could easily be lengthened if time and interest permitted, but the basic point should already be clear. The strenuous disposition to force compliance on the one side, and the urge to rebel on the other, suggests that all authority relations were somehow undermined.

Circumstances had reduced the capacity of the older generation to provide the young with leadership, with guidance, with help of various kinds. The young, while still expected in theory to follow their elders, were in fact faced with new and difficult choices to be made largely on their own.

This factor of choice was now emerging as essential to a broad range of youthful experience — choice of occupation, choice of residence, choice of values, of friends, of spouse. Questions which in traditional communities had been more or less decided *for* young people were increasingly matters of individual consideration.

And, where the alternatives were immediately juxtaposed, such choices and questions could be painful indeed. The predicament of a boy named Smith, age 15, during a series of intense revivals in upstate New York was fairly typical; again I quote:

> The whole country seemed affected by religious commotion and great multitudes united themselves with the different religious parties which created no small stir among the people, some crying, "Lo, here," and others, "Lo, there." Some were contending for the Methodist faith, some for the Presbyterians and some for the Baptists.

Now the boy who recalled and wrote about this experience later on felt great uneasiness and confusion and spent many hours in the woods near his home praying for guidance.

I've said that the predicament was typical, but its resolution in this case was rather unusual. Eventually the boy received his answer. An angel appeared instructing him not to join any of the competing sects but instead to found a newer and truer religion of his own.

And thus was born that quintessentially American church known to later generations as the Mormons, with young Joseph Smith in the role of founding prophet.

By the middle of the nineteenth century it was clear that these various pressures bearing in on the lives of youth had a specific locus, the new and bewildering environment of the city. Here the choices, the temptations all converged, and urban youth was increasingly characterized by the not-young as a social problem.

A famous book about children in the 1850's and '60's was entitled significantly, *The Dangerous Classes of New York*. But not all of the young people of the city were openly dangerous. Many were themselves in danger, and in direct response there sprang up a whole new genre of sermons, lectures, published books and essays, the genre of advice to youth.

These materials, whose remnants now lie gathering dust on hundreds of shelves in old libraries across the country, epitomized both the problem of mid-century youth and the dominant cultural strategy for responding to that problem.

The problem in a nutshell was how to choose well and wisely from among the infinite possibilities thrown up by urban life. The response was moral integrity and above all what counselors call "decision of character." Uncertainty and vacillation must give way to willed decision. Here was the central message, and if this message now sounds a little thin and trite, it must then have struck some resonant chords, for it was widely and endlessly repeated.

We come now to the final part of my little historical model, a period covering the last three or four decades of the nineteenth century. This in fact takes us right up to the climax of G. Stanley Hall's career and the dawning of the modern concept of adolescence.

I will speak only briefly about this period for my time is growing short, and the crux of the story is, I think, already clear.

Many sectors of American life in the late nineteenth century were characterized by what one scholar has called "a search for order," and this same impulse did, I think, directly affect the experience of youth. The effort was made in many ways to channel and organize the jarring influence of a generation or two earlier.

Consider, for example, the field of education. It was in this period that our nationwide system of public schools assumed definitive shape. It was then and only then that primary schools and high schools emerged as distinct institutional entities.

What this meant among other things was an end to the old pattern of mixing ages in the schools and henceforth the young would be separated into grades as they passed through their student years.

Henceforth, development was subject to a kind of social processing, with schools as the key institutional device and with other institutions also playing a part.

But the efforts of schools in this connection were complemented by trends internal to families. The earlier forms of semi-dependency whereby youth moved back and forth between family settings and the wider community gradually disappeared.

Henceforth youth was to be a time of fuller and fuller and longer and longer dependency. Demographic change also played a role. The birth rate had been falling throughout the century so that the average size of family was reduced by about half.

The result was a new style of careful, highly self-conscious parenting. Another scholar finds in this period a whole ethos of "intensive family life." Mothers, in particular, were expected to direct all their energies to individualized nurture of their children.

The larger impulse which underlies all this activity, whether in domestic life or education or whatever, was to create a systematically planned environment for the young. Youth might then progress in a more orderly fashion toward the great goal of adulthood, bypassing insofar as possible the perils and pitfalls along the way.

In a sense the outcome of these trends was a broad-gauged standardization of youthful experience. Henceforth development was subject to a kind of social processing with schools as the key institutional device and with other institutions also playing a part.

There were, for example, new organizations devoted to the improvement of both morals and practical skills in the young—the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, the YMCA, the YWCA and so forth.

Adolescent fashions in dress, in recreation, in speech and social mannerisms reflected the same sort of trend. Indeed, it is to this period around the turn of the century that we can trace the appearance of a "youth subculture" with features that are familiar to all of us today.

The effort to standardize the life of young people was ambivalent in motive and complex in result. On the one hand there was some intention to constrain precisely those elements of experience which seemed most youthful — the adventuresomeness, the opportunity to sample a wide range of behavior styles and beliefs and values.

On the other hand, there was implicit recognition that adolescence was a bona fide life stage with its own particular requirements; and insofar as the standardizing tendency brought young people together in specially contrived settings of one sort or another, it greatly accentuated peer-group consciousness.

To be an adolescent was to share with others of similar age not only a developmental position but also a social status. This is to say, in other words, that many adolescents found themselves caught up in what Erikson calls "identity diffusion" of a sort hardly conceivable during earlier periods. The process of deciding who one was, what one wanted to be and how one's particular character would intersect with the social order — here was a labyrinth of personal and social complexities. Perhaps there are other psychological perspectives that one can also bring to bear on this and I'm sure some of you are better qualified than I to canvass them. For the moment, I would simply like to conclude by suggesting what, I suppose, in the broader sense is the moral of this somewhat long and tortuous story, namely, that the experience of people passing through this life stage, ages 14 to 24 — as indeed is true for people in all life stages — is itself in motion through time; historical circumstance, historical pressures, the whole momentum of history in one way or another are likely to change the contours within which each one of us as an individual is able to experience the passage through any particular part of the life course, including this one.

Maybe the term adolescence, and all the connotations the term has for us today, will no longer seem sufficient as time goes on.

One of the things that I have tried to present for you in these remarks is the way in which the concept of adolescence arose, and I leave it as a somewhat less clear, but I still think basically supportable proposition, that not only the concept but in many respects the experience of adolescence was something new that began let's say a century or a century and a half ago. This raises the further question whether, as we move into the future, we may come to still newer and different ways of experiencing passage through this same chronological portion of the life span.

Indeed, the term adolescence is, I suspect, a term that would come most readily to mind for dealing with this period in the life span today. Maybe that term, maybe all the conceptual apparatus, maybe all the connotations the term has for us, will no longer seem sufficient as time goes on. I am reminded in this connection—I wish I had been reminded a few days ago and I would have done some more homework—I am reminded of the essay by Ken Keniston whom some of you may know. Some years ago, it appeared originally in the *American Scholar*. It was called "Youth as a New Stage of Life." In that essay, Keniston, in fact, revived the old term, youth, the term that was, as I said, customary in talking about this time of life in the colonial period, but he revived it in a rather special context. He was suggesting, in effect, that we really need to conceptualize another stage of experience between what we think of as adolescence and adulthood proper.

He developed a rather interesting list of some of the central characteristics, issues, and so forth, of what he called this new stage of youth. Speaking as a historian, I feel that one of the things that seems to happen as history moves along over a long span of time is that our sense of the life course and indeed perhaps of our experience of the life course becomes increasingly differentiated. Where before there were four stages, now there are six or seven or eight. And maybe the number will continue to increase. It seems likely that the process cannot continue indefinitely, but in the near future, anyway, it may be that we will need new ways to think about our experience passing through these years.

Discussion

Leonard Duhl: One thing that's fascinating to me is that I am not sure that all of the young people I have been dealing with have had the same history that you are talking about. As you pointed out, you are talking about middle-class American youth. We often maintain that our history has been an attempt to standardize the experience of youth so that we can bring people from multiple cultures into a relatively standard culture. And yet, as I look at all of the youth that I know now, whether in college, in the streets of Oakland or any other place, I find entirely different histories. The history of their adolescence, whether they are American Indians or blacks or what have you, seems to be very different. I haven't been able to find, anyplace, good histories of any of the other cultures except modern American middle-class. I would like to know where some of this history might be.

Demos: Well, it doesn't exist in printed form where you could readily put your hands on it. One of the difficulties a historian faces is getting all the materials. One thing about middle-class people is that they write, and they have for a long time. They tell you some of what is going on in their lives. They have the time, the money, the leisure, and the access to printing presses to produce the documents on which, alas, most historical scholarship is based. This is not to say, however, that groups a little apart from the middle class are not beginning to be heard from. Recently, for example, history of black family experiences has become a very lively and interesting vein of historical scholarship. There have been several big new books dealing, at least in part, with the black family. I have looked so far without much result for ideas in those books about the life cycle in general and adolescent experience in particular. It's not really there, but I would expect that once the groundwork of understanding about black family life in general is laid down, then we may get some refinements in the direction of studies of things like adolescence.

Alfred Kahn: John, I wanted to raise a similar question. Apart from the ethnicity issue, is there not a social class issue? I have had the privilege of reading Keniston and some of your work. I appreciate the beautiful job you did in summarizing it for us. But I have also read *Youth and History*, by John R. Gillis. There seems to be a story there that has to do with social class and stratification, at least in Europe. Is that applicable here?

Demos: Well, I think there is definitely a sense in which a large part of the impetus to channel and organize and standardize youthful experience began in the late nineteenth century. In short, the founders of the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts, for instance, were certainly concerned not only to kind of control and constrain the lives of their own middle-class young people, but also, and probably more particularly, to somehow bring into the fold and reduce to some sort of standardized pattern, the young people of other ethnic, racial, and class groups, too.

I do think that one of the interesting things about the nineteenth century part of the story is the way the middle-class youth in itself seemed dangerous and potentially out of control. But then, I think as the story moved along, the effort became not only to control the middle-class kids but also to find ways to embrace them under the same broad umbrella of organizations—ethnic and lower class youth, and so on.

Paul Bohannan: While we're at this, John, let's broaden our perspective a little bit further, because your description of the early seventeenth century and eighteenth century situation is a variation of a very broad pattern which is recognizable from peasant societies in Africa in the twentieth century, and it may have some resemblance to what it was like to grow up in a hunting and gathering society. Unfortunately, we have very little information on this. However, the Harvard people who are studying the Kalahari Bushmen have made some interesting observations about them. Growing up in that kind of society was, again, very very different if for no other reason than that they lacked peer groups. The type of community—and hence the context for human development—underwent a sea change at the time of the agricultural revolution and another at the time of the industrial revolution. We have a whole variety of patterns in today's world, associated not only with different geographically distinct societies, but with ethnic groups and other culturally distinct part-groups in complex societies.

John Schweppe: John, may I make a comment on your reference to the trend, over the past two centuries, toward earlier maturation? When I went through the Tower of London, the armor I saw there would fit a man about five feet four inches tall. The men who wore the armor were really very small. And I think we can say that in the last 50 or 75 years our general population has increased considerably in stature. One wonders why this has happened. Is it a genetic manifestation? Is it purely a nutritional event? I don't think anybody can answer for sure, because we weren't doing that kind of research back in the 1850's, but I think we can say that nutrition certainly must have played a pretty prominent role.

One other thing you said raises some questions. Many of the families you mentioned had eight or nine children. They would end up having 50 percent or less by the time of puberty, for the simple reason that pneumonia and other diseases killed off a lot of children. Today we are interfering with Darwinian Law in the sense that by the use of modern antibiotics and modern means of medicine, we are preserving children who otherwise would not be able to survive; we are changing the patterns of adaptation. I just leave that open for whatever one wants to think about it, but really, medicine, in a sense, has changed the patterns of Darwinian development of the human being for the foreseeable future, and will continue to do so.

June Christmas: A couple of thoughts occur to me in relation to eighteenth and nineteenth century African-American adolescence. One, even though there aren't many first-hand reports by people in that stage of life, we do have a number of reports of older people who described what life was like and what children and adolescents did. And I wonder if we might not be able, in reviewing some of them—particularly those that appear in written documents and those that came at the end of the nineteenth century in the form of first-hand oral histories—to get some sense of what the historical determinants of slavery have been on present-day African-American life.

The other point that struck me is that the adolescents John Demos talked about were able to make some kind of work choice, but work for the adolescent slave was a given. It did not necessarily provide a sense of accomplishment. It had, in fact, quite a reverse connotation. I also found myself thinking that today there are many adolescents who cannot visualize work as a possibility for the future. It simply isn't available to them. That is a part of present history just as condemnation to work for somebody else was part and parcel of the history of adolescent slaves.

Demos: Yes. You have suggested that the change in the fundamentals of experience for black youth over the past 150 years, from slavery time to the present — the sheer amount of change — must have been fully as great although quite different in its particulars, as has been the case of middle-class youth coming from the small farms to the city or suburban environments, and I think you are absolutely right. It's only recently that historical scholars have begun to discover and use the wealth of material of one sort or another about the black experience during slavery. It's only a beginning, but I hope there will be more of it.

Sidney Werkman: One of the themes that was most powerful to me in the excellent history you gave us, John, was the introduction of order and standardization in the nineteenth century. That seemed to be concurrent with a decrease in any concern with the essence of man. One of the things that is most fascinating to me about our increasingly pluralistic society is what indeed are the deeply shared ideas that allow it to function. It does sound as though the nineteenth century, and perhaps the early twentieth, with their tremendous velocity of change — the scientific revolution, industrialization and all the rest — left us without that long and powerful sense that history has given us of what human nature is. It's as if with the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century we stopped being moralists. Instead, a lot of other people came in — psychiatrists, psychologists, and so forth — to ask questions that had been essentially moral questions from the beginning of civilization.

Demos: I think that the beginning of the story of standardization, which is so central to our society today, is really found way back in the nineteenth century. In fact, I think it could even be argued that the second half of the nineteenth century was the time of greatest pluralistic development in this country — that to a degree, anyway, the various efforts and mechanisms of standardization which were put into place in the late nineteenth century plus the development of a mass-production, mass-consumption system in the twentieth century have narrowed the range of pluralism, at least in contrast to what it was earlier. The mid-nineteenth century was a time when in some very deep-seated way, Americans felt that their world was flying apart in all directions and that all order had broken up, the moral order particularly, as you said. Although this was perceived as a very liberating kind of situation, opening up a sort of success myth, it was also very frightening.

Since that time, I think you could read a lot of things around the theme of an attempt to put some limits on experience. Much of the concern with pluralism — with infinite choice and so on — has always zeroed in on the age group we are talking about.

Terry Saario: Could you expand on that, John, and talk a bit about sexual expectations and whether they became more rigid between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or whether they became a little more elastic?

Demos: I think that in the nineteenth century there was a massive increase in sexual and—what sociologists call sex-role—stereotyping. During the period I'm most familiar with—the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—sex roles, while they certainly existed, were not a matter of terribly rigid or self-conscious experience for most people. Male and female roles, broadly speaking, overlapped at many points. Work was, in many sectors, shared. Social experience was substantially shared and so forth and so on. I'm struck by some of the little things. For example, in seventeenth century court cases you will often find assault and battery—cases of open interpersonal conflict between male and female. A woman fights with a man, over a cow, where part of a stone fence has been knocked down.

When you get to the nineteenth century, all that has suddenly become inconceivable. From that point on, men and women are thought to occupy entirely different spheres, which is really saying they have entirely different characters, that they are different species of being, and all that stuff.

I think there has been some retreat from the extreme sex-role stereotyping of the nineteenth century for a good two or three generations now, and that it has accelerated over the last fifteen years. But there was certainly a massive change in the nineteenth century.

Ernest Bartell: One of the things that occurred to me, John, was that many of the changes in the life experiences of young people during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries coincided with changes in our economy. In Colonial times, for example, we had a self-sufficient, agrarian economy, and dependency was confined largely within the family. With the growth of exchange and marketing, trade was growing so the dependency shifted somewhat from dependency in the household to dependency on an interdependent kind of market economy, and the youth got caught a little bit in that growth period—that is, they went out of the home to earn a cash income, but still returned some of the income home. That was part of the growth of market specialization. Now, this type of market evolution leads to a certain degree of standardization, too, because the technology that came along then was designed for economies of scale, that is, to realize the most gains from larger-scale production and trade. Some of the social standardizing was quite consistent with the standardizing of jobs to achieve the economies of larger-scale production, which was centered in cities. There was a certain standardizing of economic roles all along which I suspect contributed to the social standardization. In the economic development theory, you move finally to the wonderful age of mass consumption.

Presumably, in a finely tuned, well-working interdependent kind of market economy where all the economies of scale have been achieved, one finally moves to great freedom of choice, and that should restore autonomy at the consumption level. We are seeing some of that, I think, in the kind of recent youth culture at the consumption level. The trouble is that at the producer's level, the dependency thing became very difficult as we moved into a less labor-intensive kind of economy. It was hard to find jobs for young people, so in more recent times, we have had an economic tension between the dependency of young people who are not being productive — not getting into the productive process — while the consumption possibilities for a while, were very, very broad and very great. This left young people facing an identity confusion in finding themselves. So there is a certain economic foundation to some changes in the life experience of young people. Maybe I haven't made it clear, but it's there.

Robert Aldrich: I just wanted to flag an issue that is going to be talked about a great deal more, and that's the issue of cities. I think one of the things that's happened is that most of the American cities were designed by white, middle-class males for the kinds of people who were going to live in them during the latter part of the nineteenth century. A misfit now exists in trying to accommodate the female of the species — in trying to make the city function for her or for blacks or for American Indians or Chicano populations. The misfit for many of our cities is profound. When you stop and think about the capital investment in these misfits and how much it would cost to make changes, it poses an issue of such size that it almost fits in the energy crisis category, it's that big.

Later on, I'll talk a little bit about some of the things they are doing in Toronto, which I think are at least a step in the appropriate direction, but I wanted to just flag this issue so we can come back to it, because it really affects this age group profoundly.

Demos: I suppose the further irony is that the cities that were designed in a mistaken way by white, middle-class males have now been deserted by many of the same white, middle-class people.

Demographic Considerations

Arthur J. Norton
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Bureau of the Census

Now we move from the historical perspective to a demographic perspective, and it should be understood that demographic considerations reflect social, economic, psychological, technological and political developments, because the disposition of people to behave in certain ways relative to what I am going to be principally concentrating on — marriage, fertility, education and the labor force — is unalterably bound to the social and cultural sanctions that are imposed by the institutions that I just mentioned.

> **I could describe the 14-to-24 year age span as the age of preparation for labor-force entry, the age of transition from youth to adult, and the age of sexual differentiation — the age when diverging routes are taken by young men and women regarding education, marriage, career, and so on.**

I would not presume — no sane person would — to be able to speak intelligently on cause and effect relationships of these many diverse interacting forces. I merely want to call your attention to the fact that a series of complex interactions do create behavioral patterns that provide interesting data for social and demographic analysis. I always find it necessary to qualify my remarks in such a general manner before launching into a monologue on the demographic developments influencing any age-group segment of the human life course.

Last year we considered the 25-to-40 year segment, which I cleverly described as the age of application. Well, with equal cleverness, I could describe the 14-to-24-year age span as the age of preparation for labor-force entry, the age of transition from youth to adult, and the age of sexual differentiation — the age when diverging routes are taken by young men and women regarding education, marriage, career, and so on.

What I would like to do very briefly is trace relevant demographic developments from the entry into and the exit from the age range of 14 to 24. That range, by the way, is the one the Census Bureau uses in gathering and reporting data on the young people we are talking about at this conference.

John Demos covered three centuries in his remarks, but I am going to confine myself to developments since 1960. But don't feel disappointed. There have been many dramatic developments since that time, and certain demographic patterns for the future have begun to emerge.

Let me begin by giving you some numbers. There are 45 million young people in this age group, and they represent 21 percent of the total U.S. population. About 37 percent of them are under 18, and about 67 percent are from 18 to 24. By the year 2000 this age group will diminish in importance in terms of numbers to a little more than 15 percent of the total population. So, we are talking about a straddling age group. The older members are the tail end of the "baby boom" cohort, and the younger ones represent the beginning of what is called the "baby bust" cohort.

Table 2 on the following page, and the chart on page 32, show the relative size of the 14-24 age group in relation to the rest of the U.S. population.

Historical contingencies have an important impact on the life experiences of people in all age groups, and those in the 14-to-24 age group are no exception. The older members, because of their sheer numbers, are relatively disadvantaged. They are in fierce competition with one another for education, jobs, and other opportunities for advancement. The younger members, because they are fewer in number, are relatively better off.

Since an individual's sense of worth, security, and self-prognosis for success may influence him or her to act in a certain manner, at least

Table 2

Age Structure of the U.S. Population, July 1, 1979
(Includes Armed Forces Overseas)

Age Group	Number	Percent Distribution
Under 5	15,649,000	7.1%
5 to 13	30,647,000	13.9
14 to 17	16,276,000	7.4
18 to 24	29,285,000	13.3
25 to 34	35,024,000	15.9
35 to 44	25,136,000	11.4
45 to 54	22,957,000	10.4
55 to 64	20,952,000	9.5
65 years and over	24,658,000	11.2
Total	220,584,000	100.0%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census

some of the actions of young people in recent years may be a result of the failure of society's institutions to satisfy the needs of an unusually large age group. A general sense of insecurity among the "baby boom" members of the age group may very well be one reason for the recent rise in crime, victimization, and divorce rates.

> **An increasing number of young people are experimenting with what might be called "independent living." This may be seen as a transitional phase, and it may become the norm for young adults in the future.**

Some new young adult behavior patterns which may last and be beneficial to society have also occurred, again in part because of the unique situation of the "baby boom" cohort. Included among recent changes have been a delay in the age at which young adults marry for the first time and an increase in the incidence of young adults leaving the parental home to establish non-family living arrangements prior to entering into family responsibilities of their own. This independent living phase may be seen as transitional and may become the norm for young adults in the future.

Distribution of the Total U.S. Population By Age and Sex

(1970 and 1978)



Source: *Current Population Report*. Series P-25, No. 800, Bureau of the Census, April 1979.

Back to the demography of the 14-to-24-year olds. Young people at ages 14–17 are relatively homogeneous with respect to generally descriptive demographic characteristics. Ninety-four percent are enrolled in school; 98 percent have never married; 99 percent live in families — usually in a child status. Labor force and fertility activity are negligible in an aggregate sense.

As we move to a consideration of the next segment (18–24 years), changes begin to become apparent. School enrollment drops and other pursuits signal the movement to what we call adulthood. Forty-five percent of 18 and 19 year olds are in school, a level which drops to 22 percent for the 20-to-24 year olds; in 1978, 80 percent of the 18-to-24 group were high school graduates with 30 percent of the graduates enrolled in college. Men and women are enrolled at equal rates compared with a 60/40 overrepresentation of men among college students a decade ago.

These developments, along with the delay in marriage and the increase in independent living for young adults, seem to indicate that these people and their successors may be better equipped for later life challenges than their predecessors were.

> **There has been a lessening of distinction between men and women with respect to their social and economic roles, and this is another in a series of crucial considerations that must be taken into account when reflecting upon implications for the future.**

One of the most important demographic developments of recent years has been a decline in the fertility and birth expectations of women 18 to 24 years old. Data on labor force participation give another indication of change; 76 percent of men and 62 percent of women 16 to 24 were in the labor force in 1978. The rate for men has remained unchanged during the last decade, while that for women has increased by 47 percent. Also, for women, going to school has replaced keeping house as the main reason for not working.

Other important statistics reflecting the current status of 14-to-24-year-olds are: 12 percent live in poverty; 13 percent are black, and close to 30 percent of the blacks are in poverty.

However, the very basic changes I have described regarding marriage, living arrangements, fertility, education, and labor force activity have occurred among the various social and economic strata. These changes indicate that a new transition system — or rite of passage — is emerging, enabling young adults to more adequately prepare for greater responsibilities, family and otherwise. Since there is less pressure to conform to social pressures, there is more time for selectivity, experimentation, and rational planning for future roles.

Speaking of roles, one of the interesting features of the changes I have described is that there has been a lessening of distinction between men and women with respect to their social and economic roles — another in a series of crucial considerations that must be taken into account when reflecting upon implications for the future. Indeed, the pattern for much of the future — individually and collectively — is established during this developmental phase of the life span.

Discussion

Robert Aldrich: Do you have any recent statistics on single-parent families?

Norton: Yes, we do. Some of them were published recently in the journal of the Elementary School Principals.

Aldrich: The reason I asked is that the needs of people in single-parent families are being very badly met. We don't have very many models on how to do this reasonably well, and it seems to me that this is an area that we should again flag here. There is need for research as well as direct action.

Norton: Well, about 11 million children live in single-parent family situations. That's about two out of every ten children under the age of 18. For blacks it's more like five out of ten. I should point out that these are what we call period statistics — that is, statistics that come from a snapshot of the population taken at a given point in time. They show highly transitional statuses.

Willard Wirtz: What were those figures ten years ago?

Norton: As I recall, the figures for 1970 were 5.6 million single-parent families, with probably 7 million children.

Alfred Kahn: It's interesting to me that we have 11 million children in single-parent families, and we have about 7¼ or 7½ million children

— with about 3 million mothers — receiving Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children. That suggests that we do have the model Bob Aldrich was talking about. It's AFDC.

June Christmas: The aggregate statistics you gave us about children living in one-parent families were dramatic. But the difference between the overall population and the black population is even more dramatic. It seems to me that every time we hear statistics that are overall we don't really get enough of a picture to allow those of us who are interested in policy and in programs to get a true sense of what it means to be in certain social and economic situations. For example, there are still black male college graduates who earn only what white male high school graduates earn. That is very revealing. I think it would be very helpful if we could get more data broken down in a way that allows us to see what the reality of life is for a lot of people. It doesn't come across as vividly when you look at the overall statistics.

Norton: Such data are available in a very descriptive way, but there is no question about the differentials you mentioned. Unfortunately, we haven't really devoted much time and effort to gathering qualitative data that would highlight the differences. We just haven't had the money to do it.

John Demos: One point specifically. What is the new work that is just now getting started? Can you describe it for us?

Norton: It's called the Survey of Income and Program Participation. It's being funded by HEW and we're currently pretesting it on 12,000 households. It's a longitudinal survey that will follow the same individuals for five consecutive calendar quarters collecting social and economic information at each of the five interviews.

Sidney Werkman: Getting back to single-parent families — are they unusually mobile?

Norton: Yes, but they don't tend to move very far. They are mobile within a small geographic area.

Leonard Duhl: Do you have any data on the legal and illegal migration from Mexico into the United States, and particularly into California? There have been estimates that there will be 30 million Mexicans in this country within a short time, which is more than there are blacks at present. The governor of California claims that there will be a Mexican governor in California within ten years.

Norton: We don't have that kind of data. We at the Census Bureau don't differentiate between so-called legal and illegal people. We try to count everybody. We go to great extremes to avoid prying. We just want to know how many people there are at a given point in time at a given place.

Duhl: At Berkeley we're beginning to see a shift in admissions. In searching for quality admissions at the University it is now easier to get qualified Chicanos than it is to get qualified blacks. That represents a rapid shift in the last ten years, and it's going to change a lot of things.

Vivian McCoy: Do you have any data about the career expectations of people in this age group?

Norton: To my knowledge, we have very little information on expectations, but we do have data on labor force participation among young couples. It's about 75 percent joint participation.

Philip Blumstein: Can you say anything about the data you have on household arrangements — specifically focusing on heterosexual couples living together without marriage?

Norton: Not what you would call hard data. We simply go and ask who's living here. Sometimes we find a household that contains two adults who are not related to each other and not married to each other. And there the matter rests. However, the number of heterosexuals living together has doubled since 1970 — from about 500,000 in 1970, to about 1.1 million in 1978. So there has unquestionably been an increase in cohabiting couples. Sometimes it's economically based and sometimes it's not. If we look at the data within that 1.1 million couples there are something on the order of 200,000 to 300,000 who have children under 14 living with them.

Blumstein: You don't ask about maternity of those children?

Norton: Not specifically.

John Cannon: Do you ask questions about religion?

Norton: No.

Willard Wirtz: Let me ask a question in two forms and you take your choice. They both involve the degree of confidence you feel in the data on employment and unemployment. In one form the question would be how much confidence do you feel in the monthly figure which reports unemployment among black 16-to-19-year olds? The broader form of the question would be how much in general can we trust the aggregation of any of the figures on employment between the ages of 16 and 24?

Norton: That's a tough question, and it's a little bit outside of my bailiwick because the data you mentioned are analyzed and published by the Department of Labor. However, I'll try to answer it as best I can. My guess is that in terms of measuring change, the employment-unemployment figures are pretty good, but in terms of measuring what the situation actually is at a given point in time they're not so good. My hunch is that this also applies to the age, sex, and racial breakdowns.

Wirtz: But even in terms of measuring change, isn't the sample so small that the change itself becomes suspect?

Norton: You may be right. I just don't know. But the sample has to be small in order to make monthly reporting possible.

McCoy: Do you have any data on students in the 18-to-24 age group who are married?

Norton: Yes. Each October we take a survey of school enrollment by age, by race, and by whether the students are married or not married. I'm not sure of the exact figures, but the number of married students is declining.

Demos: But so is the number of marriages.

Norton: True.

Demos: If my sample of my own graduate students is any good, I would say there's been a very major change between a time as recently as ten years ago, when the majority of them were married, to the present, when virtually none of them are.

Norton: That's an interesting point. There have been all kinds of dramatic changes in our demographic profile over the past ten years.

Demos: I would like to press you on the "transitional independent living" trend you mentioned. I think you suggested rather briefly that maybe there were some good things about this new pattern. You talked about options. Perhaps ultimately it may be a better way of preparing for what lies ahead at the next stage of life, but I wonder whether this independent living pattern is, in fact, transitional. Is it really intended to prepare people for what lies ahead, or is that merely what they tell you?

Norton: Let me start out by saying that the one thing that's held up over time in terms of being highly correlated with eventual divorce is early age of marriage. Income, education, and other factors don't hold up. So, for a growing number of young people, living together before marriage is a way of finding out what marriage is like before committing themselves to the real thing. But, we don't have any data on how many of these couples eventually get married to each other.

Sheila Kamerman: If 20 to 24 is the most typical age of divorce for women, and there's a delay in marriage, are we seeing any delay in the time at which women are likely to get divorced?

Norton: Not yet, but the duration of marriage before divorce has been declining.

Donald King: Is there any way to do a longitudinal study on the 1.1 million unmarried people who are living together? For example, among those who eventually married, did the divorce rate go down because they had more experience?

Norton: That's a good subject for further research. We just haven't had the money to pursue it.

Blumstein: I'd like to respond to Don King's question about the 1.1 million who are living together. I've done research in a related field and it was inconclusive because we couldn't get adequate data. It seems to me that the Bureau of the Census is in a unique position to gather it. The census people have the legal power to intrude on people's privacy. They certainly have the moral authority to require people to respond to their questions.

Norton: We don't have the legal authority. We are mandated by other federal agencies and sometimes by legislative acts to collect certain kinds of information. Generally, respondents are not legally required to cooperate in surveys. But we can't go beyond the seven items asked of 100 percent of the population unless we have a special mandate to require compulsory response.

Cannon: Do you have with you any family income data that would shed some light on the whole question of dependency? For example, how dependent — or independent — is a young person who works part time while going to school or who works only intermittently?

Norton: Unfortunately, I don't.

Ernest Bartell: What about income data for the unmarried people who are living together? Do you have any data about the extent to which they are dependent on each other's income?

Norton: I have no real information on dependency.

Cannon: One question that really interests me is when is our social/economic system ready to adjust to the young adult? Another is what happens when the young person suddenly leaves the fold, and has to adjust to a lower standard of living?

Young People as Individuals and as Family Members: The Implications for Public Policy

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There are two things you ought to know before I begin my remarks. The first is that I'm basically a social policy analyst, which means that my approach is multidisciplinary and my primary interest is in questions of public policy. The second is that my major focus is on youth in western industrialized societies, including, but not limited to, the United States.

I don't have a prepared text, but for the benefit of those of you who like a neat and orderly outline, let me say that I will be making three main points. The first is the lack of clarity regarding the parameters of this age group that we're talking about. People define "youth" very differently, using very different ages to denote the beginning and end of this period. The second point that I'm going to discuss is the need for us to think about every cohort of youth in its own historical time. When we talk about the current 14-to-24 age group, we must remember that the young people in it are far different from the young people of a generation ago. And the third thing that I'll talk about is the need to begin to interject some family-related considerations into our discussion in order to be able to raise some very significant questions for public policy.

Let me illustrate some of the problems in defining the parameters of the youth population. I'll begin with the Census Bureau definition: youth is the age group from age 14 to 24. Parenthetically, I might mention that even in Census data it depends upon which current population series you look at. Some publications refer to those aged 15 to 24. The bureau's latest statistics define youth as the group from 16 to 24, subdivided into two groups, 16–20 and 20–24. Legal majority in this country varies among the states. Usually it's either 18 or 21. Voting age, needless to say, is 18. If you look at other specific items of federal legislation there are even more variations. The Runaway Youth Act defines youth as those under 18. The Youth Employment Demonstration Act applies to youths up to 21. The Adolescent Pregnancy Act covers youths of 17 and under. If you read articles by experts on the teenage pregnancy problem, some people talk about girls under the age of 19 but others talk about those under the age of 15.

The three most significant tasks of youth are leaving the parental home, entering the job market on a regular and permanent basis, and forming a new family. Although these tasks tend to be completed at different times by different people, they tend to be completed by the time young people reach the age of 25.

Clearly we're not addressing the whole question of the onset of puberty; that usually happens before the age of 14. Webster's Dictionary defines youth as "that part of life which follows childhood and precedes maturity." In social policy analysis we usually find it easier to identify a chronological age, simply because legislation has to be specific about who is eligible for whatever it is that is going to be provided.

One of the most consistent criteria that can be used for indicating the beginning of youth is the school-leaving age. In the United States it's 16 and in most European countries it's either 16 or 15. But when we turn to the question of when youth ends, the task is far more complicated, because that varies enormously among different countries.

Basically, the tasks of youth have to do with completing certain transitions. The three most significant ones are leaving the parental home, entering the labor force on a regular and permanent basis, and forming a new family. In general, although these tasks are completed at different times by different people they tend to be completed by the time young people become 25. In effect, however, there is no consistent definition of what youth is, but for policy purposes we can probably assume that the group 16 to 24 is the central age group that we're talking about.

Now we come to the second point that I wanted to make—the need to remember that just as individuals have their own individual life experiences within a historical context, so does a cohort.

Very briefly I would like to identify what I think are some of the most significant aspects of the historical and social context in which the current population of youth has grown up. As Arthur Norton pointed out, some of the young people in this cohort are members of the "baby boom" cohort and others are members of the "baby bust" cohort. There are major implications to this and I'll return to them in a moment. First let me talk about the historical and social context.

> **This is a group that has grown up in one of the most acutely stressful periods of history. It's also the first age group that has grown up in an intensively automated and computerized society.**

More than 90 percent of today's young people were born in families with native-born parents. More than 90 percent lived in non-farm settings. More than 81 percent completed high school. More than 95 percent had both parents survive their childhood and more than half had three or fewer siblings. This is a group that has grown up in one of the most acutely stressful periods of history. Through the media or television, it has experienced the Vietnam war, the civil rights movement, the riots and the student uprisings of the 1960's, the Middle East war, Watergate, the first resignation of a President in U.S. history.

In addition, of course, it's also probably the first age group that's grown up in an extensively automated and computerized society. In a whole series of ways youth are experiencing a kind of technology that was not known before. They have also witnessed major changes in the roles of men and women—major variations in the nature of their role models and in the kinds of models that are available to them. Among other things the group that we're talking about is more likely than previous groups of young people to have had working mothers, to have experienced divorce within their own family, to have lived with a member of the opposite sex before marriage, to have experienced divorce themselves, and to have had the experience of being unemployed. All of these are particularly characteristic of the age group we are discussing.

As students and job-seekers, the older members of the age group were in oversupply. In effect, they were sellers in a buyers' market and they're still suffering as a consequence. They grew up in a period in which the so-called problems of youth—that is, the physical manifestations of what has been defined as unacceptable behavior—received an extraordinary amount of attention and left something of a stigma on youth in general. In contrast, the younger members of the age group—those born since the beginning of the "baby bust" period—are now in short supply. In each case there are important policy implications.

Maybe we can begin to get some additional insights and raise some new questions for policy purposes if we begin to look at the family aspects of youth.

Now for my third, and major point. Given the various experiences of this particular age cohort as well as our consciousness of the fact that subsequent cohorts will have different historical and life experiences, how do we begin to think about youth?

One of the things that I have discovered over the last few years since I've been working in the field of family policy is that there are two age groups which rarely get mentioned when one talks about government policies with respect to families. One of those groups is the elderly and the second is the group that we call youth. In the process of preparing for my comments today it occurred to me that there is a growing tendency to focus on youth as independent and autonomous individuals and to support them as such. Less attention is paid to the fact that young people also have families. Maybe we can begin to get some additional insights and raise some new questions for policy purposes if we begin to look at the family aspects of youth.

In order to explain the implications of what I'm saying, I'd like to arbitrarily select a few illustrations. In general, when we talk about the group aged 16 to 24 or 16 to 25 we're talking about a group which experiences the most significant social and personal transitions of any age group in society within a very limited period of time. These transitions are critical for what happens subsequently to individuals in adulthood and during the rest of life. As I mentioned, these changes include leaving school, leaving the parental home, entering the labor force on a permanent basis, and forming new families. One of my hypotheses is that all of these transitions occur in a family context. They occur while young people are still living within their own families — their parental families — or they occur while they are living in the new families they form. The tasks they accomplish may vary by race or class, but essentially they are tasks which must be completed in our society and similar societies by the time the young people are approximately 25. To illustrate the implications of employing a family perspective, I will focus on what I think are the three most essential transitions — leaving home, entering the labor force on a permanent basis, and forming a new family.

As Arthur Norton pointed out earlier, the vast majority of American young people live in families. That is, they either live in their parents' families or they live in the families they're forming themselves. If one looks at the younger group, those aged 14 to 17, it's about 98 percent. Even when we look at the group aged 18 to 24, 88 percent lived in families in 1977, and interestingly enough, more than 90 percent of the black youth this age. More specifically, for the 18-to-24-year-olds: 24 percent of the males lived in husband/wife families and 62 percent with their own parents, while 38 percent of the females lived in husband/wife families and 46 percent with their own parents. Clearly, the group that lives alone is a relatively small group, one which included only 13 percent of the males and 11 percent of the females in 1977. Although this group has grown rapidly in the past decade, we really know very little about how they live: For example, we have no idea whether these youths are really separated from their families, or whether they are actually in very close contact with their parents and see them frequently.

Another interesting question — and I'm delighted that the Census Bureau is going to conduct a survey that will give us this kind of information — is how much parents contribute in money to the children. To what extent do intrafamily transfers influence the way young people are living? If they play a significant role, what are the consequences — for the parents as well as for the children? For example, when young people move out of their parents' homes does that mean that the parents are going to have less income? Two possibilities could lead to lower family income: (1) the withdrawal of financial contributions by youth who now require these funds to support themselves; or (2) increased parental contributions to support youth now living in a separate setting.

Although some families may be better-off financially if the same income is shared among one family member less, we know very little about what the actual consequences — and patterns — are.

When young people decide to live together is that a new form of what used to be called engagement? To what extent does it influence divorce rates? We just don't know.

Another interesting aspect of the trend towards living together has to do with the question of whether what we now have is what the President of the French National Union of Family Organizations refers to as "a new form of engagement." He says that all this living together really isn't anything new. Instead of going through a formal "engagement," where a boy gives a girl a ring, a young couple now simply shares an apartment or a house together. He suggests that, ultimately, it makes very little difference which procedure is followed. It is merely a matter of semantics. If that's the case — if living together is just a form of surrogate marriage — is there any influence on divorce rates later? This is another example of the type of questions that need answering if we are to understand the implications of this living-together trend.

With regard to labor-market entry there's another kind of question that needs to be raised. Indeed, there are a series of questions. The development of successive generations of workers basically takes part through the socialization of young people before entering into the labor market. The family and the education system provide nearly all of this socialization. The role of the school has been fairly extensively studied, but the role of the family has been given very little attention in previous research. Although there were some studies in the 50's that looked at the whole question of the role of families in influencing occupational choice, there are a whole series of other questions that have never been raised in regard to the socialization of young people for entry into the labor market. For example, what sex role norms are used? What occupational aspirations and expectations are instilled? What very specific labor market knowledge and skills do parents impart to their children? And in what ways do these influence career choices and achievements?

In some families, labor market socialization is done either poorly or not at all. For example, I read an article by Mary Keiperling recently which described what happened when she asked a group of 10-year-old girls how many of them expected to be working when they were 40 years old. Only about ten percent of them raised their hands. Mary was horrified. Personally, so was I. The fact is that at the present time over 60 percent of the women who are 40 are in the labor force. Within the next few years it will probably be 70 percent, and by the time those 10-year-olds get to be 40 it may be still higher.

We are moving to a period of time in which nearly all children will have both parents in the labor force.

I think we have to recognize that parental example is the most important influence on the young's attitudes toward work. Maybe it helps to explain the very extraordinary growth in the female labor force participation rates over the last 15 years. Research studies of the National Longitudinal Study survey data reveal that women whose mothers worked are more likely to be in the labor force when they grow up, and that they are more likely to have more positive attitudes toward work when they grow up. Research in West Germany and Sweden reached the same conclusion. Lois Hoffman's recent review of the research on the effects of maternal employment on children underscored these earlier findings. She reported that both the sons and daughters of working mothers "showed better social and personality adjustment, had a greater sense of personal worth, more sense of belonging, better family relations, and interpersonal relations at school."

From a policy perspective, this country does absolutely nothing to support family formation by young people.

Since most of the women that were studied in the series of research projects reviewed by Hoffman had worked for some time before their children had reached adolescence, she concluded that the positive benefits of mothers working were cumulative, and that they surfaced in the high school years. I mention this not only because it has significance for the age group we are talking about, but also because it will have even greater significance for the cohorts who are about to enter adolescence. In effect, we are moving to a period of time in which nearly all children will have both parents in the labor force. We have very little understanding of what the implications of this may be for socializing young people in their later attitudes towards work.

The final point I want to make has to do with family formation. I would like to remind you, that although about half of the young people in this age group are not married by the time they reach 25, about half of the women have already had their first child. Clearly, new family formation is an extremely important fact for this age group. Yet from a policy perspective, this country does absolutely nothing to support family formation. I stress this because, having worked for years in Europe, I am acutely conscious of the different values placed on family formation in the U.S. as contrasted with other countries.

The United States is unique among 65 countries in providing no family or child allowances. We are unique among about 45 industrialized countries in providing nothing in the way of statutory maternity benefits, paid maternity leaves, let alone parental leaves. Finally, we are unique among a still larger number of countries in not providing maternal or child health care programs. In effect, we do nothing to facilitate family formation by young people in this particular age group or by those who are slightly older.

Although the probability of divorce and of being a single parent are relatively high among women in this age group, we are doing relatively little to facilitate their entry into the labor force.

Some of the reasons behind later marriage and delayed child bearing may have to do with economic factors and the growing stress on young people to be able to manage having children at the very time they have to cope with beginning their regular participation in the labor force. At present, I would stress, we are doing nothing, also, to address the whole question of how a young couple, both of whom are in the labor force, can cope with having children.

Now, from a very different perspective, I want to mention two other kinds of family-related issues. First of all, as I said during the discussion of Arthur Norton's remarks, 20 to 24 is the most typical age for divorce among young women. For some years afterwards, therefore, these young women are going to have to support themselves. And many of them have children. Furthermore, 16 percent of the black women in this age group are already single mothers, heading their own households. This means that the probability of divorce and of being a single parent are relatively high among women in this age group. Yet we are doing relatively little to facilitate their entry into the labor force.

Finally, let me say that although I have stressed the need to pay more attention to young people as family members, I do not mean by this that we should underplay the significance of policies focused on youth as individuals. Quite the contrary. I wanted to suggest rather, that we need to have a somewhat broader perspective as we begin to explore who these young people are and what is needed in the way of policies concerning them.

Discussion

Robert Aldrich: Sheila, I have a question. I have been very disturbed in the last six months by the appearance of a very well-organized anti-child force in this country. I recently read a newspaper article containing quotes from letters put out by this group which said essentially "Down with children. Let's not have any more. If you have children it will spoil your fun." That kind of approach. I wonder if anyone else in this room has seen any of their literature? The interesting thing about it is that it's fairly recent. I was driving from Portland, Oregon, to Seattle a few days ago, and just outside of Centralia, Washington, I saw a billboard which said essentially the same thing. Don't support the International Year of the Child and so forth and so on.

Leonard Duhl: There's another kind of development that I find somewhat more disturbing. It's the kind of thing that I've noticed over the last five years in California — the growing number of apartment houses and condominiums that exclude children under the age of 15.

Kamerman: I've spoken in situations in which I've been heckled by members of some of these groups. One thing that's usually very effective is to remind them that when they get to be 65 they're not going to have any Social Security whatsoever if there aren't any young people around who are going to pay for their Social Security pension. My guess is, by the way, that the concern with having children is short term. There is a real anxiety that's sweeping much of Europe at present and that I think will be here in another five to ten years, and that's the worry about too few children being born! That's the opposite of the present concern in this country.

Duhl: I wonder if this problem isn't part of the general fragmentation that's taking place — the segmenting of society by age groups and by interest groups all the way across the board. There's been some feeling in California that the kids who felt completely superfluous and the old people who felt superfluous were the people who voted in Proposition 13. They did not feel that they are getting a piece of the action.

I think we are approaching a point in the history of the world when children and youth will be superfluous. Work by people is no longer important in our society, because we are designing a society which makes large segments of our population superfluous, and thus there is no longer a need for children. At times I feel the reason our society gets screwed up is not because we can't keep it sane and working, but because a screwed up world gives jobs to people like us who have to deal with the results of the screwed up society.

Anyway, I think these are the kinds of problems that are not youth problems at all. They are societal problems. What kind of society do you have where meaningful work has no role? A lot of the jobs in the labor market are meaningless jobs. And you get kids asking themselves: "Do I really want to work in that kind of job? Doing that kind of thing?" They're starting to raise a whole lot of qualitative questions about work and family. I think these questions are much more significant than labor force statistics, because we don't really give a damn about kids.

Kamerman: Before we go on to anybody else, I'd like to respond briefly to what Len has just said. First of all, I don't think work is unimportant in our society. I think it's overwhelmingly important. It's important to the society and it's important to the individual. It's important both to those who are working and those who are not working. The problem may be a lack of work in certain circumstances, but I have no question about the significance of the role of work.

My second comment has to do with the question of children being superfluous. What I'd like to suggest is that in an industrialized society such as this, children—not one child in one family to one set of parents, but children as a group—are economically essential to the adults in the society as a whole, because without their productive labor as they enter the work force there is no support for the base of the economy. I also think that part of what's coloring our perspective right now is the fact that we are at the tail end of the baby boom. We have been threatened by an enormous number of young people entering the labor market at one particular point in time and we haven't handled this well. I have a feeling that ten years from now we will have a very different perspective.

A. J. Kelso: When we talk about broadening our perspective, it seems to me that it's also important to realize that we're talking about a very small segment of the past — the last couple of decades. At other times in our history the situation was quite different.

I also think we ought to broaden our perspective geographically. Whatever modest experience I have had with people from other cultural backgrounds suggests that for them the process of growing up is not a process of becoming independent; it's a process of becoming interdependent, which is very different from the kind of process that we expect.

Kamerman: I think you're quite right. In the late 1950's, a lot of people I knew were convinced that there was going to be massive unemployment — that the labor force was essentially much too large and that a very small percentage of the people were going to be needed to actually work. Then, in the 1960's, the labor market expanded rapidly in both numbers and types of jobs available. In effect, one possibility is that work is so important in our society and societies like ours that as one form of work ends other forms of work will be created. Very often, as I'm sure several of you will agree, it is very hard to make a distinction between what is defined as "work" and what is not work. We usually distinguish *paid* work from unpaid, but apart from that, there's a very fine line between the two.

John Schweppe: I remember about four or five years ago Senator Kennedy suggested that at some point between the ages of 18 and 20 every young person — male or female — should be required to devote one year to some form of national service, either military service or something like the Civilian Conservation Corps of the Depression era. I think that was a good idea. It would give our young people a better perspective on life and work. Instead of losing a year or two they might gain a year.

Willard Wirtz: Let me say this. I don't think we're going to get through the next five years without the development of a substantial youth service program. We're that close to it. Jobs in the traditional sense are drying up, and I think the emergence of a significant-service component in this preparation period is almost imminent.

Schweppe: How much would it cost?

Wirtz: The current assessment is about $7,000 to $10,000 a head. That would be far beyond any conceivable budgeting in the next ten years, but I think those figures are completely unrealistic. It would be more realistic to assume that such a program will cover one million kids the first year, maybe two the second year, then three and so on, and that the right per capita cost will be about two to three thousand dollars. That involves getting it out of our heads that we should pay the minimum wage for the service program. We're talking about national service, not work in the job-market sense. Therefore, it shouldn't be covered by the minimum wage. If you get rid of that nonsense and if you decentralize it to the local community — get it out of Washington — I think the cost would be about two to three thousand dollars per head, per year.

John Demos: I personally think that this service component idea is tremendously important and I hope it will be one of the recommendations of this conference.

I think it's important for a lot of reasons beyond the fact that it deals with problems of youth unemployment. One of them is that in some broad, and somewhat intangible, but nonetheless perhaps very important way, it might move us in the direction of sort of bringing children and youth back into some larger social network. And this really gets me to the reason I wanted to put in a comment here — the whole broad question of the lack of support for children and youth and family in this society. It can be looked at in the broadest way of all, I think, in terms of a certain kind of anti-child sentiment that may run quite deep and go back quite far in our history. But there's another, sharper aspect to it, and that, I think, is the developing sense over a century or two of our history that, essentially, children are the sole responsibility of their own parents. "You take care of your kids, buster, and I'll take care of mine." That's what it comes down to. The whole issue is really whether, how much, and in what ways we care for other people's children. I think that's different from the way it is in other countries, and I think it's different from the way it was in this country two and three hundred years ago. I wish that we could come up with some set of devices — prescriptions almost — for starting to move in the other direction.

I want to make one further point. In terms of policy making, it seems to me to be of some interest that people in positions of high public responsibility, both in government and the private sector, no longer need, as they used to, to have a family life that is recognizable in conventional terms. I think it's a really significant point that for the first time in American history the governor of the largest state and the mayor of the biggest city are both single people. I've even heard that in the business world it is thought to be an advantage for some people to not be encumbered by family ties, so they can be moved about more easily, and special demands can be made on them in terms of travel and the length of their working day. I think one would have to be very cautious about assuming that such nonfamily people are sympathetic to family problems and issues. The biggest difference among the kinds of people I know is that between those who have or have had children and those who have not. In part it's an age difference, but it's more than that, and it may ultimately have some bearing on this whole policy issue.

June Christmas: I can see four or five positives that might come out of the youth service corps idea, but I have a question as to how it might ultimately relate to the problem of long-term unemployment. I can see that if some of these public service activities were human services, or public service, or conservation, that youth might learn to understand certain kinds of social problems and social needs — especially if the program were operated on the local level. They might develop some sense of community. I can also see that if the youth service corps brought together not only the disadvantaged, but those who are well off, this might begin to break down some of the barriers that separate us economically, ethnically, and so forth. Finally, I think that society might come to value youth a little more, and that for some people community service could be a way of building better work habits. These to me are all positives. But I'm wondering, as the youth service corps idea has been conceptualized, whether it really would contribute to the long-range solution of preparing people for entry into the labor force.

Kamerman: That's a good question, and we ought to deal with it when we talk later about careers and vocations.

Duhl: I think the policy question is how can we create social institutions that provide not only job opportunities for young people, but also an opportunity to reconceptualize their role in society. The Peace Corps has been very successful in doing that.

Youth: Stage or Problem?

Alfred J. Kahn
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To those who make public policy in the United States, youth is a problem. It's not stage, it's not status, it's almost a diagnosis. This policy orientation is manifested in all of our legal tradition and in our legislation for youth. We have youth *service* programs, youth *treatment* programs, youth *rehabilitation* programs, and youth *control* programs.

These are the major government youth programs. If you ask somebody on the White House domestic policy staff to give you a list of government youth programs, you'll find that almost all of those listed deal with youth as a problem. Except for the recent youth employment program, these are very small programs, in terms of expenditure, but there is one big exception—education. Our national education budget for the last fiscal year amounted to about $166 billion—federal, state, local, public, private. But the strange thing is that education is not thought of in the context of youth policy. It is something apart.

Youth has been described as the preparation for the next stage in the human life cycle. I'd like to argue that it should have its own validity — that there are things about it that deserve their own recognition.

I am not saying that education should or should not be the anchor point of our national youth policy. Instead, I'm suggesting that it would be a good idea to explore whether we could refocus the core of federal youth policy on normalcy, on development, on positive aspects of the stage of life we are talking about here.

Maybe our approach ought to be to face the fact that in a society of 215 million, there are 45 million young people who are different from the ones who are younger and the ones who are older. Maybe we ought to recognize that life consists of stages and phases, each of which is different and each of which has its own validity.

Youth has been described as the preparation for the next stage in the human life cycle. I would like to argue that youth should have its own validity and that there are things about it that deserve their own recognition. Maybe young people aren't very important in the marketplace, but maybe they do bring social benefit to the larger society in a way that validates their role. I'd like to suggest that.

In any case, my role here is to attack the notion that the sum total of youth policy is rehabilitation, therapy and doing something special about minority youth. My approach has its difficulties, because it is legitimate to ask: Can we focus on development, on the majority, on normalcy, and not give short shrift to minority students who are having such a difficult time in the kind of society that we have today? Would they be helped by this approach, or would we be creaming off the resources of the society in a way that doesn't address their needs as well? That's one of the questions that I'm preoccupied with. I can argue the case that, in general, universalistic social strategies help people who are poor and who are at the margins better than selective social strategies; that is, programs that are means tested and focused on specific groups. However, I also recognize that one cannot be sure just what the results would be for a given group at a given time.

The other problem with the current approach is: Can this youth stage really be conceptualized as having standing of its own, and be accepted as having standing of its own? Those are two different things. You can conceptualize it and develop a point of view of how it would be, but I don't know if you can sell it politically. By way of example, let me cite the efforts of the Carter Administration to develop something called a "Youth Policy."

As you know, the Carter Administration began with large ambitions for the reorganization of the federal government and the improvement of the services it provides. What is relevant to our discussion is a report the President's Reorganization Project produced in July of 1978. It was publicly circulated, and there were hearings on it. The report dealt with a problem which in one way or another has been written about and talked about since the early 1950's—that is, the fact that we have very very loose boundaries in human services, enormous numbers of programs, ten federal departments and agencies, 100 programs, $23 billion and (when you put it all together) imprecise federal policies and goals, unclear assignments of responsibility for the delivery of services, lack of effective citizen involvement despite a lot of milling around, uncoordinated service delivery at the city and county levels, complicated administrative requirements, inaccurate information about services available, weak federal enforcement in monitoring the policies and programs, and poor coordination of the federal agencies. The report laid out alternative ways of dealing with each of these problems, but by the time it was published, the political mandate for a major initiative was lost (except for the recommendation for a Department of Education). The report therefore offers only the terms for a debate.

Shortly thereafter (August 1978) an initiative within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Office of Human Development Services) produced proposals for a possible youth initiative. The National Institute of Education also issued several relevant RFP's ("Requests For Proposals") in an atmosphere in which major initiatives would not be forthcoming. The former called for "demonstration" projects to help communities cope with youth and problem-oriented service demonstrations. The latter sought "youth budget" data, understanding of teenage pregnancy, and the history of school social services. All three of these reports and proposals saw the differences between therapeutic and prevention efforts and wondered about the nature of this age cohort. Was it a stage? What were its characteristics?

The OHDS document said:

> What this statement suggests is that the troubles facing today's youth may be far more significant and long-term than the immediate problems of the runaway, delinquent or pregnant teenager, and may in fact affect all youth. These troubles seem to relate to the very process of adolescent transition to adulthood. While the problems of runaway youth, juvenile delinquents, alcohol and drug abusers and teenage mothers are widespread and, in some cases, reaching crisis proportions, many experts are beginning to explain such behavior, not as individual maladjustment to a well-ordered society, but rather as understandable, but perverse adaptations which occur when social arrangements make healthy transition to adulthood difficult or impossible. If youth find few healthy avenues to adulthood open, the natural drive for self-assertion increasingly expresses itself in aggressive delinquent behavior or in resigned, apathetic escapism.

Where are we? Most of the programs that provide services to youth do so as part of broader programmatic objectives, such as the National

Institute of Drug Abuse. We have a series of small, problem-related so-called categorical youth programs. Runaway Youth is in the Office of Human Development Services, which is a service unit in HEW. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Program is in the Department of Justice, or Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. ACTION, which has something called Service Learning Programs, and National Youth Sports Force and Summer Youth Recreation programs is oriented to minority youth and their problems. These are relatively small, and they are located in four different departments. The reorganization staff wondered: should we pull these together, keeping them as individual programs but reaping the benefit of a streamlined program structure?

The reorganization staff—as indicated—offered some possibilities: one could attempt to create policy and service coherence by: a) creating a youth agency within the Education department, recognizing the centrality of education as "the major life activity of most youth", but also assigning that agency some responsibility for the problem-oriented social services; b) consolidating all social service programs for youth (now dispersed throughout government, but especially within at least four departments) in HEW's social service agency, Office Of Human Development Services. The choices refer to agencies; the differences are between policy leadership from a developmental or from a problem-oriented focus. If the focus is developmental, can it be based in education? If the focus is problem-oriented, is an age category a good principle for organization? And what happens to the rest of youth policy?

Apart from political obstacles, the first alternative ignores the statistics that have been given to us at this conference, showing that there is an increasingly large number of youth in the age cohort we are talking about who are no longer related to education as an institution.

The problem with the second alternative, as most of you know, is that OHDS has a very weak political standing within HEW, an even weaker political standing in government generally, and thus far has failed in its efforts to integrate human services programs. In fact, it has met constant defeat at the hands of Congressional committees that are backing categorical service programs. (That, by the way, points up another problem. The Congressional committees themselves have become categorical, and so have the interest groups that press for legislation. In fact, the entire legislative process has become categorical.)

But even if one could consolidate service programs, they are problem-oriented, not universal, separate from education and not related to work-transition for most youth. So the problem remains: how to create a center for coherent consideration of youth trends, problems, needs — while recognizing the centrality of education, work, for all youth — and yet meeting some functional principles for the organization of government generally (health, personal social services, education, etc.) and desperately needing a broad view of youth.

In any event, the Carter Administration, after a lot of milling about, has achieved very little in the way of a coordinated, streamlined policy for dealing with youth as a whole.

We need to promote youth policy for the majority over youth policy only for those having trouble.

My argument is that we need a focus at the federal level of policy development for the nation, for coordination of services and research. And we need long-term overall federal policy goals. Maybe this conference can make a contribution to the debate. But even the question of where to locate the debate on a national scene is a tough one. In the White House? In the Office of Manpower, in Budget, in HEW? How do you get Congressional committees to do for youth what they've already done only for the aging — establish the Select Committee on Aging and develop a point of coherence which was insisted upon because the political pressure became so great?

The issue of how to go about helping young people is a long story, and I hope it's going to be part of our discussion. We never do well if we think that we are dealing only with people who cause trouble. That's also a false perception of the issue that we're talking about. So I favor universalism over particularism. I think we will do better for everybody with that approach.

What I have been trying to suggest is that maybe the real direction in policy is to look at youth as a stage, not as a problem. We need to promote youth policy for the majority over youth policy for only those having trouble. Such policy will do better, as well, for those of the margins.

Discussion

Robert Aldrich: Al, I really enjoyed your very quick run-through of some awfully important issues, and I'd like to draw everyone's attention to what's been done in Canada. We don't have to go very far to find some effective grappling with some of the things you were talking about. It's going on right next door to us.

In 1961, I participated in a national conference called Mid View of 1970, regionalized all across Canada. It was an effort to find out what Canadians wanted for their youth. About 50 percent of the participants were young people, and much of the research that was done and presented was done by young people — some as young as 13. It was an incredible experience. I could count the number of people in the United States—and I know a lot of people—who even heard of the conference. But I think it would be a useful thing to resurrect the conference reports, and then to look at what's gone on subsequently.

The children and youth program is very powerful in Canada. They now have developed probably the best North American model of how to deal with human civilization on a city-wide basis. I don't want to give you the details, but the leadership that has arisen in Canada for children and youth in cities and small towns, and the policies that are being developed by the Canadian government have had from the very beginning strong participation by youth. I'm tremendously impressed with what they are accomplishing. When I compare it with the chaos in our country, it makes me damn mad, because I think we could do at least as good a job if we made the effort.

Maybe it's sort of un-American to say that we can learn from anybody else, but I think the time has come when we damn well better start looking at what other people are doing and are doing in real good style.

June Christmas: Al, I've often said that I'm the Commissioner of mental illness rather than mental health, because much of what I have to do with regard to service has not been directed toward helping people grow up healthy — learning how to cope and adapt and to develop — but rather getting people when they are casualties, and perhaps those who are the most trouble to society, or perhaps the most ill.

Philosophically, I would say that if we addressed youth as a whole, we would not be overlooking those who are troubled and those who are in the minority. That would be fine if we were starting at point zero in designing youth programs. But how would you, with the philosophy that you've espoused, deal with the fact that there are some young people who do need more help than others, whether it's more money or more attention?

Kahn: I do recognize that fact. There are two types of problems, one practical and the other almost an issue of morality. I believe that we somehow have to deal with the larger policy question without slighting the troubled groups. The problem is that we deal with the second in terms that almost negate the first and create a distortion about what the youth policy question is. We act as though the institutions are fine, and that all we have to do is to get these other kids to fly right. I'm arguing that the institutions aren't fine.

Margaret Hastings: I don't have the answers but I do have a few observations about youth policy that stem from my own experience in working on legislation dealing with education.

Policy requires consensus. From what I have observed, I would say that our typical way of making policy in this country goes something like this: You pass a bill which creates a program, and then you fund it. Pretty soon it delivers service. Sometimes it dies out, and you create another one.

In my estimation, the annual budget process is antithetical to a comprehensive approach to policy making. In the long run, nothing really happens because what is really required is the bringing together of the major power interests in our country to see if they can agree on a policy they are really committed to. Frankly, I'm not sure that this is even possible in this country. What I'm saying is that I think the mess we're in stems from the lack of real national commitment to youth as they really are.

Kahn: Yes, we're in our present predicament because of the way our process works. The issue is how do we break out of it?

Leonard Duhl: I think we're really talking about the need for a national dialogue. When Bob Aldrich talks about Canada, what intrigues me is that Canada went into a national dialogue. It was not a dialogue about expenditures on youth services. It was a national dialogue about Canada as a place to live, as a community, over the next ten years. In order to break out of the situation we're stuck in — all these fragmented programs — we really need to start talking about what kind of society we want to have. It's that level of discourse that we have to start moving to, instead of arguing over the allocation of funds.

One other thing the Canadians did proved effective. They started a multiplicity of small functional programs by giving anybody with a good idea a few thousand dollars in seed money. The people that they've supported over the past 16 to 20 years are now the leaders of Canada —not on the national level yet, but on the local level. So in a way we have to start making a shift, not about youth, but about how we start really discussing where the hell we're going as a society on many many different levels. Maybe the theme should be: "Let a thousand flowers bloom." Let's try thousands of programs all the way across the board, and let the local communities start emerging with answers rather than HEW.

Kahn: I think we're going to have to do both. It's that kind of a problem. We need local initiative, but we also need a national policy.

Aldrich: I want to just say one other thing because I think it illustrates very clearly what's happening in another culture which is just as urbanized and industrialized as we are. I was lecturing in Japan not long ago, and one of the public lectures I gave dealt with effects of urbanization on the family. The Tokyo papers must have reported it, because a couple of days later the Prime Minister called me at my hotel to ask if I would come and give the same lecture to his staff. I agreed, and we had a delightful discussion afterward. Then, a few days later, I spent another evening with the man who is responsible for police service throughout Japan, the chief planner of highways, and a number of other key people.

I mention this because it illustrates what a heck of a high priority the Japanese government places on family and children. For example, they're taking very stiff action to stop the dissolution of small neighborhoods. In Tokyo, it's practically impossible for a developer to tear one of these down and put in high rises. I think we have a lot to learn from Japan as well as from Canada and some of the European countries.

Kahn: I think I've left a number of people depressed. What I really wanted to do was to challenge all of us, in the rest of the discussion, to think in larger terms about youth and youth policy.

The Challenge of Shaping A Personal Identity

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My intent is to initiate a discussion of one of the more urgent challenges of the age group we are considering in this conference. I refer to the challenge of fashioning a personal identity—the process of selective interaction between our internal demands and desires and those of the external social, natural and divine worlds which present themselves with increasing force as we emerge from childhood. The decisions to accept some values, to reject others and modify still others ultimately give us our identity.

The task of definition is peculiarly human, for only humans need to know who they are and what they can become; only humans can shape their identities consciously. The task is incomplete even at death, when the final adjustment is demanded. It is too intimate to yield to a general formula or chronology. Nor is it special to any one stage of life.

Nonetheless, the years 14 to 24 represent in our culture the time when we face most directly and acutely the conscious decisions which begin to set us apart as definable persons, with our own configuration of values, beliefs and principles — those we choose to hold and those we choose to reject or ignore.

With full cognizance of the dangers of isolating any one set of influences from the others, I will concentrate on the intellectual features of identity formation for the following reasons:

- The formation of an identity involves choices which are ultimately rational.
- Certain tools of learning are needed if the choices required are to be consciously and confidently made.

- These intellectual tools must be designed to deal with value choices.
- This is precisely the dimension most notably lacking in collegiate and university education in recent decades.
- As an educator, and as a physician, I am impressed repeatedly with the distress and the perturbations of personal growth that ensue from a defective education of the intellect in making value decisions.

Though he lives in a nexus of emotional and social forces and is delimited by the richness or poverty of his genetic endowment, man perceives himself a thinking being. He is the only creature who needs to know who he is and what he can become, who demands meaning of his life and of events, and who insists on making his own choices. Many things and events determine the constraints which an individual life must face. These are the cards fate deals us, but it is our free choices that determine how we shall play the cards.

While the process of identity formation continues throughout life and cannot be completed until death, there is a convergence during youth of a number of factors which make this period of life a most crucial one.

It is this ultimate grounding of identity in an intellectual process that will engage my attention. I would like to address the subject under the following headings:

- What a mature intellect is, and what it is not.
- The process of identity formation and the anatomy of its development.
- What special tools of intellect are required in this process.
- What is the role of the college and the university and what obstacles are encountered.

An essential task of adolescence is to begin to form one's own identity, to make active choices among the many values presented — those choices which will define who we are, what we will become and what meaning we give to what happens to us.

While the process of identity formation continues throughout life and cannot be completed until death, there is a convergence during youth of a number of factors which make this period of life a most crucial one. For one thing, the adolescent is beginning to emerge from the influence of family, church and school and becoming exposed to the multiple and often conflicting value systems of his peer groups, of the youth counter-culture, and of cultures foreign to his own. It is at this time also that the intellect is ready for the questioning of received opinion and is, as Piaget has shown, ready to deal with abstract questions, to fomulate answers, and to pass from a stage of passive acceptance of knowledge to the skeptical examination of what is put before it. This is a time also when the creative assimilation and synthesis of ideas and thoughts begins to occur. During this period, the young person devotes the major part of his time to the advanced stages of education and is forced to make choices about a job, the formation of a family and the establishment of independent relationships with other persons. These latter decision points all involve a comprehension of values and choices among them.

In primitive societies, the transition from childhood to adulthood is more formalized and structured. Young people must undergo certain well-prescribed rites of passage. If they navigate those successfully, they are accepted as mature adults and are immediately a part of grown-up society.

In the more sophisticated or the more complexly organized societies, the passage from childhood to adult life is much looser and depends more upon independent choice. There is no formal time of entry and no set of rituals which upon completion assure young people that they have become adults.

In modern society the dilemma of passage is greatly complicated by a number of socio-cultural factors. As a result of the loss of a homogeneous value system, widely conflicting values and countercultures present themselves with equal force. The influence of all authority structures such as the family, the school, the church and government has been weakened. Young people face the paradox of technological capability which promises a material paradise on earth on the one hand, and a threat to their survival as human beings on the other. A growing and overt disparity is constantly displayed on television and in the media between the stated goals and values of our society and the performance and behavior of public figures. Those who happen to be taken as models — athletes, entertainers, and the whole panorama of youth heroes from rock artists to race car drivers—often exhibit values counter to the traditional ones. There is a general loss of faith in the value of rationality itself with a strong pull to intuitive, romantic and mystical modes of knowing.

These difficulties notwithstanding, in our Western society at least, each person must ultimately fashion an identity, a self which is definable and justifiable on some rational grounds. This process will ordinarily require a maturation of the intellect as an instrument of decision and choice. Let us look, then, at the characteristics of the mature intellect. I will address this question from a special point of view and this must be kept clearly in mind as the rest of the discussion proceeds. I will define the mature intellect in humanistic terms — that is, in terms of those characteristics which are most closely related to being human and being part of humanity, because the process of identity formation is distinctly human. Animals do not emerge as distinct individuals except in their psychological behavior and physical characteristics. We have little evidence that animals will deviate from the set patterns of behavior of their species although they may manifest differences within a very limited set of behavioral responses.

Intellectual maturity is the very antithesis of some of the major characteristics that social commentators have described in today's youth culture.

The mature intellect manifests itself in a capacity to locate itself with respect to conflicting claims, values, beliefs and principles, encountered in the interaction with society, with nature or with the divine. A person with a mature intellect, in this sense, is one who has made his or her own selection of ways of living, of seeing and being. He or she has actively assimilated a set of values and made them part of himself or herself so that he or she can explain and justify his or her actions. The person with a mature intellect is willing to subject his/her choices to criticism and to opposing viewpoints without yielding to every challenge, yet being open to change, when facts or arguments demand. The mature intellect has respect for the choices of others and can see its own choices in relationship to them; it understands that its own identity is always undergoing re-examination and that the process will never be completed. The mature intellect is capable of dealing with questions of ends and purposes in relationship to some concept of the good life and the good society.

Intellectual maturity is the very antithesis of some of the major characteristics that social commentators have described in today's youth culture. For example, the mature intellect would be inconsistent with the idea of the "dislocated man" so well described by Robert Lifton. The "dislocated" man is disconnected with the past, feels no sense of responsibility for the future, sees himself as isolated in time; he has no allegiance to, or belief in, what has gone before, no hope of modifying what happens in the future. The mature intellect is inconsistent with the feelings of uncontrollable drift described by many young people who feel that their ideas are not their own and who feel manipulated by powerful forces. The immature intellect confuses fantasy and reality — a phenomenon in no small part engendered by constant exposure to television. To see the horrors of the Vietnam War — to see a human being murdered by deliberate gunshot to the head on television — in sequence with equally violent events in the regular "shows" is surely to raise questions about the value of human life. The mature intellect is inconsistent with the inability to know when to say "yes" and "no" and the failure to see the boundaries between good and evil, just and unjust.

If maturity of the intellect is the antithesis of "dislocation" it must also be distinguished from overconfident, static stances and unrealistic certitudes. The mature intellect is therefore not to be confused with the strong adherence to a value system with no comprehension of the possibility of validity in its counter-views or without the capacity to engage intellectually with those of opposing views. A mind which has conclusively but passively located itself on all the major issues of life without active examination and assimilation cannot be considered mature.

The mature intellect is not equated with "feeling good" about values unless that feeling has been subjected to critical reflection.

Maturity of intellect is not to be confused with professional or technical expertise or scholarship in any of the usual human disciplines. Specialized study enables one to solve individual problems in a particular realm of thought or action. Specialized education, however, does not fit one for asking or examining the value questions which transcend a specialty. Indeed, narrowness of focus essential to scholarship impedes the broader vision needed to define goals and purposes. Education and scholarship are not the same thing. It is possible for a specialist to locate his specialty within the larger framework of human experience. But only when that happens does the expert become an educated person.

The mature mind has no relationship to age. Some never advance beyond the earliest stages in the development of the intellect, while others may reach the stage of maturity in their thinking relatively early.

The mature intellect is not equated with "feeling good" about values unless that feeling has been subjected to critical reflection. Many people experience successive moments of exhilaration, "getting psyched up" as they encounter some new idea, some exotic experience or some unusual person. The transitory exhilaration is usually followed by disappointment and rejection until the appearance of another new experience or idea starts the cycle again.

One popular way to avoid consciously making one's own choices is to join the youth culture. This is another mark of the immature mind. Here a pre-set system of values and a lifestyle can be appropriated and justified simply by peer preference and the sharp contrast with the "straight" world of the adult. The characteristics of the youth and countercultures of our time have been too well delineated by sociologists and psychologists to be repeated here. The countercultures usually, however, are anti-rational in spirit. They emphasize "experience" engendered by the simultaneous stimulation of the senses by music, visual images, drugs, in combinations that the adult finds ludicrous or physiologically unbearable.

The above are all examples of refusal or inability to engage in the process of selective interaction with the claims and values set before us in admittedly confusing disarray in a pluralistic society. They are all mechanisms for avoiding the difficult critical intellectual process of value choice either by rejecting all choice or assuming passively some preformed system.

We do not become fully ethical beings until we are clear about our values.

Let us now turn to the process involved in identity formation. That process itself is a selective organization of values, ideals and principles that bring the inner demands of our nature into some form of confrontation and resolution with the demands external to us in our environment. The key words are "selective" and "interaction," a set of decisions to accept some of the values offered, to reject others, and to modify still others. This selective interaction is an active, conscious process which we can justify and explicate.

The selections we make determine those values which will become realities for us and which become the standards by which we judge ourselves and expect others to judge us as success or failure. Our choices give meaning to what happens to us. It is the configuration of those choices, taken as a whole, that in large part defines us as persons. We begin to have a "stance," to stand for some things and not for others, and thereby we achieve an identity. As William James says, "We belong in the most intimate sense wherever our ideals belong." Choosing values of our own from the multitudinous possibilities and claims before us converts us therefore into "fighters for ends" (again William James' phraseology). All the other choices which occur at any time of life, and particularly in adolescence — namely choosing a job, a religion, a life's companion, a political party — all are related to the values with which we choose to identify. We do not become fully ethical beings until we are clear about our values, because only by the selective interaction to which I have been alluding can we develop standards of morality — benchmarks, as it were, against which to evaluate our own ends and purposes and those of other human beings.

There is a rough anatomy of development of the capacity for selective interaction. With no pretensions to the sophisticated formulations of the development of personality and intellect like those of Piaget or Erikson, I would like to propose the following stages:

- **First is the stage of passive reception of external values.** Starting with the earliest years of consciousness, the young person is exposed to the values of school, church and family. These values are, at first, taken in unselectively and parroted back at appropriate times and on appropriate occasions. This passive reception of values corresponds to the major mode of learning in the early years of life when things are learned by rote and images; stories and poems are easily memorized, as are historical dates and the names of objects, and people. Multitudinous questions are posed to satisfy the enormous curiosity of the young child. But the answers are not subjected to tests of validity or verifiability. Everything is regarded as information without the selective interposition of critical questioning.
- **The second stage is that of beginning skepticism.** The child begins to appreciate that there may be a number of different answers to the same question coming from different people. He/she begins to see

also that there is a world of fantasy that does not square with the world of experience — Santa Claus, for example. In this stage, we see the beginning of the use of logic to monitor the information contained in memory, to question our observations and to initiate debates to resolve doubt. Negative views of what is offered are common.

In this stage the intellect begins to be used as a critical testing instrument. The opinions and behavior of parents, friends, public figures come under question as do even the received religious beliefs and practices. The need for a definition of terms and for clarity of statements is realized. The child or young adolescent will not at this point have formulated his or her own stance, but he or she nevertheless begins to move in that direction by using the "via negativa" of doubt, skepticism and attempting to disprove what is claimed to be true.

- **The third stage is that of selective affirmation.** Here the process of active assimilation and incorporation of values begins to occur. The selection of a particular configuration of values and beliefs begins to define the individual as this person and the self begins to take on a more distinctive shape. The person begins to appreciate that there are indeed different answers to the same question and that these express different values which each of us must evaluate and on which we must take some position. The self then begins to determine its own relationship to others, to the world, and thus to emerge as a recognizable entity. This is the stage when the intellect begins to mature.
- **The most advanced stage of maturity is that of creative assimilation.** Here the person who develops to this stage not only uses the usual methods of deductive and inductive logic but also supplements, expands and extends the possibilities of a personal identity by creating new forms, modifying others, and adding original insight into the synthesis of his or her ethical and moral stance. There is a closer identity here between the self and some creative work of the imagination in which personal expression and identity are greatly enhanced. Each of us at this stage shapes his/her identity as a work of art, and with personal style — a stage of sophistication not open to all.

The correlation or lack of correlation with Piaget's classification of the stages of cognitive growth in children is not the essential point here. I mean only to indicate that cognition and the capacities of the intellect do exhibit a developmental anatomy which has a rough correlation with age. Important for our discussion here is Piaget's observation that it is in early adolescence that young people begin to develop the capacity to deal with formal logic and symbolic forms, and abstract entities. These are the intellectual capabilities required in making value judgments. They are essential to the selective interaction between internal and external demands, desires and beliefs out of which an identity can be formed.

There are people who have never progressed beyond the first stage of passive reception of values. . . . There are others who become arrested at the stage of skepticism.

There is also a pathology corresponding to each of the developmental stages I have described. That pathology manifests itself in an arrest of growth and development at one stage or another. Thus, there are people who have never progressed beyond the first stage of passive reception of values; they have identified themselves with a value system but have not actively and critically examined that system.

There are others who become arrested at the stage of skepticism. They lose faith in reason entirely and become convinced that there are no correct or possible answers to the fundamental questions about life and existence, or if there are answers, they cannot be ascertained by the use of reason. Such persons may become complete cynics, taking a negative stance toward every claim and proposition concerning values, the good, the true, the beautiful. Their skepticism makes them unable to formulate any alternative of their own.

There is a pathology associated even with the stage of selective interaction. One may overemphasize the process of continual change and be too ready to yield to counter propositions. The true meaning of tolerance, for example, is to differ with someone, to hold to one's view, and yet to respect the person and the opinion of those with whom we disagree. Tolerance does not demand absolute relativism of value systems. Rather, it rests in the recognition of differences and the willingness to give them fair hearing. The pathology of the last stage is usually manifest as an overemphasis on the limitations of reason. The artistic, imaginative, creative, romantic, intuitive elements become overvalued. Personal style is confused with critical assimilation and substituted for the hard and undramatic work of reason. There is a kind of reversion to the first stage of passive inhibition—this time of one's own creativity rather than someone else's values.

For most of us, the slow and vexing process of identity formation demands some careful, often error-ridden, selective interaction with the values presented to us from a myriad of sources.

Clearly the developmental stages described, and their disorders, overlap often. They follow no fixed chronology in any particular person. Arrest of development can occur at any stage. Sometimes, all the stages may be telescoped, and confusion about identity and values may be suddenly resolved with the emergence of the "new man" in a true mystical experience. (We may think of Paul on the way to Damascus, or St. Augustine in the garden.) These are rare events. Too many young people, and adults as well, hope for the blinding light of inspiration from God, or from a drug, or transcendental meditation, or even the Devil. For most of us the rather more mundane, slow and vexing process of identity formation demands some careful, often error-ridden, selective interaction with the values presented to us from a myriad of sources.

It is essential here to re-emphasize that the psychosocial and cultural influences are powerful indeed, and that my emphasis on the cognitive elements in no way denies their great significance. However, I do hold that the process of selection does finally depend upon the use of the usual rules of deductive and inductive logic, of *post facto* ratiocination and pre-logical suppositions. There is a logic, an epistemology and a metaphysics of value choices, and to dissect these entirely free from the psychosocial and cultural is not possible in the unity we call man. Suffice it to say, that as humans, we do explain, justify, criticize, judge and reject or accept value claims. It is my assignment here to describe the development of these critical facilities and this requires some violence to the complex unity we call a person.

The development of critical faculties of mind coincides with the sociocultural need to form an identity, and these in turn both coincide with the process of formal education which is the major occupation of youth in the years 14 to 24. Let us turn then to the function of the universities and colleges in the process of intellectual maturation.

Manifestly this process of identity formation takes place in all of our life experiences and at all levels of education—primary, secondary and higher. However, in our Western society, the major part of the preparation of the intellect for this process—at least in the most formal and most sophisticated sense — occurs during the college and university years.

Having said this, I wish to underscore the fact that those who do not have the privilege of attending the university must not thereby be deprived of the opportunity to develop a critical intellect. Education of the intellect and wisdom does occur outside the university, reluctant though the academicians may be to see this. Indeed, as I will suggest later, the university as it is constituted today may in some cases inhibit the development of a mature intellect.

The required attitudes of mind are those traditionally inculcated by the liberal arts.

Nonetheless, the university does have a major function in initiating the process of selective interaction and its major responsibility is to provide the tools of intellect required in the process. The university cannot guarantee that the student will graduate with a mature intellect but it must initiate the process, and above all, restore and sustain the student's faith in the feasibility of the enterprise as an exercise of human reason.

What tools are requisite for the process of selective interaction?

The required attitudes of mind are those traditionally inculcated by the liberal arts. I refer here specifically to those tools of learning and of the intellect which are most characteristically human—the capacity to reason logically and critically, to engage in dialectic with conflicting claims and ideas, to engage in moral discourse, to understand the structure of language, to be able to define terms, to use words effectively and with style—that is, with individual and personal nuances. Included also in the liberal arts are the capacity to understand the continuity of human experience and to see the relationship of past, present and future developments in ideas and culture, to be able to judge beauty and to arrive at some personal conception of a good creative effort in literature, music and the visual arts.

The topic of liberal education has been under discussion in the Western world for 2,500 years. The tools required for the enterprise of identity formation are the tools of the liberally educated mind as set forth in Plato and Aristotle and further refined and enriched by Cicero, Quintillian, the Renaissance humanists and in more modern times by John Henry Cardinal Newman. Among these tools are the capacity to disentangle fact from opinion, the proven from the merely plausible, to identify and address another person's line of argument and to see the relevance of our own subject or discipline to the culture in which it relates and to be able to tackle a subject on our own and to learn without a teacher hovering over us.

These are, in fact, the liberal arts. They are "liberal" by virtue of their capacity to "free" us from the potential tyranny of others. This freedom is crucial to the process of identity formation and value selection because in fact every statement of values, beliefs, principles about life and the world, is a claim in the philosophical sense. We are asked either directly or indirectly to give assent to a statement that this or that matter is so important that it should modify our behavior and indeed become an overriding factor in decision making. The mature intellect has the capacity to free itself to the highest degree possible from passive assent and from being overwhelmed by the claims and opinions of others.

If we keep this idea of freedom clearly in our minds, we will not confuse the liberal arts with the humanities. The humanities are disciplines and therefore specialties. They are taught today as disciplines for their content and their methodology. It does not follow therefore that anyone who is a scholar or expert in a field in the humanities is necessarily liberally educated.

What is important, however, is that the humanities are the preferred tools for teaching the liberal arts. It is the philosopher who can teach us the art of dialectic, the rules of deductive and inductive logic, the evaluation of evidence and the kind of knowledge we have, and it is the philosopher who can expose for us the metaphysical foundations of our beliefs and practices. If philosophy is taught this way, then it is a tool for the advancement of the liberal arts. If it is taught for the content of philosophical systems or the history of philosophy or even for the generation of a new system it may not be effective in teaching the liberal attitudes of mind noted above.

The same reservations and distinctions must be made in the teaching of literature, history, and language — the other three disciplines classically included among the liberal arts. The historian can use history to teach how to think critically, how to evaluate evidence, how to understand and comprehend language and culture. If, however, he teaches his discipline merely for its content or method then he, too, defects somewhat from the purpose of history as one of the tools of the liberal arts. I hardly need repeat that literature and language can suffer the same disability.

The major obstacle to the teaching of the liberal arts today lies in the confusion of scholarship and technical expertise with education and the equating of simple exposure to the humanities with the teaching of the liberal arts. Scholarship by definition requires intense concentration on some aspect of a discipline—on an organized field of knowledge and method. It requires clearly the use of the intellect to evaluate the data within the field, but the mere teaching of the field will not assure that the use of these tools of mind are communicated to the student. Those attitudes of mind must be addressed explicitly.

Two things are required for the development of a mature intellect. One is the liberal arts as the tools of learning. The other is a set of beliefs, a set of principles and values that can serve as benchmarks against which conflicting value claims can be measured.

Today our emphasis on pre-professional and professional education, while understandable and commendable, tends to depreciate the liberal arts. It is for this reason that I have worked two decades in an attempt to inculcate the teaching of the liberal arts within professional medical education, within the education of the other health professions, and in the continuing education of physicians. Here the subject matter of medicine is used as the material on which to sharpen and test the tools of the intellect—that is, of the liberal arts.

The college and the university, but especially the college, is charged in Western society with two things — first to prepare the minds of young people to engage the world of ideas, concepts and principles as free minds, and second to prepare young people for specific positions in society. The first task is best achieved by the inculcation of the liberal arts and the second by the specific disciplines and the content of the professions.

Two things are in fact required for the development of mature intellect. One clearly is the liberal arts as the tools of learning, and this we have discussed. The second is a set of beliefs, a set of principles and values that can serve as benchmarks against which conflicting value claims can be measured. The importance of a set of beliefs and values is that it provides a necessary focus for the selective interaction between internal desires and demands and the external claims of society. An educational institution which provides only for the development of the tools of intellect and does not provide a set of values on which these tools can be exercised by each student in a personal quest for identity does not fulfill its total educational responsibility. A belief system presents itself as an organized, coherent, integrated reconstruction of all the dimensions of life and experience, which gives them meaning.

Much of the confusion in all age groups, much of the uncertainty about identity and the process of identify formation, may be related to the absence of creditably articulated and defended belief systems during the crucial formative years of college.

There are practical difficulties in fulfilling this second requirement for the maturation of an intellect in a democratic pluralistic society. In the case of educational institutions under religious auspices the problem is simpler. The Catholic, Protestant or Jewish institution stands for an explicit belief system which can and should be clearly articulated and presented to the world and to its students as a base and a stance from which the crucial issues confronting mankind can be measured and judged. Even church-related institutions in the past two decades have often defected and defaulted from a clear statement of their own belief systems. They have reflected the confusion created even among believers by the tumultuous upheaval of value systems that afflicted the universities of the late 60's. There is evidence now, however, of the beginning of the return of confidence in religiously sponsored institutions. A renaissance of education under church sponsorship may be in the offing. Church-related institutions do not fulfill their responsibilities as universities unless they do attend to the inculcation of the liberal arts against the background of a clearly articulated, intellectually and critically justified set of beliefs for which they stand.

In the case of the public and secular institutions the problem is more difficult. We have traditionally in this country forbidden teachers to proselytize, and this prohibition should not be relaxed. However, the interdiction of the proselytization has been equated with a stance of moral neutrality with respect to the major issues of truth, justice and the good society. Teachers have prided themselves on the suspension of personal moral judgment in the classroom. The dominant emphasis has been on the analytic dimensions of their teaching to the exclusion of any attempt to snythesize or to give meaning to the phenomena under consideration. Indeed, one of the most lasting memories I have of my conversations with the troubled students of the late 60's was their great disappointment, disdain and disaffection for many of their faculty members who maintained moral neutrality in the face of such obvious discrepancies as racism, poverty, the Vietnam War or the dangerous potentials of unrestrained technology. Students then, as students now, have always wanted to know the answer to the question: "What do *you* think?" "How do *you* feel?"

Much of the confusion in all age groups, much of the uncertainty about identity and the process of identity formation may be related to the absence of creditably articulated and defended belief systems during the crucial formative years of college.

I believe the problem of providing a benchmark set of beliefs in public institutions is resolvable if we can become sufficiently mature intellectually as a society to understand the supreme social importance of mature intellects in our midst. When we gain that maturity, I can conceive of three ways in which secular and public institutions could initiate the critical discussion of values in a framework of stated belief systems:

- The first would be to encourage each teacher to be more open about his own value system. As crucial questions rise in class a teacher should be prepared to explain and justify his own point of view as long as he makes it clear that it is his own point of view and not the point of view of the school, or the society in general. As long as the teacher stimulates critical examination of his position there should be no real danger of a "takeover" of one ideology. Students expect teachers to have positions; they are disappointed and shortchanged when a teacher does not illustrate that it is part of an education to be able to take a position and to defend it. A set of beliefs is also essential because a student needs to have a stance and some benchmarks before he can examine some of the more esoteric, bizarre, and far-out value systems that are being offered to all of our society today. There is no reason why an adolescent should not examine the claims of any or all value systems — especially when they violate reason and depend largely upon intuitive and immediate knowledge. To examine these positions it is necessary to have a stance from which to examine them. We cannot protect students against exposure to these systems; the best we can hope for is to prepare them to deal with them critically.

- A second would be to propound the secular philosophy, since in many cases this is the philosophy implicit in our public educational system anyway. If the secular philosophy is propounded responsibly and with the same attitude of critical examination, then I see no reason why it cannot also serve as a foil for discussion, a subject for examination, and a stimulus for the student's own thinking. As long as we permit rigorous and critical examination of the claims of the secular philosophy then theoretically we should be able to use it as a means of inducing each student to take his or her own position in the matter.
- A third way, and I think this would be the preferable way, would be to define the common set of beliefs we do hold in our democratic, pluralistic society. The ideals of equal rights, of tolerance, of justice, of truth, of mutual assistance, of common concern — all of which are in the Western tradition — certainly form a belief system. The uniformity of this set of beliefs would to a certain extent be mitigated by the obvious differences of opinion among the viewpoints which make up our pluralistic democracy.

By taking one of these three routes and preferably the last, even a secular or public institution could provide a set of beliefs as a template or as a set of benchmarks for the student.

Up to this point I have emphasized largely the interests of individual members of our society and particularly the individual quest for identity. There is, of course, very great social significance in what I have been saying. A mature society requires that as many of its citizens as possible possess a mature intellect and have a clear view of their own position and stance. It is difficult to think of the preservation of a democratic society and a democratic world order without individuals in that society capable of examining the questions of value and purpose in a critical fashion. Much of the difficulty in our nation today in arriving at national policy for health, social welfare, security, environment, and so forth, is related to our incapacity to define what we mean by a "good society." We have not debated the question or reached a consensus on what goals and ends we wish to achieve and what kind of society we wish to foster.

We need more citizens who have mature intellects and who have a set of beliefs which provide them with a stance from which they can engage in conversation with their fellow citizens. It is only a society with individuals whose own identity is clear that can provide the conditions for the compromises that are necessary in any common societal and political effort. A human being can compromise only when he knows precisely what his own values are, and at what point he may yield in the interest of a common goal. Without knowing the limits of good and evil or the limits of justice or equality we cannot know if we have compromised these values irreversibly.

It is imperative that we do not confine the process of selective interaction and the preparation of the intellect for this end to the university. There is a grave danger in assigning this vital task exclusively to any institution.

The mature mind is also the only defense members of our society will have against a technocracy—that is, rule by experts. Every field of special knowledge is possessed of a special language and special methodology which is closed to the non-expert. We are all at the mercy of experts in environment, in health, in nuclear armaments, in space travel, in finance, and so on. Unless we preserve our intellectual capacity to judge the values and purposes to which they wish to put their technology we will be their unwilling subjects. Once we equate expertise in a special field with expertise in the values pertinent to that field then we have lost our freedom as a society. We are subject then to the kind of society designed for us by the particular technocrats whose knowledge and whose methodology is dominant at any particular moment in history. Science and technology become an ideology and a political system. The dangers are all too obvious.

Therefore, if we are to preserve our liberty and still make use of the capabilities of technology, if we are to vote intelligently and participate in public policy debates, if we are to retain those elements of life which are most distinctly human, it is important that we foster the healthy, mature development of personal identity and of intellects capable of arriving at that identity in a reasonable and rational way.

It is imperative that we do not confine the process of selective interaction and the preparation of the intellect for this end to the university. There is a grave danger in assigning this vital task exclusively to any institution. The values of that institution too easily become the official position or the only respectable one. The general public must be exposed to the same questions; the process is, after all, a lifelong one. Mere exposure for a period to the universities will not suffice.

We must find means to raise the fundamental questions in a variety of places — in community organizations, in local government, in the media, and I believe in a more formal and organized program of continuing education in the humanities conducted by colleges and universities for graduates and non-graduates as well.

We must overcome the fear of adults that the young will be seduced to error if they are permitted to examine all the facets of a belief system, critically and openly.

A formidable obstacle will be the disinclination of Americans to debate value or "gut" issues. We are not accustomed to the rules of polite disagreement about belief systems. We are fearful of offending, and we have yet to learn how to distinguish between an idea with which we disagree and the person with whom we disagree.

To achieve these goals we must overcome the current loss of faith in the use of reason to decide questions of value; to restore the liberal arts as tools of the intellect and make them essential parts of the educational process both within and without universities. Above all, we must prepare faculty members who themselves are capable of teaching in this fashion. This may be the gravest obstacle we have to overcome.

Lastly, we must overcome the fear of adults that the young will be seduced to error if they are permitted to examine all the facets of a belief system, critically and openly. It is understandable that adults wish to replicate their own world and their own values. If we follow this policy we can only expect a static society which would never enrich, expand, and advance in achieving its main purposes. This fear of seducing the young to error very often betrays an underlying lack of faith in the values we hold. That, in turn, may well be due to our own incapacity to develop a stance of our own which we can justify and explain to others. I can only remind you that it was this charge of seducing the young when he was trying to develop their critical intelligence that brought Socrates to his sad, but nonetheless dignified end, 2,500 years ago. The tragedy is that the death of Socrates continues to be enacted in a thousand different ways up to our day.

Discussion

John Schweppe: How can colleges and universities help young people define themselves? I'm thinking now in terms of such questions as: "Who am I?" and "Where am I going?"

Pellegrino: As I indicated, by providing them with the tools of the intellect, through the liberal arts, and by providing them with a set of values to examine critically. Professors should not hesitate to express their point of view on such questions.

Alvin Eurich: I was interested in the distinction you made between the liberal arts and the humanities.

Pellegrino: John Demos gave us an excellent example of how the content of the humanities — in his case, history — can be used as an intellectual tool. As I indicated, however, the purpose of the liberal arts is to free us from the potential tyranny of the opinions of others.

Harold Visotsky: I have a pragmatic problem with what you said about identity formation being an intellectual process. A lot of young people look for their identity in peer groups.

Pellegrino: I think you're right, but I don't think that all young people who join a peer group really want to belong to that group. Some are either pressured into joining, or they go along because they don't have a value system of their own.

Paul Bohannan: When it comes to helping young people find themselves, I don't think we should rely exclusively on the university. We ought to develop "back-up" institutions. For example, I could make a case for the family being the starting point in the identity-formation process.

Pellegrino: I thoroughly agree with you.

A. J. Kelso: Do you make a distinction between "teaching" and "professing?"

Pellegrino: Yes. To profess something is merely to make a claim. Not all professors teach.

The Evolution of Human Genders

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During the past few decades, the path our ancestors followed in the course of human evolution has become much clearer to us. The major landmarks, from the adoption of erect posture to the appearance of *homo sapiens*, are well known and the pattern is so familiar it seems simple. But the results of human evolution, the variety of contemporary human beings, serve as reminders that human evolution is not as simple as it seems. Change within has not been uniform. As long as our attention is directed to the whole species, we may miss some of the complexities within.

Males and females illustrate the unevenness of human evolution. Of course, the genders evolved together, yet across the species and within local populations males and females faced separate environmental stresses, particularly severe on sexual and reproductive characteristics, and in responding to these each gender has changed in different ways. Within our species evolutionary change has been relative to the adaptive problems to be solved. Females have changed more than males and the difference suggests a stage in human evolution which has been neglected, a stage possibly as significant as erect posture or the acquisition of culture.

For a long time, human sexuality was thought to be basically similar to primate sexuality in general. We can take little comfort from realizing that this view was based on a comparison of ourselves with animals caged in zoos. But about fifteen years ago Jane Lancaster and Richard Lee, basing their argument on free-ranging monkeys and apes compared with a contemporary hunter-gatherer group, concluded that human beings, in reproductive features, are decidedly different, "qualitatively different," from other primates. This helped change our outlook; human beings were not simply sexual apes, they approached sexual and reproductive matters in their own way, the human way. As other investigators sought to identify the specific characteristics of the human way, it became clear that the distinctive features are to be found in human females. The most striking differences are: 1) continuous ability of females to become sexually aroused; 2) increased reproductive capacity; and 3) a long post-reproductive life. Compared with other primates, human females stand out as conspicuously different, whereas males are similar to other primates, especially our closest living relatives.

Continuous Ability To Become Sexually Aroused. This feature is usually called loss of estrous periodicity and, of course, refers specifically to females. Sexual activity in mammals is usually confined to a brief period lasting perhaps only a few days out of a year. In primates the cycles are more rapid and the receptive periods — that is, estrous periods — are signalled and controlled by hormonal changes in females, any one of whom may enter estrous at any time.

> **There is a kind of continuum in sexual receptivity from African apes to human females . . . This is both evidence of our common ancestry and a measure of the extent to which human females have differentiated in the hominid line.**

The general primate picture is, then, one of primate males continuously capable of sexual arousal living in groups with females who are discontinuously arousable. In extending the comparison with human beings, it will be helpful to focus on our closest relatives, chimpanzees and gorillas, and, as much as possible, to use data from free-ranging groups. Sexual behavior is distorted in captive animals, and, because it is rarely observed in free-ranging animals, many have concluded that chimps and gorillas are not especially sexy. But we do not know what, if any, difference a human observer makes and, of course, we don't know what goes on in the forest after the observer has gone.

African ape females are sexually receptive only a few days of their reproductive cycle. Gorilla and chimpanzee males appear prepared for arousal of sexual interest at almost any time. Adult females in the group become receptive at different times and as they do the adult males compete with one another for sexual access to the estrous female. Among chimpanzees an estrous female is treated more deferentially than a non-receptive female and, if meat is available, the former receives the greater share. In African ape communities it is far more common for the group to be without any estrous females than it is to have one or more. The African apes, in other words, are typical of the primates in general, discontinuously receptive females with continuously arousable males. The duration of receptive intervals is longer among chimpanzees (6 to 8 days), and among them it is even longer in those groups living more widely spread out in open country (8 to 10 days). Gorilla females are receptive for three or four days. The cycle recurs in both gorillas and chimpanzees approximately every 35 days. A few months after an ape female conceives, her receptive periods cease altogether for three or four years until the infant is nearly weaned.

In contrast human females can become sexually aroused at any time, they remain sexually competent throughout pregnancy, and recover their capability for coitus within a few weeks and their ability to conceive within a few months after the child is born. To be sure, there is a kind of continuum in receptivity from African apes to human females. On one end, Jane Goodall notes a few instances (less than one percent) of female chimpanzees who, even though they were not in estrous, were mounted by males. On the other end, Udry and Morris have shown human females to be most responsive sexually midway between menstrual periods and least responsive four days before the onset of menstruation, though they continue to be responsive throughout the cycle.

To Robin Fox the evidence for a continuum is sufficient ground to disagree. Fox claims that the estrous cycle still operates at a very profound level in the human female. Recognizing a continuum, however, should not obscure the real differences between human and African ape females. The continuity from apes to human beings is both evidence of our common ancestry and a measure of the extent to which human females have differentiated in the hominid line. In effect, the changes have synchronized male and female sexualities more closely in men and women. The synchrony is far from perfect, but much closer than between the genders in the African apes.

Chimpanzee females mark their receptive periods by a pronounced swelling of their genital regions. The swelling is much less pronounced in gorillas. Mature human females, capable of continuous sexual arousal, display attributes continuously attractive to the sexual interest of males — well developed breasts, everted lips, rounded hips and buttocks. Desmond Morris discussed these and their evolutionary implications in his widely read book *The Naked Ape*. Since these female features become fully developed at sexual maturity, there is a possibility they may be the continuous morphological expressions of the underlying continuous capability for sexual arousal in females.

Increased Reproductive Efficiency. Thirty years ago G. G. Simpson observed that human reproductive efficiency is the highest in the animal kingdom. Basically, this means human beings do not waste their reproductive potential; they are capable of producing more babies than gorillas and chimpanzees, and infants are more protected and cared for and so are more likely to survive infancy. Reproductive efficiency, therefore, consists of two related components: reproductive capacity and ability to care for the young once they are born.

An increased reproductive capacity may have been an adaptive solution to the problem of high mortality which existed in early hominid populations . . . . But it may be an adaptation to conditions that no longer exist. Yesterday's solution thus becomes today's problem.

In regard to their capacity for reproducing offspring, women exceed gorilla and chimpanzee females in all significant measures; they live longer reproductive lives, they ovulate more frequently and ovulation resumes more quickly after a child is born. Human females are capable, under optimum circumstances, of bearing an infant every fifteen months. Over a reproductive life of approximately thirty-seven years, from age 15 to 47, a woman is therefore *capable* of bearing twenty-five children even without twins or triplets. Fortunately, optimum circumstances are rare and few women actually reach their full reproductive capacity. Among modern day hunter-gatherers, fertile women who survive their full reproductive life usually bear fewer than seven children. Contemporary hunter-gatherers, however, live in difficult marginal subsistence settings and for this reason fail to represent accurately the human capacity. Hutterite women, generally well nourished and actively seeking to have as many children as possible, average between ten and eleven children.

By comparison, chimpanzee and gorilla females are estimated as able to bear approximately six or seven infants. In fertile females, capacity is probably close to reality. The estimate is not secure, however, since it is based on very little data. No one, to emphasize the point, has ever observed the birth of a gorilla or chimp infant in the wild. But if the estimate is even close, then human females are able to produce many more offspring than African ape females can produce. In this regard —the capacity to produce infants—human females are reproductively more efficient.

An increased reproductive capacity may be an adaptive solution to the problem of high mortality which existed in early hominid populations. The most compelling evidence for our improved reproductive capacity comes indirectly from the explosive population increase in recent decades following a marked decline in mortality rates. The recent increase illustrates the capacity of our species to produce more of its kind and the growth has taken place even though all cultures have one or more constraints on unrestricted fertility — for example, marriage regulations, intercourse taboos, sanctions favoring infanticide, abortion, celibacy, chastity, virginity, homosexuality, masturbation, surgical sterilization, and recently, the availability of a multitude of pills, potions, devices, gels and foams which inhibit conception.

The overall effect of culture on human reproduction may be more insidious, for culture defines the very nature of the relationship between the sexes. According to Columbia University anthropologist Robert Murphy, culture defines the relationship in a way which reverses the biological reality. Citing the work of Masters and Johnson in his support, Murphy argues that the common cultural beliefs about human sexuality express views which in fact are the opposite of the biological reality. Females are in fact sexually more competent than males, their need for sexual arousal less than males, their capacity for sexual gratification longer lasting and of finer quality than males. Overall, the effect of the cultural reversal of these beliefs represses female sexuality and thereby constrains reproductive capacity.

So improved reproductive capacity may be the powerful remnant of an adaptation to conditions which no longer exist. Yesterday's solution thus becomes today's problem. Improved reproductive capacity was not a complete solution even yesterday because of the immediate effect it had on child care and nurturing, the other aspect of reproductive efficiency. More babies per mother meant more infant care for survival. In the economics of evolutionary biology, survival is always contingent upon the successful completion of a businesslike transaction across generations. Sociobiologists have developed this marketplace analogy to enable them to measure several aspects of behavior in adaptation.

Infant care is a way one generation protects its investment in the next. Though at a very general level one may see social organization as a protection of the mother-infant relationship, in most mammals, the tasks of infant care are performed primarily by mothers, and in primates the responsibility is more exclusive since mothers rarely bear more than one infant. Among the gorillas and chimpanzees observed in the wild, mothers regularly cared for but one infant at a time. Among chimpanzees the care is extended over a long time and reports are common of a chimpanzee mother carrying an infant on her belly as a juvenile rides her back. Yet even among chimpanzees, mothers rarely care for more than one infant.

Human females are unique among the primates in having a long post-reproductive sexually active stage in their life cycle.

In human evolution, with multiple infants per mother relatively common, primary child care tasks extended to juveniles, adult males and childless females. The early hominids protected their generational investment by involving all other members of the group more directly in the nurturing of children. In human groups child care is the direct concern of all individuals; it is imbedded in affective ties, sharing networks and reciprocity relationships, an entire social reticule expressed in the kinship systems of preliterate societies. *Homo sapiens* is a species in which both genders and all life stages beyond infancy have been selected in part for their ability to contribute directly to the care of infants.

Long Post-Reproductive Life. Human females continue active sexual lives long after their reproductive lives are over. There are no data on gorillas, but chimpanzee females, according to a recent study from the Yerkes Primate Research Center, continue to ovulate throughout their lives. Human females are unique among the primates in having a long post-reproductive sexually active stage in their life cycle; there is nothing comparable in apes, nothing comparable in men. The value of experienced females in stabilizing and nurturing small populations with multiple infants per mother is easy to imagine, though very difficult to measure. Grandmothering augments parenting and thereby increases the opportunity for selection to improve on reproductive efficiency.

The post-reproductive stage is not merely the addition of years under favorable conditions, for it occurs as well under adverse conditions. Nor is a long post-reproductive life understandable as simply another step in an irrevocable ontogenetic program. The post-menopausal life stage, currently more than one third of a Western woman's life, is understandable, to return to the business metaphor, as an advantage to the individuals of one generation enhancing the likelihood that the investment in the next generation will be successful. Mothers may have several infants at once, but a long post-reproductive life assures that the proportion of adult females to infants remains high in human populations.

The patterns of female sexuality and reproduction are distinctive in human beings—patterns which took shape after our ancestors separated from the lines which led to modern gorillas and chimpanzees. As mentioned earlier, the patterns reveal that evolution within our lineage has not been uniform. The differentiation of females has been so strikingly different from males, one can hardly escape the implication that the changes must have been of fundamental importance in human evolution. This brings us to the question of how the changes influenced the course of human evolution. What was their significance? Erect posture, for example, freed the hands for carrying and for making tools. But what role did the differentiation of female sexuality play in human evolution? One fact, itself an enigma, offers a clue: our ancestors spread across the earth very rapidly. Changes in female sexuality may have enabled that explosive dispersion to take place.

Whatever the significance, females changed in more basic ways during the course of human evolution than males changed.

If the biochemical evidence is accurate, our lineage had separated from the African apes by from four to six million years ago. As recently as two million years ago, the hominids were still confined to the tropics. One million years ago there is evidence of our ancestors beginning to move out of the tropics and into temperate climates in the Old World. Within the last million years the hominids spread around the world. The dispersal took place well after the first recorded fossil evidence of erect posture, and well before evidence of the earliest significant cultural achievements. For these reasons there is reason to believe the spread of our species is somewhat independent of the adoption of erect posture and acquisition of culture.

Without the hard evidence of fossils, one can only speculate on the sequence of and interrelationships between events. Our ancestors were colonizers. A colonizing species constantly faces high mortality as its populations encounter new adaptive challenges. High mortality selects for improved reproductive efficiency. Once adapted, populations faced the problems of improved reproductive efficiency which, in turn, created again the conditions calling for more colonizing. As Duane Quiatt argues in a forthcoming publication, improved reproductive efficiency in females provided individual males with an opportunity to improve on their reproductive fitness by affiliating more or less permanently with one or more females. The synchronizing of male and female sexualities rendered these affiliations attractive and at the same time facilitated colonizing by enabling very small groups to move out and occupy new territories. Even a pair of individuals could become a colony. Thus, improved reproductive efficiency with continuous capability for sexual arousal could have worked together in enabling our ancestors to spread rapidly into new regions. Extending primary child care to all members of the group, to post-reproductive females in particular, represented an investment in parenting which further secured the chances of survival in the subsequent generation.

Whatever the significance, females changed in more basic ways during the course of human evolution than males changed. While this paper deals with three of the most distinctive changes, others have been proposed. Human females regularly copulate from a ventral position; African ape females regularly in a dorsal position. Human females are capable of orgasm during intercourse; ape females rarely if ever experience organsm in intercourse. Human females masturbate as a means of sexual gratification; ape females rarely masturbate and it is possible that in the wild they never do. Sexual activity continues in ovariectomized women; it ceases when the ovaries are removed from primate females.

Some of these apparent distinctions may disappear as more data become available on primates living in their natural settings. At present they add strength to the impression of basic changes having taken place in females during human evolution.

There is a familiar evolutionary precedent in the evolution of mammals. The differentiation of the mammals involved fundamental changes in the sexual and reproductive characteristics of females, changes not paralleled in mammalian males. In many ways the distinctive features of mammalian reproduction — internal fertilization with implantation, placentation, parturition, lactation — are the distinctive features of mammalian females. Similarly, the distinctive features of human sexuality and reproduction are the distinctive features of women.

The turbulence of adolescence and early adult life in contemporary society is thus likely to be felt more keenly by females than males. The human female during those years is adapted to a close network of support from others, particularly from older post-menopause coresidents. In place of the intimacy and support of kinfolk, a contemporary woman faces alone the critical decisions accompanying sexual maturity, the early pregnancies, childbearing and responsibility for child care. There is no biological precedent for such isolation among our primate relatives or for that matter even our closest human ancestors. Living alone, or nearly so, is an unnatural act.

Men have the largest penises and are alone among the apes in lacking a penis bone. These features deserve more serious attention than they have been given, but apart from these there is only one other thing one can say about the sexuality of men that one cannot also say about ape males: Men talk a lot more about sex. A good place to stop.

Chemical Dependence and Drugs

Donald West King
Delafield Professor of Pathology, Columbia University

The age group we are discussing is a very healthy age group. The childhood diseases have pretty well run their course, and the death rate is extremely low. Most of the deaths are caused by accidents, homicides, and suicides. (See Table 3 on the following page.) There is, however, a relatively heavy dependence on drugs of various kinds. Most of my remarks will deal with that problem, but I also want to talk briefly about mental illness and the growing problem of environmental pollution.

Therapeutic Drugs in Excess. Most of the discussion we hear about the drug problem among young people has to do with marijuana and the so-called "hard" drugs, but there are lots of other drugs which, if taken in excess, can be dangerous — not only to adolescents but also to older people. Even an overdose of certain vitamins, such as A, D, E, C, and B_6 can produce harmful side effects. There is also a broad spectrum of antibiotics, some of which affect certain people in unexpected ways. Penicillin is a good example. Some people just can't take it because they're allergic to it. Unfortunately, there are certain chemotherapeutic drugs that are extremely useful in treating certain diseases, but some of the people who take them develop secondary malignancies.

Even aspirin can be dangerous. Many young people in the age group we are discussing take aspirin in large quantities, and they develop severe stomach and pancreatic ulcers. Cortisone, a very useful anti-inflammatory drug, sometimes produces insensitivity to pain, which can be quite dangerous. Antihistamines, when taken in large doses, have serious toxic ramifications.

Table 3
Ten Leading Causes of Death Among People 14 to 24
(1977)

	Rate per 100,000
Accidents:	62.5
Motor vehicle 44.1	
All other 18.4	
Suicide	13.6
Homicide	12.7
Cancer	6.5
Heart disease	2.5
Congenital anomalies	1.6
Influenza and pneumonia	1.3
Cerebrovascular diseases	1.2
Anemias	0.4
Diabetes	0.4
All other causes	14.5

Source: Mortality Statistics Branch, Division of Vital Statistics, National Center for Health Statistics, DHEW, Hyattsville, Md.

Now we come to contraceptive drugs, which more and more young women are taking. The oral contraceptives usually contain estrogen or progestin, or combinations of the two. Some are long acting, and taken only once a month. Others are taken daily, beginning about five or six days after menstruation. Both of these drugs have harmful side effects.

Estrogen produces nausea, dizziness, and vomiting; fluid retention or edema formation; painful breast engorgement, hypertension; mild to severe headache; blood clotting disorders; alteration in liver function tests and jaundice; changes in blood glucose levels, and increases in hormone binding proteins in the blood.

Progestin causes fatigue, mental depression, and lack of motivation; decreased menstrual flow; changes in liver function; acne, weight gain, and hirsutism.

Women under 50 rarely have coronaries—they seem to be protected from them until the beginning of the menopause—but some preliminary studies indicate that women who have taken contraceptives for at least ten years have a higher rate of coronaries than those who have not. So maybe in a few years we'll see an increase in coronaries among women under 50.

Caffeine, Nicotine, and Alcohol. These are the drugs that are most widely used by adolescents and older people. Caffeine, of course, is present in Coca Cola, coffee, and tea. Most people think it's not important, that it isn't anything to worry about. But caffeine is an important stimulant. It increases the response of the reflexes. It also decreases the appetite, and some people use it to lose weight, but if taken in large doses over long periods of time it can be harmful. People who use it that way do so at their own peril.

The adverse effects of nicotine are so widely know that I don't have to go into them here, but the tragedy is that many young people start smoking at an early age.

Teenagers are also beginning to use alcohol at earlier ages than was the case 20 or 30 years ago. When used in moderation, alcohol is not a particularly harmful drug, but when used to excess over long periods of time it can produce acute intoxication, delirium tremens, hepatitis and cirrhosis of the liver.

The question that's usually asked about alcohol is how much is too much? A friend of mine has an answer to that. I don't know whether it's right or wrong, but I'll pass it along to you anyway. He claims that if you have eight ounces of 50-proof alcohol a day for ten years you are going to find yourself in trouble. That's about four martinis a day. When you take a drinking history from patients you sometimes get four bottles of wine a day, or two bottles of whiskey. Those people are in real trouble already. I guess the best answer is that the ability to handle alcohol varies widely from individual to individual, but if you drink more than you can handle over a long period of time you will develop acute chronic alcoholism.

Hallucinogenics. The one that has received most attention is LSD, which young people call "acid." There's also mescaline, which is present in cactus buttons. These drugs precipitate dizziness and nausea, and they have psychic effects which may be pleasurable for a while, but they can be extremely dangerous.

Some people include marijuana among the hallucinogenic drugs, but other people claim it is not hallucinogenic. The number of people throughout the world who use marijuana is probably around 300 million. Here in the United States it's about 20 to 30 million, and my guess is that maybe half of the 45 million people in the age group we are discussing here have tried marijuana at one time or another. We know it produces euphoria, sleepiness, and a dream-like state, but we don't know much more than that about it. In some states it's outlawed, but interestingly enough in a few other states it has been given legal status for experimental use in the treatment of glaucoma.

Tons and tons of anti-anxiety drugs are prescribed with little or no justification.

Depressants. The depressants are a large group of drugs that include the barbiturates and the so-called anti-anxiety agents. Among the longer-acting barbiturates are barbital, which is sold under the trade name Veronal, and phenobarbital, which has the trade name Luminal. The most commonly used intermediate-acting depressants bear the trade names Nembutal and Seconal; they induce sleep. Many people take Nembutal or Seconal every night of their lives.

The anti-anxiety agents — such as Miltown, Equanil, Librium, and Valium — are the most widely used prescription drugs in the United States. Tons and tons of these drugs are prescribed with little or no justification. Their toxic and psychological effects can be extremely harmful.

Narcotics. These are the so-called "hard" drugs. They include heroin, cocaine, methadone, morphine, and opium. All of them are covered by the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. The granddaddy of them all, of course, is opium. It's the substance from which most other narcotics are made, and it's been around for hundreds of years. After the Civil War, for example, it was estimated that about four percent of the population was taking opium in one form or another.

Heroin, a widely used derivative of opium, is the drug most commonly sold on the streets. Twelve kilograms of opium will make only one kilogram of heroin. Then it's diluted as much as 20 or 30 times with quinine, barbiturates, or lactose. Although heroin is a tremendous respiratory depressant, it also has certain other side effects caused by the contaminants that are put into the final mixture. One of these side effects is hepatitis, which is transmitted by contaminated syringes.

The heroin problem, although still serious, has been diminishing in the past four or five years. In 1972 it was estimated that there were about 700,000 heroin addicts in the United States. This figure dropped to about 400,000 in 1974, and of those approximately 80,000 were on methadone maintenance. Methadone itself is an addictive drug. It's not anywhere near as dangerous as heroin, and you can maintain people on it, but eventually you have to wean them away from it just as you have to do with heroin.

Cocaine seems to be growing in popularity. A lot of people seem to be sniffing it these days. Its abuse potential is high, and it can have severe physical and psychological effects. Morphine is not as widely used as it was around the turn of the century.

Deaths from narcotic overdoses seem to be on the decline. In New York City last year, the number was about 800, almost half of what it was in 1966. That's not too bad when you consider that there were 1,700 murders in New York last year—and New York is not the murder capital of the world. There are several cities in the Southwest that have a higher murder rate, per capita, than New York.

Mental Illness. There are so many experts on mental illness in this room that I don't have to dwell on that subject except to say that about 60 percent of the 48,000 deaths in the 14-to-24 age group are caused by mental illness. In addition, there are 5,600 suicides, 4,600 homicides, and 1,700 fatal accidents. Two things about these figures are interesting to me. First, mental illness must have been a contributory cause in some of the deaths by suicide, homicide, and fatal accidents. Second, I would guess that about half of the deaths by suicide resulted from an overdose of drugs.

Environmental Pollution. We're all aware of the tremendous array of contaminants that pollute the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the food we eat. Most of them are carcinogens. The air pollutants are probably the most pervasive. For example, there is one county in New Jersey that at one time had the highest incidence of cancer in the country, largely because of its heavy concentration of industry. We've all heard about the smog in the Los Angeles area, produced by the exhaust from automobiles. And then, of course, we're beginning to be conscious of the fact that smokers not only injure themselves but also pollute the air that others breathe.

Pesticides and industrial waste are the principal causes of water pollution. It took us a long time to recognize the dangers of DDT. It has not only contaminated the water we drink, but it has also gotten into mother's milk. It's now banned in this country, but in several other countries it's still being used as a pesticide. Love Canal in upper New York state brought home to us the dangers of industrial waste, but there are probably about 600 Love Canals around the country. Asbestos is still being dumped into Lake Superior.

Rural areas are thought to be healthier than highly industralized cities, and that may be true, but we've all heard about the cattle feed contaminated by fertilizer and the migrant workers in California being sprayed with pesticides.

In recent years we have become increasingly concerned about food additives. Some are harmful, but others are not. Cyclamates and saccharine are probably not carcinogenic, but they have been largely pushed off the market by a recent amendment to the Food and Drug law, which says that any drug that causes cancer in any species in any dosage is banned.

The fact of the matter is that we are surrounded by toxic substances, and there's no way to ban them all. We're going to have to live with them.

Discussion

Leonard Duhl: Several of my colleagues and I have been gathering data on toxic substances in the equipment and materials used for construction. We have found that buildings constructed with sealed windows and built-in air conditioning systems have a higher moribidity and mortality rate than other buildings. That applies to homes as well as office buildings. And with the energy crisis and the slowing down of air conditioning, there has been a tremendous buildup of all the toxic stuff in the rooms.

I mention this in reference to your comments because it seems to me that what we've got here is a situation where we spend most of our lifetime trying to control the environment, and each time we control the environment with one thing we end up having to control the thing we controlled, and then we are in an endless process of controlling the controller. Isn't it about time to start raising questions about this whole philosophy? Maybe we ought to shift gears. This is something the adolescents are raising questions about all the time. Do you have to live in a system that controls everything or, as they say, do you take to the hills?

Robert Aldrich: I can add one other example. In the March issue of the *Journal of Epidemiology*, there's a good article by someone in our department showing that the occurrence of carcinoma is directly related to how close the individual lives to power substations, telephone poles, and transmission lines. It's very sophisticated.

Sidney Werkman: Don, I was curious about why you said that tons of anti-anxiety agents are given to patients without justification.

King: Maybe because of my personal experience.

A. J. Kelso: I think a lot of people use them because they're so easily available

Harold Visotsky: That's right. People get upset about something and they reach for some Valium. Why should they do that?

Werkman: Why shouldn't they take something to relieve their anxiety? There are 25 million people in this country who are chemical copers, which means they regularly use agents of the kind Don was referring to, but that doesn't mean we are an over-medicated society.

Edmund Pellegrino: I think we are. We spend 18 billion dollars a year on drugs in this country. We've abandoned our critical faculties when it comes to the ingestion of drugs. We have an insatiable itch to take something.

John Schweppe: I'd like to bring out one other small point, and that is that some of these agents are given for a specific reason. Whatever they're used for, the physician should explain to the patient exactly what the drug does and what side effects it has. The cross-mixing of drugs can have very serious consequences.

June Christmas: I agree. I think we do often have physicians prescribing without encouraging patients to explore the causes of stress and anxiety and pointing out that there are other ways of dealing with them.

Werkman: May I just make one point here? It has to do with deep values in the society. I don't think we can cast these values into a puritanical versus permissive dichotomy, with some people saying you should be able to bear whatever your suffering is and never mind the mechanisms or prescriptions that are available for helping people to cope.

Pellegrino: That kind of polarity has no place in the relationship between the physician and the patient. Before a physician prescribes medication he should make it clear to the patient the alternative possibilities and let the patient decide, based on that knowledge. If the patient wants medication that really isn't necessary, the physician must decide whether or not to prescribe it. That really has nothing to do with puritanical views.

Werkman: There are many different positions, but I've worked with physicians who felt very uncomfortable about these issues. There may be alternatives, but sometimes they're not very realistic, like taking long walks and cold showers and all the rest to control sexual desire.

Visotsky: There's another consideration involved here. We had a detoxification unit for patients who had been taking prescribed drugs and become psychologically or physiologically dependent on them. The point that I'm making is that many of these patients realized that the drug they were taking was affecting their lives, their health, and their relationships with their families, and literally wanted to get off the drug. They came in asking for alternatives. If they had been made aware of these alternatives before they were put on the drug, I think they would have chosen not to take it.

Willard Wirtz: I have a great deal of difficulty in formulating my question. For the last 15 minutes we've heard the experts here discuss carcinogens on a level totally beyond my comprehension. I'd like to get some idea of the scale of concern we ought to have about the things that have been discussed. I assume that the life expectancy of a 25-year-old today is longer than it used to be. Can anyone tell me, on a scale from one to ten, how great our concern should be about carcinogens?

King: I'll give you a personal opinion. Bruce Ames says that so much has happened in the chemical industry in the last 15 years that he thinks we're going to have an increase in cancer in the 80's and 90's. I disagree with that. Right now there are probably between 20 and 30 known compounds that are causing cancer in humans. If you take something like diethylstilbestrol, there are less than 300 cases of cancer from DES out of all the millions of doses that have been given in this country. Vinylchloride is another compound that has made the front page. It produces a peculiar type of cancer of the liver. There are less than 200 cases documented in the country. Arsenic is another example. There are less than 20 cases documented in the country of cancer produced by arsenic, yet every plant that has anything to do with arsenic is considered hazardous. My answer to your question is this. In those industrial situations where the toxicity is high—even for a small group of people—extreme precautionary measures should be taken. The same sort of things should be done in chemical plants. But to say that one chemical plant that is making a chromate is a hazard to the entire general population is crazy. The real hazard lies in the quantitative change that's taking place. Individual susceptibility of the cell to the great spectrum of 60 or 70 thousand chemicals that are now present in our environment is completely unknown.

Ernest Bartell: I think the eagerness of society to zero in on these rather small cases that we're talking about, and the eagerness of practitioners to prescribe drugs as opposed to other alternatives, really has to do with our preception of probabilities. The practitioner prescribing the drug knows well what some of the consequences are, but at least there's a probability of some kind of success. A quick fix of some kind is more certain than the alternatives. There's a bias toward making the choice whose chances of success seem greater. And that applies to a lot of things in our society. It also has to do with going after these carcinogens. We go after the ones where we can find something rather than trying to regulate the ones where there is still a lot of uncertainty.

Visotsky: Getting back to the question of alternatives to drugs. I think you really have to belong to what I call the "chicken soup" school of therapy. Maybe they won't work, but there's no harm in trying them.

Paul Bohannan: My concern is with the cultural dimensions of the drug problem. That we can maybe do something about. We can learn to think about it and talk about it.

Aldrich: I want to comment on another aspect of the drug problem. I think the ignorance of this age group about personal care and personal hygiene and that sort of thing is really rather large in comparison to what is known, and I think that those of us here in the medical profession can rightly be criticized for not launching a really major effort to educate people in elementary school and on up about personal hygiene.

There's a very interesting program of that kind going on in India, where, as you know, the child mortality is very high. What they do is teach personal hygiene of the simplest kind to elementary school children and then have those kids teach it to their younger brothers and sisters at home. This system works very well. We in this country could do a lot more than we're doing now.

Werkman: I'd like to follow up on that point. In this age group several of the most important health issues have to do with nutrition as well as ingestion of all kinds of drugs. Society in general has not come up with useful guidelines that would help young people make informed choices about their diets. What we have is a lot of advertising on TV and in the newspapers that pushes junk food. No wonder young people are bewildered about what they ought to eat.

Visotsky: That's the kind of anxiety that causes some people to take Valium.

Psychiatric Factors

Leonard Duhl
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My remarks will be brief, but I hope they will be provocative. My thesis is that we are moving into a time when we must change the way we think about reality.

What we have called education is really de-education, because it stifles our natural curiosity and teaches us to conform to an established set of realities. It ignores the fact that there are other realities, and other ways of looking at what we call reality. Take, for example, John Schweppe's questions: Who are we? Why do we exist? What's the meaning of life? These are the big questions that somehow never get answered by science but get answered by religion and philosophy. My experience with students in the university, and interestingly enough with students as young as junior high age, is that when you start raising these questions they get turned on and are willing to talk about issues in a way that says: "Hey, those questions are interesting," while some of the scientific issues which get us into dead ends are issues that are bothersome to students. If you can show them how science and philosophy tie together they're really turned on. Their imagination begins to move in many, many different ways. So I think this raises questions for us about what education is all about.

Now, briefly, I would like to comment about health and medicine. We have talked a lot here about growth and development. I have a suspicion that what we are calling health is the optimum balance between one's internal and external environment. When a crisis or a difficulty arises, we sometimes break down and go into dis-ease. What tends to happen is that we develop a series of symptoms. The physician goes in and treats the symptoms. In modern medicine we do magnificently in treating the symptom, but we do very poorly at returning that person to the normal growth and development cycle — what I call healing. Treatment and healing, which used to go hand in hand, are now almost separate. In the process of getting more and more scientific, the physician has given up that healing quality which has in part been the laying on of hands. In part it's been the reconnecting of the individual to all the significant others. This is, in fact, the role the shaman plays — the role of doing both the treatment and the healing by reconnecting people. So networking and reconnecting people to the environment become part of the concern with health.

At the present time, there are a tremendous number of people emerging who are called alternative healers. Many of them, I have to say, are quite fraudulent. On the other hand, they are performing functions that the medical profession is not performing. This is a more general question I'm raising for all of us — that if our institutions do not deal adequately with the problems that face us, alternatives will emerge. Confronted by these alternatives emerging in medicine, the profession can do one of two things. It can absorb or co-opt them, which is what I guess will happen. Bioethics is just one of the opening doors. Acupuncture and biofeedback are other ways of co-opting the alternatives. I believe that a lot of these unorthodox healing methods will get absorbed by modern medicine. On the other hand, there are some things that modern medicine cannot do. Some of us work in cultures where there are not just white Anglo-Saxons, but also Chicanos, American Indians, and people from the Pacific. What we suddenly find is that we cannot treat these people primarily by Western medicine — that we have to find some kind of blending between the two.

We're living in a period where we have to search for many different ways of looking at things.

The Public Health Service, to my amazement, is supporting medicine men on the Navajo reservation. There are programs jumping up in many different places around the world in which the two kinds of medicine are being put together. So, just to sum up, the challenge that I think is now before us is that we're living in a transition period. We're living in a period where we have to search for many different ways of looking at things. But how can we live with the ambiguity of this period? As Harold Visotsky asked earlier, do we have to take Valium to deal with that ambiguity and anxiety? Or can we openly deal with it and realize that some of the problems do not have answers given our current reality? And that we have to start searching in new ways? Ways that may be very foreign to our education?

My experience with all kinds of alternative health methods during the past eight years has taught me that I have to accept the fact that people do believe in them, and that some of them are effective. It's like the argument I used to have with my father, who says: "Prove it to me and then I'll believe it." I've had to say that you've got to go back to the old religious notion: "You'd better believe it first, and then I can prove it to you."

I found that as I moved into alternative reality I had to go into it with an open mind — to suspend judgment first and then try to understand and appreciate it. But what does this have to do with adolescents? I think they are probably becoming better prepared for this world than any of us. And I must say that I am disappointed that there aren't any of them here in this room. It's very hard for us to talk about them without their being present.

Discussion

Auditor: I'd like to raise a point. I think Freud mentioned that the musings of the educated conscious mind do not fully explain reality. I was curious as to what you might say to that.

Duhl: Freud was talking about the unconscious, but I'm talking about cultures other than our own. An awful lot of us don't know how really civilized those cultures are until we get into them — until we actually wallow in them. The more I got into some of these other cultures the more I realized that some of them — for example, that of the Tibetan Lamas — have a view of the mind which is far more complicated than Freud ever dreamed. They took me into spaces that I haven't got the vaguest conception of yet.

Paul Bohannan: I would like to point out, from an anthropologist's point of view, what Len has been doing is participant observation — that is, going out to discover how other people in the world organize their reality and understand it. I'm going to say categorically that there is no better way to understand what our form of reality is than to go out and come to terms with another form of reality. It is the only cure for ethnocentrism. It is the only cure for thinking that you have all the right answers.

I think it's very important to pay a lot of attention to other cultures, because we all know that the multiplicity of cultures has gone into making this country what it is. And by going out and actually living in other cultures you begin to get another point of view. You really develop a stereoptic point of view that gives you an entirely different perspective on reality. The cultural dimension is not something that anthropologists just talk about. It's something without which we can't even understand our *own* little culture and our *own* little prejudices.

Robert Aldrich: I think that a great many people — and I'm one of them, or was until I began to see a little light at the end of the tunnel — who don't think of culture as being as firm and rigid and real as it is. I used to think that changing a culture was as easy as buying a new suit. I really did, and I know that's not so. Now I'm beginning to think that changing a culture is as difficult as changing a person's genetic makeup. I'd like to hear more discussion of this.

Duhl: It might sound crazy, but the current discussions about the problems of death are really quite interesting, because they are part of a concept central to all religions. It has to do with the question of change. You've got to die in order to move into another world. Every culture of the world that talks about death talks about it in that way. And it's no accident that death is a very important issue for adolescents. They're talking about it now like I've never heard it talked about before. They're talking about dying — giving up everything they have. Giving up what most of their searches have been about — all their religious quests. You have to give up everything that you hold dear to you in order to really be born again.

John Schweppe: Len, I understand certain elements of what you're saying and to me it's intriguing. I know that if you're going to understand something you have to understand what went before it, and I know it will take a long time to fill in all the gaps. But is what you're describing a state of mind or a new way of looking at reality?

Duhl: I guess I'm suggesting that science has to switch around, from linear thinking to something which is relatively holographic — which says in fact everything already exists. That we may not have to find it. That all we have to do is let it emerge. It's a very different notion of research, and a different notion of education. Instead of saying the child is an empty vessel that we have to fill up, it says maybe we have to invent ways for the child to emerge. That's a philosophy of education that hasn't done very well. It means in medicine and in health maybe instead of thinking that we can treat anybody, all we do is facilitate the self-healing of the person in tune with the universe around him. The native American healers say they don't treat anybody. They say all they do is transmit God's energy of the universe to heal. Now, that's a very different notion.

So you're perfectly right and I'm really asking for a radical shift in the way we conceptualize issues. But I still believe that science is relevant. I'm really asking for what Ed Pellegrino asked for earlier—a dialectic between these various points of view so we can start expanding the way we look at things. For example, I have a suspicion that really great creativity does not come out of rationality alone. It comes out of a blending of rational with nonrational thinking — a hunch, or a flash of intuition. So, John, what I'm really pushing for is a major shift in the way we think about reality.

Auditor: When you say you're pushing for a blend of rational and nonrational thinking, aren't you taking a step back?

Duhl: I don't think so.

Auditor: But putting the pieces together in a different way doesn't necessarily mean that it's rational. It could be a step back.

Duhl: I'll go so far as to say that it's the last gasp of the scientific model to claim that if we only keep doing something we will find the scientific answer. My point is that we have to do something else besides.

Bohannan: I agree. What you're suggesting is not as frightening as many who have not tried it seem to think. Finding this "something else" would establish a sort of dialectic—a way of looking at problems from the point of view of many cultures, instead of looking at them inside the environs of our own culture. Our problems, of course, are our problems. But, let's get a wider view of them. They're very much easier to solve that way.

Pellegrino: I think the key to what Paul said is that you really have to understand the place where you are standing in terms of the experience of other cultures. One of the problems of the age group we're discussing is that they have not yet established a place to stand on. That creates this tremendous confusion and shift in values.

Duhl: I agree. A lot of the young people we see as psychiatric patients are those who have gone out and experienced the alternative world without being grounded. Their problem, though, is that those of us who are their teachers do not help them go through the process, chiefly because we haven't gone through it ourselves.

A. J. Kelso: You don't have to go very far to make the contrast, either. You don't have to go to another home or another place. The value differences between us and the young people we're talking about are probably as great as the value differences between separate cultures. Try listening to your teen-age son or daughter.

Bohannan: I want to add something to what I said earlier. In order to understand what is happening right now we cannot stand where we were standing yesterday, because new realities are emerging all the time.

Aldrich: I want to raise a question that I raised last year at an international symposium on the future of children. I got thoroughly blasted, but I'll try it again, because we really shouldn't engage in a serious discussion about young people in our own country without looking at the youth population of the rest of the world. The numbers are staggering, and so are the differences in culture, in beliefs, and in concepts of reality.

One of the new realities, as we may learn first hand very soon, will come when the young people in the rest of the world decide to come and get some of the things they perceive as needs.

I would guess that if you look at the international cohort of 25-year-olds, the vast majority live in Third World countries. These are the rough dimensions of the world reality. The reason that these numbers are so staggering is that we in the United States are so concerned about the future of our own children that we fail to recognize that the resources needed to produce high-quality offspring in the rest of the world should be in the hands of the 15-to-25 or 15-to-35 age group right now. And they aren't.

It seems to me that we have to ask ourselves how to go about realistically sharing the world's resources so that we will have high quality future generations on this planet. That's a much bigger challenge than our problem in the United States.

Socio-Psychological Approaches

June Jackson Christmas
Commissioner of Mental Health, City of New York

I shall discuss some approaches we use in New York City to help youth experience adolescence adaptively in regard to themselves, others and society. I also want to share some of my concerns and the challenges I believe they pose for programs and policy.

Adolescents experience stresses resulting from the normal developmental tasks. Their physiological drives are intense. They have to cope with bodily changes, sexual urges, feelings of anxiety, frustration, aggression, and self-doubt. They live in a nether world, as neither children nor adults. In early adolescence, impulsivity may be prominent. In later years, the outside world is a potent force. The struggle to free one's self from parents arouses guilt and causes conflict. Peer pressure can contribute to growth and also to anti-social experimentation. The search for identity is painful; the search for one's own values is uncertain.

Socio-psychological approaches which we have developed address the varied aspects of adolescent life. Their referents are intrapsychic, interpersonal and social. I have conceived of them as containing, in varying degrees, five elements: social, therapeutic, educational, vocational, and environmental. In each, there is a social component, for human relationships are essential to the implementation of all approaches.

Specific programs can be preventive, developmental, therapeutic or rehabilitative in nature. Conducted in the natural setting of community or in the mental health, youth, or health service system, many of these programs are group-structured, taking advantage of the natural desire of adolescents for peer relationships.

Socio-psychological group approaches provide assistance to individuals in reaching one or more goals:

- To accomplish the developmental tasks of adolescence: psycho-sexual identity, independence; a value system; and vocational choice
- To develop effective coping mechanisms and adaptive alternative behaviors
- To decrease psycho-social, physical and psychopathological symptons, behaviors, discomfort, and dis-ease
- To reduce disabilities due to physical, mental, and social handicaps
- To gain increased ability to relate effectively to the familial and social environment
- To have a greater sense of self-esteem and awareness and to achieve a satisfactory level of personality integration

Now let me turn to the approaches themselves, emphasizing one or more examples of their usefulness.

In the *social* approaches, individual and group relationships are directed toward socialization, resocialization, and social learning so that youth can move in widening circles of social competence. These approaches may be carried out with varying degrees of structure. Some employ peer leaders; others rely on trained counselors, educators, or therapists. In peer group "rap sessions" the focus may be on problems of daily living. Other groups may deal with interpersonal relationships; decisions about sex, drugs, school; or habits and behavior. Topics for discussion and mutually arrived at solutions may arise from the group or be initiated by the leader. Sometimes the issues are hypothetical; often they hit close to home. Worries about the future, resentment over parental control, and difficulties in resisting pressure toward sexual activity (or guilt at not resisting) are typical. As members discuss ways of handling these situations, they use the group not for content but for the social learning that comes from problem solving, tolerance, choice, and support.

Therapeutic elements predominate in approaches based on psychodynamic principles, in which understanding of factors and influences beyond awareness is important. Group therapies involve the expression of inner feelings and the resolution of deep-seated conflicts through the use of group as a whole as well as through relationships with individual group members. This process can lead to improved self-awareness, impulse control, and clarity of identity. In group therapy, emotions, fantasies, problems, and reactions are expressed in an atmosphere of both acceptance and support and constructive response. Members come to see their own habitual way's of relating; by understanding their behavior within the group they gradually come to recognize "ghosts from the past" that distort today's reality and interfere with functioning. Appropriate for those with personality problems, neuroses, or behavioral disorders, group therapy is particularly useful in helping young people going through the normal processes of adolescence as all participants express feelings, experience self-discovery, and begin to care for themselves and others.

In the educational approach, content is more important than process, although both are used.

The third or *educational* element focuses on social learning also but in the context of problem solving and cognitive development. Avocational skills development, intellectual growth, and the acquisition of knowledge characterize this approach. Content is more important than process, although both are used. Interpersonal relationships are viewed more in the "here and now" than in the probing, therapeutic approach. This element is used in sex education, in teaching parenting skills, in education about responsible choices around drugs, drinking, and sexual activities. It is both the gaining of information which is important as well as the learning of its applicability.

The *vocational* element is present in approaches less related to emotions, relationships, or information, but more actional in process. For younger adolescents these approaches include group projects or tasks which teach planning, require collaboration and patience, and provide a sense of accomplishment or the opportunity to handle failure. For older youth, role playing helps in preparation for the unknown of tests, interviews, or the work world. Skills development leading to prevocational competence includes making choices and learning new social roles.

The *environmental* element relates to control over the social situation, decisions affecting one's life, and increased life options. Many youth have to deal with racism, discrimination, and poverty; if emotional disorders are also present, they are at greater disadvantage. The interventions in this mode aim to strengthen positive and decrease negative aspects of the social environment. Youth become more involved members of their community and the wider society, by social action and by links to community support systems which give them a sense of being valued, of belonging, or of having a shared purpose. Group forces are used to mobilize change potential in both individual and group as well.

Let me now turn to concerns and problems. Although I have emphasized groups of peers, using social interventions as an effective way to address some of the needs of adolescence, I must add that I do not consider these to be panaceas. Sometimes they are used as an approach which can best be described as "watered-down therapy" rather than to meet specific needs of certain youth. At times this is as a second-best substitute for recommended therapeutic programs or for more culturally appropriate therapies for ethnic minorities of color. This is shortchanging those youth, for all approaches need to be used selectively and appropriately for their intrinsic value. Complementary to other services or alone, they should not be used to explain away the lack of program innovation or to deal with a Proposition 13 mentality.

We need more multi-service centers, where adolescents can find help for a wide range of problems such as drugs, alcohol, jobs, or parents, without having to enter the health care system.

Using adolescents to help one another, both within the age group and with younger children, is a good idea. But we should not forget that young people can also help and be helped by older people, both in regard to tasks and in human relationships. In our society today, with its high mobility, small apartments, and numerous nursing homes, we lose sight of the fact that having grandparents around can be a wonderful way to teach the young how to relate to older people. I don't think we draw enough upon the kinds of people who are natural helpers — for example, the "surrogate parents" whom kids turn to for help when they run away from home. They have an enormous influence on young people, and they could be of great help to us if we learned how to use them effectively. Finally, I think we need more multi-service centers, where adolescents can find help for a wide range of problems, such as drugs, alcohol, jobs, or parents, without having to enter the health care system.

My time is running short, but let me finish by listing some of the problems that we face in trying to help adolescents:

- Adequate funding is extremely hard to come by, especially at a time when federal, state, and local budgets are tight.
- The scope and boundaries of the mental health field are in dispute. Is mental health really health, or is it education? Part of our problem here is a guild problem.
- We need to do more health promotion, to encourage constructive life styles and to do more in our schools to teach young people how to cope with stresses inherent in living.
- Some young people are more disadvantaged than others. We can't afford to short-change them in dealing with young people as a whole.
- How can we figure out what works and what doesn't work? Or, to put it another way, how can we evaluate experimental projects without running the risk that the evaluation plan itself will distort the experiment?
- There are many young people who went through periods of stress and came out knowing how to deal with stress. How can we build on their experiences in a constructive way to foster positive mental health?

Discussion

William Threlkeld: What about the peer groups you mentioned? Are they carefully structured peer groups, or are they the spontaneous peer groups that occur on the streets?

Christmas: We use various kinds. We have found that whether you have an informal group that you start on a street corner, or a formal group set up by an older teenager in our leadership program, or even one that just grows out of kids hanging around together, you can get the benefits of peer-group therapy. In the public schools we started out by talking about drugs, but we soon found that the kids also wanted to talk about other things, including sex and parents. The subjects ranged far and wide.

Sheila Kamerman: The thing that particularly fascinated me was that all of the therapeutic approaches you talked about were essentially universalistic approaches of the kind Al Kahn mentioned. Would you care to comment on that?

Christmas: You're right. I think that all young people need to know what makes them tick. That's one thing they all have in common. But they also want to know what makes *you* tick. What goes on in *you*. What makes you different from another person. That, too, needs to be part of the developmental approach.

Kamerman: What kinds of people make good peer-group discussion leaders?

Christmas: Well, from my experience I would say the best leaders are people who have the ability to empathize and not to be narrow and ethnocentric. People who care. People who can conceptualize. People who understand what kinds of interplay turn young people on.

Alfred Kahn: One of the obvious things to ask at this point is: Shouldn't the educational system be able to train such people, or is it something that you have to feel? If you have specialists, do you train them or do you untrain them and then try to educate them?

Christmas: I have helped train teachers in the art of leading peer-group discussions, and you're right. Some of them have had to unlearn some of the things they were taught before they could learn the right things to do.

John Demos: I think you've spread out a series of interesting and hopeful and quite possibly inspiring strategies for us. But I was wondering if you would comment a little more about the relationship of these particular strategies to the whole social environment in which the individuals involved find themselves.

Christmas: I certainly did not want to short-change the social environment. In answer to your question, some adolescents find the external world frustrating to the point where they feel like acting with violence against society, or against other people. But if you give them an opportunity to do something constructive with that anger—to turn it into positive social action or sublimate it—you have taught them how to deal with their feeelings and conflicts less destructively and with control.

School Counseling As an Intervention

Helen R. Washburn
School Counselor, Independent Schools of Boise City, Idaho

I am a public school educator. I have been engaged in that endeavor for fifteen years. Twelve of those years have been spent as a school counselor working with students, parents, and colleagues in the schools of Boise, Idaho. This past year I have been on leave from my position in Boise to serve as President of the American School Counselor Association. This unique experience has offered me the opportunity to travel extensively and to be involved with education programs and educators throughout the country. When I discuss counseling as an intervention, I will be doing so primarily as the practice of counseling takes place in public schools. I have made what I hope is a clear distinction between education and public schooling. To attempt to discuss school counseling outside the context of the situations facing present-day schools would be meaningless. Therefore, many issues facing schools today have been included. In light of the age group that is the focus of this meeting and the fact that the public school, in most cases, is part of their experience, such a focus seems appropriate.

What actually occurs in schools in the name of school counseling depends on many factors, including:

- The values and priorities of the community.
- The attitudes of the school administrators.
- The training, skills, and values of the counselor and, yes, even to some extent, the needs of the students.

Before we proceed further, perhaps we need to explore the meaning of the term "counseling."

That may be easier said than done, however, for counseling is one of those words that everybody understands but no two people seem to understand in precisely the same way. The term was not invented by psychologists, educators, or social workers. It is part of our everyday language, and the activity it represents is a part of our everyday life. During this century there has been an ever-increasing amount of professional counseling carried on, and an increasing number of people who see themselves as counselors.

In schools there is considerable confusion as to what is counseling, what is guidance, and what is education and consequently a broader school responsibility. One can only understand present school counseling, I feel, by understanding from whence it came. I am, therefore, going to highlight some of the events that have led up to the model I advocate and which I feel makes sense in light of the complexities surrounding present-day schools.

School counseling is an American invention, and it emerged from the early vocational guidance efforts. The need to place people in the labor force of early twentieth-century industrial New England and provide some incidental "moral" guidance gave school counseling its start. Testing functions to assist with that placement process were added in the 1920's and 30's. Also added at that time was enforcement of compulsory attendance laws.

With Sputnik, the encouragement of the academically talented took on a high national priority with emphasis on college placement, and under the National Defense Education Act many classroom teachers went through a retreading process to become school counselors. They were trained in quickly assembled counselor-education programs which lacked commonalities as to purpose, philosophy, and development of relevant skills. Client-centered therapy utilizing a one-to-one approach was touted as the ideal. Those newly trained counselors re-entered their school settings to encounter administrators and teachers who saw them as having an abundance of free time to assume the paper work associated with college admissions and quasi-administrative tasks related to the running of the school. In 1959 James B. Conant published a book entitled *The American High School Today* in which he advocated large comprehensive high schools. He also advocated full-time school counselors for every 250 to 300 pupils. Conant's ideas had a tremendous impact on public education. The consolidation efforts caused a disruption of many natural communities. The large high schools resulted in depersonalization, which created new problems.

The Sixties brought the era of great social change. Increasingly, the school was viewed as the instrument to restructure society. The civil rights movement heightened concerns about the need for guidance efforts to reduce the effects of stereotyping and bias in student choice-making. The "do your own thing" credo and the rapid increase in drug use among the age group caused a rise in conflict between students, parents, and school staff. Group process as an alternative to one-to-one counseling gained credibility. Prevention and early intervention began to be discussed, and elementary school counseling came into vogue.

The Seventies brought increased federal legislation — busing; the Career Guidance and Counseling Act; Title IX, the anti-discrimination legislation; and probably most far reaching in its impact, Public Law 94-142, the legislation for mainstreaming special education students. The Seventies also brought forth the idea of doing prevention and early intervention through the teaching of psychological education. Parents and teachers were viewed as colleagues with counselors in this process. A large volume of curriculum materials on decision making, career education, substance-abuse prevention, and self-development became available for use by counselors and teachers. Incorporation of psychological education was questioned, however, as a back-to-basics philosophy also hit the country.

School counseling needs to move beyond the stage of being a service related only to the whims of the administration and a drop-in clientele.

Psychological education is educational jargon for presenting in a planned, sequential way the tools for assisting students to figure out the questions of:

- Who am I?
- Where am I going?
- How do I get there?

Over the years the role of the counselor moved from one of advisor to one of therapist to now, one of facilitator of problem solving and decision making and educator for personal development.

I will come back to more specifics on counseling as an intervention later, but let me say that there is tremendous diversity as to what counselors do in schools. There is a need countrywide to accurately identify student needs in individual schools, and to structure guidance and counseling programs which include services aimed at addressing those identified needs.

School counseling needs to move beyond the stage of being a service related only to the whims of the administration and a drop-in clientele.

To develop such counseling programs rather than offer a service represents a significant change. The determinants, however, of the priorities of a district—change or otherwise—are the attitudes, values, and economics of the local community. The American way is local control. Everyone thinks he or she is an expert on education by virtue of experience or because of financial investment. Will Rogers summed it up by saying: "Education ain't what it used to be and never was."

With counseling services, parents sometimes resist those aspects of programs that usurp prerogatives they feel are better left to the family. In some areas counselors are subject to sharp criticism, particularly where information relates to sex education and values clarification. In the very same community there may be strong need and support for such programs. In public education the role of the school, and consequently the services of the school, are in a continual state of flux. Students' needs are often secondary to other issues.

Communities exert their influence on guidance programs, but the real determinant of what happens at the school level is the school administrator. Guidance services for too long have been seriously affected by what was comfortable for and met the needs of the principal. In one school where I worked ten years ago as the girls' counselor, my chief value rested with my abilities to be a model of ladylike decorum for our young women and to keep students from throwing what seemed like the cook's favorite dish, peanut butter balls, at the acoustical tile ceiling of the cafeteria during the lunch period. There were times when those two expectations came into conflict. That administrator, up until last year, was still a principal. The only thing that had really changed was the reality of Title IX, which prevented separately identified girls' and boys' counselors.

A school administrator who is able to react to the needs of students as well as to utilize the unique skills, talents, and interests of the school staff can do much to assure the kinds of programs that really assist students to grow and develop in healthy ways.

Most administrators tend to make decisions themselves and few view themselves as group facilitators, yet research indicates that the principal's leadership and the climate of the school can be greatly improved by bringing staff members and students into collaboration in solving problems. Such a style also increases the likelihood of innovation and change.

Reward systems being what they are in schools, utilization of such a democratic leadership style in preference to an autocratic style is discouraged rather than encouraged.

> **Although most state departments of education offer models and guidelines for guidance and counseling programs, such programs are seldom put into practice without administrator and community support. Top-down change processes have never worked very well in education.**

Few districts actively recruit school-level administrators who have skills at implementing innovative programs. The exceptional administrator is seldom given awards such as uncommitted time for research and reflection or positive recognition for achievements, let alone monetary awards. Instead, such administrators are assigned larger schools with more responsibilities and some are frequently treated as subversives.

Although most state departments of education offer models and guidelines for guidance and counseling programs, such programs are seldom put into practice without administrator approval and community support. Top-down change processes have never worked very well in education.

Counselors as persons generally are concerned people who work hard. Many feel that they are the "token caring person" and also a dumping ground for minutiae with little autonomy for changing the situation. Gilbert Wrenn, a leader in our profession, says "counselors in schools should be the ones to spot the person others don't see." Counselors would like to be that for students, yet the size of modern schools plus the complexities of today's schools prevent that kind of service. In a report I read recently a young black female said: "In my school I'm one of 3,000 . . . sometimes even I can't find me."

To make a point about student needs I'd like to share a story about a mother bird who was always building nests without bottoms. This became a community concern and some of the good citizens decided to pay her a call and find out what was going on. When asked about it, she replied, "I like building nests, but I hate kids."

One might think that we as a society hate kids when we look at our expectations of the schools and our lack of consideration of the needs of the adolescent age group. Worse yet, it appears some of the kids' needs are aggravated by or are a result of situations presented by the school. The stress of teachers over conflicting expectations — social change agent vs. back-to-basics — compounds the complexity of our dilemma.

People generally don't like force, yet currently social change is being implemented through economic and legal mandates, and as a result some unhealthy dynamics are occurring in schools. The learning climate is being affected and teachers' abilities to relate to students are restricted because of teachers' difficulties in coping. Students are reacting by missing more school, exhibiting violent behavior, and all those other myriad reasons for alarm that we read about in the newspapers.

There is a need for a more universal understanding and commitment to what services should be provided in the name of school counseling, and those services should more accurately reflect student needs.

Don't, please, misunderstand: I believe in the motives of the federal legislation. But from my perspective, the classroom teacher has been given a major role, maybe even *the* major role, in social change in this country and with virtually no preparation or psychological support for carrying out that role. If that function is indeed one which policy makers wish to continue, then counselors might well provide a valuable service by serving as a support system for teachers and as a convener of school staff discussion groups for the purpose of collective problem solving. For example, counselors could move into a role where they worked more with staffs and individual staff members to assist them in coping with the new dilemmas confronting the school and in developing skills for working with the increasingly diverse needs of students.

The implication for policy makers is that there is a need to:

- Study the impact of legislation on the people in the schools — staffs as well as students.
- Examine and alter the reward systems that are currently the norm in public education.

- Encourage smaller schools or school communities within larger schools so that trust, a sense of school community, and greater opportunities for responsibilities for students are established.
- And most importantly, continually strive toward community-level consensus on the purpose and desired outcomes of public education.

As I close, may I say that my perception is that many publics see the functions of school counselors as being a significant and positive intervention in assisting adolescents to gain understanding of themselves and their lives and to gain information and skills for making life choices. However:

- There is a need for a more universal understanding and commitment to what services should be provided in the name of school counseling, and those services should more accurately reflect student needs.
- Counselors should give greater importance to their educational or guidance functions and utilize group processes both in classrooms and in specially organized groups and in-service with teachers to carry out those shared functions.

There is a serious lack of coordination between in-school and out-of-school resources that serve youth, and between the schools and the private sector. This makes schools an artificially isolated experience for students, leads to frequent duplication of services, and wastes scarce resources.

- School counselors need to use maximally those others in schools — especially others involved in pupil personnel services — as well as specialists in the community, to provide the intensive therapeutic counseling for those students who need it.
- Finally, educators and policy makers must determine ways to improve schools as positive learning environments for people and then commit the resources to assure that growth occurs.

In summary, I offer the following conclusions and recommendations:

- Data collected in California indicated three areas in which students emphasized the need for information and guidance is greatest: planning for their futures, including work and further education; getting them to appropriate courses and seeing that they earn proper graduation credits; and understanding themselves and relating to others.

- The same study suggested that students in urban schools feel that guidance services are not accessible to them and do not assure them the confidentiality required to openly discuss their personal problems. They do not view guidance staff as the appropriate people with whom to discuss such problems.
- Sexist and racist stereotyping continue in career counseling, job placement, course assignment, and access to college admissions information.
- No effective vehicles seem to exist to communicate student needs to guidance staff or policy makers, and students are not included in designing or evaluating guidance services.
- There is a critical gap between the broad and idealistic rhetoric of guidance and what is actually delivered.
- Most guidance services operate without any program definition or clear priorities, and so are accountable to no one, do not deliver comprehensive services, misuse increasingly scarce counseling resources, and frustrate guidance personnel, students and administrators.
- There is a serious lack of coordination between in-school and out-of-school resources that serve youth, and between the schools and the private sector. This makes schools an artificially isolated experience for students, leads to frequent duplication of services, and wastes scarce resources.
- Innovative programs and counseling approaches do occur, but generally depend on the energy and inspiration of an individual counselor. Such programs tend to fade with that individual's energies. There are a few means of institutionalizing, sharing or evaluating innovative approaches.
- Ratios of students to staff in urban high schools range from 250:1 to 400:1. Almost all counselors complain that paperwork reduces direct counseling time. Counselors do not have classroom access or regularly scheduled times to meet with students. The lack of staff time for counseling is exacerbated in urban schools where government compensatory programs require extra paperwork, where counselors have larger student loads, and where students have fewer outside resources to deal with their problems. Counselors deal with crises and with the assertive students who demand their time, while most students receive little or no guidance.

My recommendations address the serious gaps between student needs and the guidance system's definition of services, between the potential of guidance counseling and its actual delivery.

- Develop comprehensive guidance programs that address student needs.
- Coordinate in-school with out-of-school resources.
- Involve students in defining, evaluating and delivering guidance services.
- Direct special resources to big city schools.
- Establish better means to share information about guidance programs and resources that address diverse needs in productive ways.
- Incorporate guidance into the curriculum.
- Assure confidentiality in the student-counselor relationship.
- Improve student-to-counselor ratios.

Discussion

Donald King: Helen, I thought Conant's whole premise was that if you had a big high school you had better art, music, better vocational education, better counseling, and so forth, and that the little country high school couldn't do as good a job in providing these things.

Washburn: That was his premise, but I think over the long haul we're finding that the small high school has some advantages over the large high school. Students in a small school have more of a feeling of belonging, more opportunities for relationships with faculty and students, and they have more freedom to grow in their own way. They have more opportunities for participation and leadership in school activities. These experiences are as important if not more so in preparing for life as the formal class experiences.

King: Wasn't Conant trying to give students of average ability a better chance to compete for admission to college?

John Darley: I think that's true, but it's also true that a lot of those students drop out of college after the first year or two.

John Schweppe: My question is how can we encourage young people to choose careers where the demand is great enough to insure them of a reasonable chance of getting a job? Or to put it another way, why don't colleges discourage students from preparing for careers that are already overcrowded? Couldn't career people from the community help with that problem?

Washburn: Let me start with your first question. I think there's a great need to identify the needs of individual students. Often times people outside of the schools have their own idea of what those needs are, and encouraging the building services around those ideas. If we did a better job of matching student needs with what is going on in the school or the school district, and making full use of the school's potential for meeting some of those needs, I think we might do a better job without spending a lot more money. We need to indentify some priorities within those needs, and if the money does not exist we should try to do the best job we can in some of the more important priority areas.

As to the question about utilizing community resources, I think school guidance counselors are in a unique position of being able to identify and coordinate those resources with the resources of the school. If they could feel better about that coordination role, and if that role could receive more importance in terms of the community, I think the schools could tap into all kinds of community resources that they are not currently utilizing.

I also want to say that school guidance counselors can't always get some of the data they need concerning student opinions and attitudes. It is increasingly hard when they have to have parental approval. Finally, I'd like to point out that schools tend to move from crisis to crisis, and guidance counselors don't have a heck of a lot of time to reflect on what's going on because they are also building up to the next crisis.

Counseling and Intervention in Colleges

John G. Darley
Professor Emeritus of Psychology, University of Minnesota

Instead of making a formal presentation, I would like to list a series of well-established facts about counseling at the college level, based on the findings of group or individual difference research and cohort studies. With our limited time for discussion, I hope we can then move directly to a consideration of their implications for action and policy change in the provision of counseling services for the age group we are concerned with at this seminar.

- **Counseling in the college years, as a form of intervention, is modestly effective. (See references 1 and 2.)**

The evidence for this comes chiefly from a 25-year follow-up study completed in 1965 by David P. Campbell, and from a more recent study done by Mary Lee Smith and G. V. Glass.

In Campbell's study, which was done at Minnesota, the 300 or more students who had been counseled, when matched with 300 or more who had not, showed superior performance in college grades, in degrees earned, and in life-accomplishments. But they also showed a greater amount of discontent and concern with their life. We're not entirely sure yet what this means. It may mean that a touch of "divine discontent" is a requisite for seeking appropriate professional help. And if so, that tells us something about the kinds of people who will profit from counseling and the kinds who will not seek it.

- **Educational environments can be measured and can differentially affect "staying power" and outcomes for various student ability levels and personality types. (See references 3 and 4.)**

These findings derive from the work of Henry Murray at Harvard, which has been carried forward by George Stern at Syracuse and Bob Pace at UCLA. Their studies show that if you put very bright kids—able to succeed at high levels of competition—into clearly differential environments, they may disappear from the system; they cannot be held in the system if it is intellectually impoverished or inappropriate to their needs.

- **In American higher education, a college can be found that will admit and may graduate any level of student ability. (See references 3 and 5.)**

In a study that we did some years ago, we were able to convert average scores of entering freshmen classes in a representative sample of colleges and universities on a single standard scholastic ability measure. The lowest average school represented a percentile of 1 on the norm, and the highest average represented a percentile of 94 on the same national norm. We pride ourselves on having an educational system of great diversity, but I think the system is not cost effective; no single master plan exists to guide its development and it has no "buying guide" for consumers.

- **The composition of a graduating college class would be significantly different in age, sex, achievement, and size if graduation were based on achievement rather than time spent. (See reference 5.)**

This is a classic study, by Learned and Wood. It has never received the attention it deserves.

- **Social class structures, sociometric variables, sex and ethnicity are all closely related to *but not inevitably causative of* academic performance, staying power, and ultimate station in life. (See references 6 and 7.)**

These data, from our colleagues in social and cultural anthropology, generally derive from studies of small communities: "Elmtown," "Middletown," and the "Yankee City" series. In such communities the intercorrelations of socioeconomic variables are quite high and determinative of one's fate.

- **But the correlational network between these variables is significantly lower in large urban areas than in small communities. (See reference 8.)**

The Hochbaum study, done in our social psychology program at Minnesota, dealt with these intercorrelations in the city of Minneapolis; they are significantly lower in an urban area and are therefore less determinative of an individual's fate. One major role for the counseling psychologist is to be an advocate for the individual by concerning himself with fostering the individual differences related to desirable outcomes and minimizing the effect of class, caste, and socioeconomic variables that too often block progress of subgroups in our society.

- **The global correlation between ratings of "goodness of family environment" and "adequacy of adjustment" of a college-aged sample is about .40; comparable values would be expected if the sample involved non-college adolescents. (See reference 9.)**

While this was a college-based study, it used a junior college sample where the I. Q. average of the sample was about 104, which is close to the I. Q. level of the typical high school graduate of most urban areas. If the sample were made up of non-college adolescents, I would predict that the correlation would be about the same.

- **Successful members of, and aspirants to, various families of occupations show characteristic patterns of interest, personality traits, values, and needs. (See references 1 and 10.)**
- **The relation between claimed and measured vocational interests, while positive, is too low to permit counseling based on claimed interests alone. (See reference 10.)**
- **Measured vocational interests are remarkably stable over time and within individuals. (See reference 10.)**

These three statements derive from our extensive research on the measurement of vocational interests.

Because of the long-standing friendship between the late E. K. Strong of Stanford University and the late Donald G. Paterson of Minnesota, our Center for Interest Measurement Research is the repository for all of Dr. Strong's original data on vocational interests.

Adequate counseling must take account of the individual's vocational interests, both claimed and measured, since they reflect basic motivational patterns.

- **Labor market requirements and vocational aspirations become more congruent and in balance in cross-sectional studies of age cohorts. (See reference 11.)**

If comparable findings emerge from our longitudinal studies, we will begin to understand how dreams are reconciled with labor force reality.

- **The origins of counseling (circa 1910 and thereafter) represent a confluence of four streams in American society and American social science: developments in psychometrics and statistics; problems and needs of an industrializing society; a strong strain**

of social idealism and reform; sociological forces, such as urban development and population shifts. (See reference 12.)

- **But the "intelligent layman" may be somewhat suspicious of the findings and methods of the social and behavioral sciences; their accepted "facts" are not immediately impressive and are sometimes threatening. (See reference 13.)**

In this connection, consider the ambivalence and understandable concern with which psychological testing is viewed today. Consider also the issues of protection of human subjects and invasion of privacy in both behavioral and medical research.

Berelson and Steiner conclude their excellent inventory with a comment regarding the human animal's unique ability to impose fantasy on the reality of his world and the resultant problems of such an imposition. Some of the results of the social and behavioral sciences make George Orwell's 1984 appear uncomfortably at hand: behavior modification, psychopharmacology, participating management, industrial/organizational psychology — all of these may contain threats to the layman's self-perception and self-esteem.

- **Today's zeitgeist seems less favorable to the age range 14 to 24 than was true in more affluent times. (See references 14 and 15.)**

Today's economic climate is far less favorable to this age range than was true in more affluent times. Our attitude is: "Let's get these kids out of the work force, and keep them out." Our society is not doing a very good job for this age group, either in involving them, or being advocates for them, or in understanding their concerns and fears and needs.

- **The problems of professionalization in American society may have gotten somewhat out of hand. Who are the counselors in the world of youth today? What standards prevail? What positions are taken by the American Personnel and Guidance Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Medical Association? What impact do third-party payments have on the provision of mental health care, broadly defined? (See reference 16.)**

The quality of counseling services, both in high school and college, ranges from atrocious to adequate, in my estimation. In the absence of effective services to youth, new "professions" emerge; witness the spate of chemical dependency counselors, walk-in counseling services, and "hot-line" services. Each of these may seek recognition and validation by way of state legislative enactments or certification requirements.

If this summary statement of findings about college counseling sounds rather pessimistic, let me say that emeritus professors may be permitted to suffer a transient episode of pessimism. If the references I have cited deal with important facts in the provision of counseling services to youth, we must find ways of getting them into the minds and hearts of counselors on the firing line. Short courses, refresher courses, targeted publications widely and inexpensively distributed, closed-circuit television, mandatory recertification and relicensing requirements — these and other innovative educational devices must be used in upgrading the performance of counselors at all levels.

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Shaping and Mentoring Influences in Adolescence

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A critical problem among the adolescents and young adults I work with is the lack of enough deeply committed, caring people in their lives—the lack of parents, teachers, bosses and other adults who really care about young people. This I find very disturbing. A society that doesn't cherish its young people is in deep trouble.

I will get back to that later on, but to set the stage for my remarks, let me make a few preliminary observations. The first has to do with the major concerns of young people. At the risk of pushing alliteration to its outer limits, let me list some of the ones I hear most frequently:

- Sex
- Sex roles
- Self
- Sense of self
- Separation
- Stable identity
- Some parental figures
- Sensible careers
- Super-solutions to their problems

As a further sort of preamble, I would urge you to ask yourself, as I constantly ask myself in working with young people: "What was I like when I was 15, or 17, or 21?" Because in order to understand adolescents, you have to be able to remember what you were like at their age, and yes, to some extent, be able to tolerate that!

Let us also remember that youth differences begin prenatally. It is not only whether a child is wanted but whether the parent wanted a child of that sex that matters. We increasingly recognize that what matters is not what parents do with children but what they *are* with children, and *who* they are with children.

A great deal of recent research suggests that parent-child bonding, and especially mother-infant bonding, is basically more important than we had believed to be the case in the past. The research data are coming in rapidly now on the first two years of life. They demonstrate that bonding is indeed crucial to later character development.

And, as those of us who work clinically with adolescents and young people recognize, what comes through as you work with them hour by hour is not whether parents spent time with the child but what the parents thought of the child, whether they wanted that boy or girl, whether the child was really in the way of parental ambitions, and how committed the parents were to their offspring.

I have seen many an adolescent who was a product of conflicted infancy. By that I mean a lack of mirroring, a lack of being able to idealize a parent or both parents and to be able to feel trusting, loving, loved and cared about, that the world was a safe and important place rather than a frightening, threatening place.

Children who have such conflicted early life experiences are very prone to a tendency toward terror and inhibition in adolescence or, if they were not soothed and able to internalize an acceptance of frustration, they have a legacy of fury, of lashing out and of mindless impulsivity. If such an adolescent is not remedially mentored, so that a group of inner goals and directions evolve, then adulthood and middle age become years of depression, of "Is this all there is?", of stagnation, of an inability to give of oneself or to give to the next generation.

I'd like to say a few words about gender differences among adolescents, with the *caveat* that the data in this field are indicative rather than definitive. We can't say that all adolescent males are this way and all adolescent females are that way. There is no question, however, that significant differences do exist.

Males, because of their superior three-dimensional vision, greater muscle mass, better gross motor coordination, and better ability to track moving objects, are better suited to stalking prey and recognizing predators.

Females, because of their better fine motor coordination, greater sensitivity to sound, greater skin sensitivity and better perceptual sensitivity, are better suited to caring for infants and young children, for assuring a kind of affiliative nurturant constancy in a community.

Such qualities would have significant survival value in an ideal hunting and gathering society in which sex roles were idyllically separated. We are not sure whether such a society ever existed and we certainly can't envision such a society in Denver or Detroit!

So what we find is that girls are different from boys, though not by much. These findings raise several questions. Is there a group of nurturant qualities and a group of aggressive qualities, and if so, are these qualities or patterns modifiable? Do we want to modify these patterns so that there is overlap between males and females or a cross-over between the two?

I will now suggest some potential directions for research, clinical work and planning for high school, college and work careers for youngsters based on some of the recognized differences between the males and females.

Parents should discuss goals with their children, in order to assure them a sex-free potential for developing their lives.

Though there are differences, one of our greatest needs is to foster an ethic that offers adolescents the opportunity to develop individual potentialities without restriction. Career and life paths should be chosen on the basis of ability and motivation, and not by sexually derived mandates. Preordained career paths or restrictions are not healthy. That is, a girl should not be hampered from becoming a mathematician, mother, physicist or soldier. A boy should not be forced to become a competitive salesman, an isolated entrepreneur, or a meaningless external achiever.

Young people get subtly directed toward one career or another. It is not that mathematics, physics or science are not available to girls, but that those very courses often conflict with opportunities for them to be "pom-pom" girls. It is not that boys are barred from child care programs, but that they get no support from school counselors to take such a direction.

There is an urgent need for a systematic study of high school courses and the informal direction and career counseling opportunities that help and hamper the autonomous development of students' abilities. Parents should discuss goals with their children, in order to assure them a sex-free potential for developing their lives.

At this point I'd like to express my strong support for an opportunity for free role experimentation in adolescence for males and females—a kind of psycho-social moratorium, an opportunity for exploration. What I have in mind is a modern equivalent of the Grand Tour—an opportunity for a person to find himself or herself, an opportunity for that very rare experience of solitude, for being alone and finding inner goals as opposed to societally directed goals. Time is needed to enjoy the creative experiment of adolescence. After all, adolescence is the touchstone experience of life for many people.

We all think back to what our ideals, our possibilities, our enthusiasms were at adolescence. Those ideals and enthusiasms must be nurtured and transformed in order that they not be frozen into a premature finality. You may remember what Scott Fitzgerald said about Tom Buchanan, the rich, handsome Yale halfback, in *The Great Gatsby*. Fitzgerald said of Tom Buchanan that he achieved such an acute, limited excellence at the age of 22 that everything afterward savored of anti-climax.

You can't be a halfback all your life, nor can you be a "pom-pom" girl. But it is important that even such goals be respected while other more durable ones are forged.

As we look at girl and boy roles in the schools, we especially need to develop structures for building self-confidence in women through awards and recognition for novel recreational and career paths. Some schools have already begun to offer athletic opportunities and leadership roles for girls. But in many schools, such opportunities are not available to both sexes. Some roles are reserved exclusively for boys and others for girls.

I think it is also important that we in some way correct the deficit image of both men and women that is constantly expressed through the media. That is: you'll be whole or good if you use this hair spray, this deodorant, this lipstick—that you're not good enough now but if you buy these things you will be able to function effectively in contrast to the sloppy way you present yourself now.

Not long ago, one executive among a group of American businessmen who were going to China was asked: "What kind of markets can you find in China?" "Well," he replied, "there are 800 million pairs of armpits." This was a good example of the advertising ethic that says you're no good as you are, but with the purchase of the right deodorants you will be made acceptable. Such negative "image" appeals help to shatter the fragile developing sense of self in young people.

It is true that young people often invest in ideals and goals that don't last. You can't be a halfback all your life, nor can you be a "pom-pom" girl. But it is important that even such goals be respected while other more durable ones are forged. Young people are constantly engaged in a quest for goals, a quest for who they are and what turns them on. They need freedom to seek the unique meaning of their lives rather than be forced into molds made by their elders.

Now let me say a word about mentors. I think this is a critical issue, because boys typically have more mentors available to them than girls. A mentor in this frame of reference is someone like the old teacher in the Odyssey—a guide. Mentors are people who live exemplary lives and are willing to give of themselves to young people.

Because of the role-changing now going on, males may become more nurturant, and females more competitive.

Why is it that in the past boys have had more mentors available to them than girls? That is an important question, but even more important is that we set ourselves the task of developing mentors for girls. In any event, all young people—male and female—need the help of mentors in developing a variety of responses to others—assertiveness, independence, self-reliance, sensitivity and concern.

I might say a word about androgyny—a combination of traditional masculine and feminine qualities. Among today's young people, there seems to be a trend in that direction, but we don't know how strong it is. But what may be lost if we blur the sex roles in youth? When the society continues to value external achievement and economic success, both sexes will certainly direct themselves toward such goals, and nurturance may well be in very serious danger. It may be relegated to the poorest socioeconomic group in our society. Is it possible for the entire society to move toward more nurturing? Is it possible to teach nurturing and the valuing of nurturance to high school students?

Philip Slater, in his book *The Pursuit of Loneliness*, made several sharp distinctions between the United States and Western Europe. In Western Europe, he said, dependence has been a highly valued concept, whereas the United States is a country that values independence. Cooperation has been a hallmark of Western civilization. The United States is a competitive society. Community has been part of all Western societies. The United States has increasingly moved toward individualism. As a result, according to Slater, Americans have experienced a loss of meaning, a loss of relationship and a loss of the value of nurturing, both in adolescence and in later years.

One of the dilemmas now facing our society is how to save male lives without losing female ones. Let me explain. Males now have an excessive rate of cardiovascular disease, cirrhosis of the liver, cancer of the lung, and a lower life expectancy than females—largely because of the pressures generated by the demands of the roles they play in society. Because of the role-changing that is now going on, males may become more nurturant and females more competitive. No net gain would accrue if women's rates for diseases of life stress caught up with those of men. It is our job to help identify and direct needed changes in the understanding and shaping of the future for both female and male young people.

Discussion

Sheila Kamerman: I'd like to make a comment about nurturing—not only as a role but as a field, a profession. A matter of some concern, for example, is that as more and more women are working, particularly women with young children, and as these women have their children cared for outside of the home, there is a growing professionalization of child care. Will this result in the development of a new female industry and, if it does, will child care become a low-status economic and social role? These are questions that are worth pondering.

Auditor: Junior high is the level at which a girl usually decides not to go on to the next step in math, even though up to that point she may have excelled in it, because she thinks her career opportunities are very narrow and in the traditional fields in which math is not that important. I think that's changing now.

Another thing I want to mention is a study done this year by Phyllis Farmer at Temple about women going through middle age. She found out that no woman in her sample had had a mentor, but that all of them were mentoring. So it looks as though there's still hope.

Werkman: Yes, there is. For some reason or other, girls don't have to make the break with their mothers but boys do. Girls, in fortunate circumstances, have a ready-made model to follow.

Auditor: That's true. Girls are more likely than boys to be mentored by their mothers.

Paul Bohannan: I want to make a plea for social invention, because many of these nurturing and mentoring things can be done if we invent new ways of doing them, and I want to give one quick example.

I had the good fortune to spend over 30 months with a people in West Africa called the Tiv. These people have an age-grade system through which young men begin to move at 16 or 17. Forming their age-group has an important role to play in making them recognizable as entering adulthood. They are assisted by an age-set of men about 30, who help them to organize and who teach them systematically how to do all the things an age-set must do.

This is a good example of socially recognized and socially controlled mentoring, and there's no reason why we can't invent new ways of our own if we just put our thinking caps on. We don't need government action.

Werkman: I agree. What we need are some good ideas and some good publicity.

Merrell Clark: I've been impressed by the capacity of elders to mentor, and I think that the mentoring apparently does increase, at least in some areas, with age. And yet, we have in our society certain patterns that create distance between elders and the young. For example, there are no elders in the schools unless we inject them into the schools. We could use more elders in the workplace, too.

Werkman: The generation gap is obviously bridgeable in certain circumstances, but I think that the tastes of the young and the old in books, games, music and the like are so different that in these areas the gap probably will remain.

Duhl: I was just wondering whether the gap may not be the fact that in order to mentor somebody in their development, you have to have been there yourself. When the mentor-mentee gap is too great, you can't help the person develop. However, in any community with multigenerational interactions gaps are very useful, because of the continuous opportunity for interaction.

My Blackfoot Indian friend tells the story about how on certain issues, the elder women, the grandparents, who are no longer sexually active, can assist the young people, while their own parents, who are still involved in sexual activity, are still competing with their children. Different kinds of issues can be dealt with in different ways. What we really need is some sense of community, as a context within which mentoring takes place. I agree with Paul Bohannan's comment about the community — that to have all these interventions separate from community creates tremendous difficulty because they all become very artificial.

Bohannan: Could I say something about that? I think it's important to keep in mind that the community of the past was far different from the community of the present. We are in the center right now of a tremendous change in the nature of community and therefore when we say community I agree 175 percent, but I also think that we have to be clear about the kind of community we are talking about.

Duhl: Yes. I think that one of our dilemmas in talking about family or community is that we're stuck with old models. In fact, the critical problem may be that new notions of family, new notions of network, new notions of community, all seem to be emerging, but have not been formalized into the institutions that we've been talking about.

Werkman: This discussion has developed nicely the concepts of nurturing, mentoring, community and intergenerational potential. It has crystallized a vocabulary that will help in both definition and action.

Heterosexual and Homosexual Relationships

Philip Blumstein
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I'm a social psychologist, and at this conference I'm a minority of one. That might become clear as I go along, but to give you an example of it I'll offer one brief, very brief reaction to what Sid Werkman just said and that is, from my professional prejudices or point of view, a few of the sex differences he described occur early enough in life to suggest that they might be due to biological factors.

I also want to point out that from day one minus nine months all sorts of non-biological factors enter in and, therefore, my principal prejudice — and I hope it's one that's shared — is that whatever those innate differences are, it is clear that they are readily modifiable through the social experience.

I don't know if any of you would disagree with that. In any event, any policy implications in my remarks should be focused on the modifiability of the differences, not the *status quo*. Since I'm not a policy person, I'll probably steer far away from that, and will be describing to you *status quo* kinds of things.

Second, I would say about myself that I am a scientist. No matter what your prejudices about the scientific status of sociology in 1979 might be, I believe in scientific models and, therefore, anything I say will either be based on fairly sound and replicable scientific research or if not will be based on observables. I think I heard a lot of things said in the last several days that are based on wishes rather than observables. That's all well and good, but I will not do that.

The other thing I want to say is that I will simplify my remarks, which means that for the sake of simplicity I will speak in over-generalized and often stereotypic ways. So, if I say something that you think needs qualification, please don't jump up and say, "Hey, wait a minute!" Please assume that I'm aware of it, but don't have the time to qualify my remarks.

In the time available to me, I'm going to talk about two things. The first is about the notion of sexual identity, if for no other reason than it has not been discussed here and if there's any time in the life cycle where it's an important consideration it's during the period that we're discussing at this conference.

Not only in adolescence but in early adulthood, sexual identity often gets short shrift. And based on research that I have done — and I've done it long enough to enjoy the luxury of being able to give a lot of thought to the topic — I have very strong feelings about it — feelings that might differ from the current popular wisdom on the subject.

My second topic — which is what I was asked to discuss and I'll devote most of my time to it — is couple relationships in general and couple relationships in the age group that we're dealing with at this conference in particular. But in doing that I must remind you that I'm talking about research that's still in progress. However, I've given a lot of thought to this subject — thought based on what I hope to find or might find rather than what I have found.

The focus of my remarks will be on sex differences. I think that was part of our mandate when we came here and, lest my friend, Paul Bohannan, go ahead and jump all over me, I'll have to say that my discussion will be limited to the Western contemporary situation — the one that prevails in the United States.

With those prefatory remarks out of the way, let me turn now to the question of sexual identity — and again, by way of preface, I want to make my own value orientation clear. I think of homosexuality in the same way as I think of Catholicism. That is, it's just a facet of American life and in a moral sense I find nothing to object to people who live as homosexuals.

The conventional wisdom and the professional wisdom on homosexuality and its development, particularly as it concerns us here is that sexual identity is fixed in early life and manifests itself in adolescence. This suggests that all we need to do is help people adjust and discover their "true" sexual selves.

After considerable thought and research, I reject that conventional wisdom. I also implicitly reject, in the absence of adequate evidence, the notion that hormonal and genetic factors play a major role in the development of sexual identity. My research has convinced me that sexual identity is subject to creation and recreation throughout the life cycle, and that *proximate* causes are much more important than has been previously considered to be the case.

In my opinion, therefore, we at this conference ought to try—from a human point of view—to come up with a program or with an attitude or policy which will help homosexuals at the age when the seed that was planted ten years before begins to germinate to deal with their experience, minimize their own unhappiness about it, and maximize their chances of having a good and happy and profitable life.

I should note again at this point that I am rejecting out of hand non-interpersonal or non-social causes of homosexuality in the human male or female. I do that simply because I remain agnostic on the question of prenatal factors—agnostic because I don't feel that any evidence we currently have demonstrates that there is any prenatal influence. However, if convincing evidence does emerge, I am prepared to reconsider my present position.

A few moments ago I said that events strongly influence the way people develop their sexuality. This is especially true among females. By way of example, let me describe a case that has happened to me time and time again in my research.

Sexuality is a much more malleable thing than we think it is.

I will meet a woman, a woman of forty, who after a divorce or maybe not a divorce—it doesn't matter—but after what most clinicians would consider a perfectly typical heterosexual adjustment will say for some reason she became rather close friends with another woman very much like herself and they discovered that they really had a lot to share—were very close—and all of a sudden it dawned on her that the intensity of this friendship really approaches the notion of romantic love that she was taught and preoccupied with as an adolescent.

At some point the relationship becomes sexualized and the woman will start to call herself a homosexual. Upon hearing this, I tell myself that what I need to do now is find out about the first five years of her life and find those seeds that should have told me that this is the life she's going to have. What I have momentarily forgotten is that sexuality is a much more malleable thing than we think it is, and the fact that we don't consider it malleable as professionals really reflects the culture's view that sexuality is fixed in early life.

I believe that perception of sexuality as being non-malleable is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Consequently, people see their sexual biographies in much more consistent and rigid terms than indeed they can be or need to be or empirically are.

But why are we so preoccupied with this non-malleable view of sexual identity that it permeates our perceptions and our research? I think part of the reason is that most of the research in this area has been done by males on males and that male sexuality is less malleable than female sexuality. In our culture, male sexuality is learned earlier than female sexuality. It is learned through intra-psychic processes, that is, males respond to their fantasy world through various stimuli and test various hypotheses from their reactions to those stimuli. They make random connections between those internal reactions and their physiological reactions, and impute a lot of meaning to those imagined connections. Consequently, males tend to come up with a self-definition based on unexamined experience.

Female sexuality, on the other hand, tends to be more reactive, less externally genital, of course, and certainly more tied to concrete experiences — experiences that tend to be interpersonal, emotional and romantic.

It's really a sloppy thing for scientists to say that happenstance or random events are the major causal factors in sexual identity, but alas, I believe it to be the case.

We are fond of saying that you can't really know certain things about a person until after that person has died. Well, I maintain that you can't really know a person's sexual identity until that person's dead.

That's an overstatement of the empirical malleability of sexuality, but I think it's not an overstatement of the potential malleability. I guess what it suggests for us in terms of policy is not only do we need to be prepared for people's sexuality to unfold during the critical period we're talking about, but we have to be prepared for it to change at later periods in the life cycle, and we have to be prepared to allow people to have a great deal of confusion about it. What eventually will unfold as people resolve their confusions will depend a great deal on happenstance.

If a woman happens to fall in love with another woman and says, "I must be a lesbian," then it's very possible to conclude that if it hadn't been for happenstance, she would have gone to her grave without ever having had that thought or that experience.

It's really a sloppy thing for scientists to say that happenstance or random events are the major causal factors in sexual identity, but alas, I believe it to be the case.

I guess that suggests also, if you're willing to buy my interpretation, that one of the things we need to do in our counseling and in our policy making is to try and persuade people who are confused about their sexuality to go to a clinician. Sexuality is not a hard and fast thing; your current feeling is not showing the true, essential you, because in fact there is no true, essential you. What it shows is what some of your options are. I don't practice therapy in my work, but people do come to me—people who have been married for 20 years—and ask: "Should I leave my wife (or husband) and try being homosexual?" And I tell them: "If you do feel you have homosexual urges or impulses or attractions, that does not imply that you must stop your heterosexual activities."

Gender is a much greater predictor of almost every realm of sexuality than is the distinction between homosexuals and heterosexuals.

So I think that's my message. But there's one more thing I want to say about sexual identity. It's a prejudice of mine, but I think it's also consistent with the data. That is that one of the best guides in understanding human sexuality in our culture is the concept of gender. This may seem very obvious, but if you want to understand, as I've sought to do, the nature of lesbianism and lesbian experience, the nature of male homosexuality and male homosexual experiences, the first thing you have to consider is the differences in gender. Lesbian courtship resembles the courtship desires of heterosexual females, and male homosexual courtship resembles the desires of heterosexual males. Gender is a much greater predictor of almost every realm of sexuality than is the distinction between homosexuals and heterosexuals. I wish

I had a dollar for every time a lesbian has told me she couldn't in any way fathom the sexuality of homosexual men.

I guess what I want to do now is to get off this topic and talk about couples. I'm not going to go into detail about what my study is about and how we're doing it except to say that we're studying four different kinds of couples and an enormous number of each of them, married heterosexual couples, cohabiting heterosexual couples, lesbian couples and male homosexual couples.

We chose to have those four for a number of reasons. First of all, we don't think it's unreasonable to say that the cohabitors, the lesbians and the homosexuals deserve in their own right, being citizens, taxpayers and real people, to be studied. I don't mean to do a song and dance about that.

But an important reason to study them is for the comparisons they provide. The first are very straightforward, practical comparisons. The cohabitors, the lesbians and the homosexual men don't have the force of law to legitimize their relationships so, therefore, if you're concerned with what the law and other institutional arrangements provide for a relationship then you can make a comparison between those three groups and the married couples.

Another reason why lesbian and male homosexual couples are of interest is because they have been facing problems, ever since God created gay couples, that are not very different from the problems that heterosexual couples in great numbers are only now beginning to face. So we come up with the irony that they are good models for heterosexual couples, namely, the dual career question and how to manage it, and the organizational problems that cannot be understated of two careers in one couple.

Second of all, male homosexual couples have been dealing with the issue of non-monogamy for a great period of time and my data suggests that it's the rule rather than the exception for them to have non-monogamous arrangements, and I think people are becoming more and more interested in that, how to work that arrangement into their relationships.

Lesbians in this culture don't seem to be any further along in this area or any different from most of their more avant-garde heterosexual counterparts — considering it, but can't seem to work it out.

But I guess the most important reason the comparisons should be made is that there has never been a set of institutional arrangements that support, encourage and almost force people who are homosexual into intimate relationships with each other. For them, there has been no social support or institutional basis for marriage—as we've traditionally known it — among homosexual couples. Consequently, homosexual couples are not talking about either getting married or staying in marriages because of the intrinsic gratifications or growth potential or whatever words you want to use, that heterosexual people are supposed to get from the partnership, so their motives are worth studying.

There's another kind of comparison that I want to discuss. It's a bit more theoretical, but I think it's worth spending some time on. And that is that there's a lot of concern, as a result of the changes from traditional forms of marriage in our culture to the current forms, with working out the way the husband's maleness and the wife's femaleness are going to be accommodated—in other words, working out the notion of gender in the relationship. There has been a tremendous social change away from traditional marriage.

Husband/wife roles need not be allocated strictly by gender. We can easily imagine a situation in which the "instrumental" roles are played by the wife, and the "expressive" roles by the husband.

Everyone is able to say what traditional marriage is. It's that awful thing that people used to have to suffer. Modern marriage can be defined as that wonderful state that we all dream about in our fantasies. People have seriously tried to understand the difference, and to understand what this incredible course of social change is going to mean for the institution of marriage. Some researchers are trying to find out by locating some traditionally married folk and some modern married folk and studying how they're different. Well, we have a different strategy, which I'll describe in a moment. But first let me ask what may seem like a very very silly question, and that is, what is a husband and what is a wife?

We all start out by saying the husband is a man and the wife is a woman. Let me define it in somewhat different terms. Husbands and wives are people in a marriage for whom there are different expectations, and those expectations have a certain consistency and coherence.

Traditionally, one of those persons was expected to work. Again, I'm being overly simple and I'm talking about the traditional model to which many people have never conformed. In any event, if the other partner also worked, he or she did so purely for financial reasons while the first person worked to gain the major psychological and life-orienting gratifications. A career was the person's world. Second, one of the persons had the responsibility for the daily maintenance of the household—usually the wife, but if the work got too heavy or strenous then it was shunted over to the husband.

They had different forms of activity when it came to decisions. They had different amounts of power in making decisions in their relationship. One was legitimately seen as the person ultimately responsible for the decision making.

The wife was certainly more responsible for child-rearing activities, although there were certain chores for the husband. The most important thing is that they had different basic orientations and expectations of the relationship, which they brought with them. These orientations and expectations have been described in some unnecessarily technical terms by social scientists as "instrumental" and "expressive."

But I will describe them to you in simpler terms. Instrumentality—part of the husband's role—refers to the ability and disposition to be the boss, the leader, to require respect and subordination, to organize the couple's energy and to get things done.

The instrumental partner was the one who tended to mediate between the nuclear family and the outside world, went into the outside world and was expected to be able to handle it.

The expressive person was quite different. That was the person who had the ability and disposition to be mediator, conciliator, to deal with disputes, to resolve hostilities, to be affectionate, warm, emotional, the comforter, the consoler, and I would add, to be deferential.

I've described to you a set of expectations of behavior and role and I didn't say which were the husband's and which were the wife's, because I didn't want to impugn your intelligence. I assume you all figured it out. However, husband/wife roles need not be allocated strictly by gender. We can easily imagine a situation in which the "instrumental" roles are played by the wife, and the "expressive" roles by the husband. Or, in fact, some of the roles could be divided up, and some could go by the boards.

Now let me say something else about the traditional husband-wife relationship. First of all, for better or for worse, it's a very very efficient social invention. There are very few of us here who would say that in terms of general social institutions a division of labor based on specialization is not a good thing. If you look at the history of social organization, you see that specialization has been enormously functional. Unfortunately, however, when one of the partners drops dead or is incapacitated, in any form of social organization, specialization can by pretty debilitating.

Secondly, the husband/wife roles in a traditional marriage are based on gender. We all know who is supposed to do what. We build this knowledge into our children, raising them adequately as male or female, and at age 20 we sort of add water and stir and presto chango we have a functioning marriage. This is a lot different from taking two unacculturated young people at age 20 and having them marry and sit down to figure out who is going to work and who is going to take out the garbage.

Unfortunately, as I said, the traditional role allocation is not the greatest arrangement when one of the persons is incapacitated. More unfortunately, because of social change and because of the change in consciousness, many of today's young people seem to think that this is a very unhappy state of affairs. They feel trapped in this kind of arrangement. So here we have a clever social invention flying in the face of people's emotions, desires, and aspirations.

Whenever you look at lesbian couples you can say: "What is female in this relationship is whatever they have too much of, and what is male is that which they lack."

We also have people in our study who are experimenting with departures from traditional marriage, but I believe it's terribly difficult for any heterosexual couple to put gender totally behind them. Not very many really do, but some claim they have done it. Unforunately, we don't have the scientific instrumentation to be able to say whether they did or not. In any event, we're stuck with people in our study who are departing — but only modestly — from what they have been socially programmed to be.

Again going back to my remarks about gender continuity, I believe that homosexuals tend to be, in many respects, socialized to the gender they are. Consequently, a homosexual couple is a better example of people having to cope with difficulty. In a lesbian couple, for example, we presumably have two people, by virtue of being women, with an overflow of expressiveness and an undersupply of instrumentality. So when you look at those couples in contrast to heterosexual couples, you can say: "What is female in this relationship is whatever they have too much of, and what is male is that which they lack."

Second, of course, there is experimentation with cohabitation — and I'm not talking about the college campus. I'm talking about the people who are trying it as an extended relationship. This may well reflect an attempt on the part of women to develop a greater instrumentality and on the part of the men to develop a greater amount of expressiveness. It may be that they are trying to avoid the kinds of differentiation that I have characterized as social invention.

Well, what do I think is happening and what do I think it means for policy? If we endorse this form of social change — if we believe that these new experimental life styles are more humane, more useful to people as personal life goals, then I think our policy will need to be geared toward what Sid Werkman was talking about, some kind of androgyny so that these people at least develop a repertoire of behavior, including some behavior that is appropriate to the other gender. Whether they choose to activate those behaviors is another matter.

My personal feeling is that instrumentality — that is, the ability to cope with the outside world, to get things done, to organize other people's activities — is a skill that can be learned even at an advanced age, and by women as well as by men.

To the extent that men do develop expressiveness, it is in two ways. One is in interaction with women (we like to say that women tame men by marrying them, and make them better persons for it) and the other is in rearing their children, which they do precious little of.

I think there is nothing like the real world to cause people to come to grips with life, to cope with their situation. Clearly, there are many people who don't. But I think relatively speaking they can. I feel very strongly that people have enormous reservoirs of strength within them and I think that many of the helping professions traditionally have ignored that fact. Women who have not been encouraged to show that strength can develop it. However, I think that in our educational system we ought to move towards recognition of the need for women to have that strength and not to stigmatize them for showing signs of it.

Expressiveness is another matter. It's the kind of thing that's hard to put your finger on and hard to measure. It's not part of our training of young people. However, there are a lot of expressive people around. Most of them are women, and they got that way somehow. We ought to be able to train people to be expressive, but we just don't know how to go about doing it. I think it's a great deal harder than teaching people to be instrumental, and I think it might be one of those things that's harder to pick up later in life.

Now that's just my hunch and my prejudice. I'll go one step further and say that to the extent that men do develop expressiveness, it is in two ways. One is in interaction with women (we like to say that women tame men by marrying them, and make them better persons for it), and the other is in rearing their children, which they do precious little of.

So I guess I see the great dilemma as developing expressiveness in men and I think it should be clear to you that one of the problems is that there has not been and continues not to be any reward for that in men. It's stigmatized. Just to illustrate that stigma, I would suggest that you try to imagine any product being sold to men by emphasizing male expressiveness. You know: "Hi, I take care of children and I smoke Camels."

Women have ambivalences about their husbands. They want them to be expressive, and they want them to be strong, and if that isn't a dilemma for males today, I don't know what is. You're damned if you do, and damned if you don't.

By the way, the single largest complaint of married women in our culture is that their husbands don't talk to them. What they mean is, what they're really saying is "Please, God, let my husband be more expressive." Unfortunately, it's not clear to me how men can learn expressiveness, given our institutions.

There's another aspect to this, but I don't have enough data on it, and that is that women have ambivalences about their husbands. They want them to be expressive and they want them to be strong, and if that isn't a dilemma for males today, I don't know what is. You're damned if you do and you're damned if you don't.

Many young couples are dealing with this dilemma in many different ways, and maybe our study will shed some light on how it's being resolved.

Discussion

Leonard Duhl: What is so striking in most of the comments you made is that you were talking about a two-party contractual relationship which is fantastically difficult for people to work out. It seems to me that what we really need in our society is a third pillar—a belief system which makes the two-party relationship—no matter what the obstacles are—much easier to deal with.

So to me the critical issue in some of the things you talked about, and some of the things Sid Werkman talked about, is how to develop belief systems that permit two parties to come together in a different form.

Blumstein: I agree with that entirely, but as a scientist I have a certain kind of conservatism. I think I agree with your long-term goal, but I'm not so sure that we can do much to modify all kinds of interpersonal contractual arrangements.

I might also add that social institutions are much more impervious to our meddling—whether positive or negative—than we think they are. So my feeling is that new institutions—and new contractual arrangements between the sexes — may emerge in spite of us rather than because of us.

John Cannon: I work as a minister in a community which is predominantly homosexual, and your remarks have been enormously illuminating to me. I keep thinking I know all I need to know, but it's obvious that I don't.

Could I ask you to speculate on how important monogamy is — among homosexual couples — in terms of personal growth and fulfillment, particularly at the later stages of the life cycle?

Blumstein: All continuing sexual relationships are contractual. Even though homosexual couples don't have a written contract, they do have a very clear understanding, and monogamy is a part of that understanding unless the parties agree in advance that it won't be.

Alfred Kahn: In some ways this discussion makes it very clear that there are two sub-groups within the 14-to-24 age group—adolescents and young people of marriageable age. My chief concern is with the latter. The vast majority are going to live in heterosexual relationships. They have to live in heterosexual relationships because the society needs children. And even though it may be desirable to shake up the gender attachment to certain kinds of roles within the family, we also need to make sure that we have adequate nurturing of children. At the policy level, the questions are: How do we make sure that society provides not only adequate *maternity* benefits but adequate *parental* benefits? How do you make it possible for both parents to visit a day care center, or a child care center, or to spend time with the child who is in the transition from being at home to being in a care center? How do you arrange for time to stay home if the child is sick? And how do you make sure that the father as well as the mother shares time in early parenting, because you want the child to have the different image that Sid Werkman was talking about?

These are not short-range questions, because we've also heard here that although we have a lot of unemployed teenagers at the moment, we're very quickly moving into a period of a labor shortage in the society. The phenomenon of both males and females entering into the labor market in large numbers is likely to be much accelerated in a period of labor shortage.

In any case, it seems to me that we need to find ways of gradually institutionalizing other kinds of supports for the nurturing role, that assume gender flexibility in dual career or one-career families. We also need better policy in the whole area of child care, maternity benefits, parental benefits, leave to take care of sick children, time for personal days, and so forth. This is not pie in the sky. Every one of these programs exists, and in countries that have a lower gross national product than we have.

In many ways, the Eastern European countries are more sexist than the West European countries or the U.S. However, if you look at the labor force distribution there, you have a very dramatic illustration of how women move into careers requiring a lot of the attributes that have been ascribed to men. Some quickly become "feminized" careers. The occupational distribution shows the enormous malleability of gender in professions, just as there is an enormous malleability in distribution of sex roles within families.

As people who want to intervene in this situation, we need to concern ourselves with policies that create social supports for families.

John Schweppe: I want to interject quite a different sort of question. We have to accept the fact that a certain number of people are going to turn out to be homosexual. What should our policy be toward these individuals?

Kahn: I don't think we ought to interfere in any way with people who want to have different life styles, but I'm very concerned that we not confuse that with what I regard as a much more fundamental issue —the shift of roles in families and the question of how we're going to make sure that both men and women play nurturing roles, and that somehow in dual-career families we make sure that we have both family and social support for the proper rearing of children.

Young People And Religion

John Cannon
Rector, St. John's in the Village, New York City

Whether we choose to admit it or not, religion is a powerful force in American society. We have among us about 137 million people over the age of 15 who belong to religious denominations — 50 million Catholics, about 75 million Protestants, more than 2½ million Mormons, more than 4 million members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, more than 3,700,000 persons of the Jewish faith, and more than 2 million other religious adherents.

These statistics are not derived from the Bureau of the Census, but from the different religious organizations themselves, so they do indicate something more than nominal preferences.

Sixty-five to seventy percent of the American people participate with considerable regularity, and with a profession of satisfaction and confidence, in organized religious institutions.

Moreover, of the 75 million Protestants, 45 million are either biblical literalists or highly conservative in their values — an enormously important fact for social policy and planning. The political implications are obvious. And this number does not include about 30 million Lutherans, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Episcopalians. I would render an educated guess that of these, more than half are evangelically inclined today, and quite conservative in their approaches to social programming. So we have among us 90 million to 100 million conservative

Protestant evangelicals, and I do not need to spell out the social and political ramifications of this.

Some of you are familiar with the annual report I've written called "Religion in America," which is put out by the Princeton Religion Research Center. Quite aside from what you may think of Gallup's sampling methods, this is one of the few available sources of information about religious behavior in this country. Political prognosticators and political hopefuls are quite familiar with it. I've just finished the report for 1979-80 and I don't believe it has been released to the public yet. Without boring you with the detailed findings, let me just mention that according to the report, some 65 to 70 percent of the American people participate with considerable regularity, and with a profession of satisfaction and confidence, in organized religious institutions.

Curiously enough, the figures are not significantly lower for the age group 18 to 24, although there is a drop for this age group in the rating of the importance of religious beliefs, from a national figure of 84 percent to 72 percent for the age group 16 to 24. That figure increases to 78 percent in the age group 25 to 29.

Clearly, therefore, we should be cautious about drawing conclusions which minimize the role of organized religion in American society and, indeed, in the transition from childhood to adulthood. America, as the Princeton Religion Research Council reminds us, is still a nation of believers, whatever this may mean for behavior or misbehavior.

Academic observations about religious influence should be most cautious and most qualified. The fact is that there is precious little empirical research to support our theological and sociological conjectures about a post-Christian society. We have in this country religious pluralism, yes. And secularization, depending on what we mean by it, yes. But organized religion remains today the repository of powerful symbols of human aspirations and social transformation. Despite all the deadening weight of organization — much of it superfluous, archaic and dysfunctional—and despite all the religious illiteracy and superficiality, we cannot ignore the sheer presence for good or ill of a complex religious institutional system in our society. I emphasize this, because as I've already indicated, it has profound implications for social policy planners.

Now what about our age group in their relations to organized religion? Well, interestingly enough, Princeton's Religion Research Center this year undertook a special survey of the religious world of the American teenagers. It does not cover college students, but I think that we can extrapolate from the findings and to conclude that they are applicable.

There was an interesting paradox in these findings. Ninety-five percent of the teenagers — an extraordinarily high proportion — said they believe in God or a universal spirit. Seventy-one percent said that they are church or synagogue members, and there is no significant decline in teenage church attendance, although parental constraint may be an important factor in this.

However, at the same time, an overwhelming proportion of the teenaged Catholics (82 percent) and Protestants (74 percent) believe that a person can be a good Christian or Jew if he or she doesn't go to church or synagogue. A fascinating, fascinating finding.

Moreover, to a considerable extent, American teenagers are turned off by churches of organized religion, despite the fact that they profess to be highly religious in some key respects. In short, a large proportion of teenagers feel that organized religion or the church is failing to do the job it should and the reasons given, I submit, bear close attention.

Three of the major reasons were as follows:

- Churches are not reaching out to the people they should be serving.
- Churches are failing to deal with basics of faith, and are not appealing to youth on a deeper spiritual level. (I'm underlining that one.)
- There is little feeling of warmth in churches.

These responses bear close examination in light of challenges to growth during the age span we are discussing at this conference.

Before I proceed to that task, let me conclude these remarks about the religious character of youth with an observation about religious growth and maturing.

Obviously, what is important for our purposes is some perspective on why and how religion has failed. Our concern is for the process of encounter and crisis that is necessary for growth. Incidentally, biblical religion places a high value on crisis and encounter, not only as essential to growth but as revelatory. Indeed, my own view is that until we ourselves recover a sense of the sanctity and mystery of this particular transition process we will not be accepted as mentors by the young, particularly in those crises and encounters that we tend to be so troubled about.

The question so often begged by parents and clergy and religious educators alike — the crucial question, and I use the words of Tom O'Day, whom some of you know, is this: "Does religion enable people to grow in such encounters and crises or does it protect us from the challenge and maintain us in a stage of relative immaturity?" It is in light of this question—really a question of values—that I want to look at the phenomenon of turning off, turning on and tuning in.

It's obvious that religious maturity—again from a biblical point of view—requires that youth suffer an ordeal of sorts. They learn the principle of suffering in order to enter the world of adulthood, equipped not only for survival but for a degree of personal freedom and satisfaction and social responsibility.

The focus of youth is necessarily on the institutional corruption of primary religious experience, a corruption enhanced and exaggerated not infrequently by a certain sense of parental and clerical hypocrisy.

The first stage of this ordeal, and as a pastor I worry more when it doesn't happen than when it does—is turning off. We can relate this proverbial rebellion to the task of separating from parents and caretaking institutions.

This process requires disillusion, a sense that the institutional embodiment of the religious involvement is less than perfect if not a fabric of lies.

The focus of youth is necessarily on the institutional corruption of primary religious experience, a corruption enhanced and exaggerated not infrequently by a certain sense of parental and clerical hypocrisy, by the sense that parents and leaders who profess belief do not practice what they preach.

Disaffection and disaffiliation may be seen from this perspective and as necessary and transitional tasks—necessary not only for the expression of critical discriminating faculties but also for the search for primary religious experience, the "high," and not incidentally, for the perfect or ideal social order or social expression, if you will, of institutional and/or ideological embodiment—of that primary religious experience.

The quest for the perfect, for something or someone to believe in—an ultimate alliance as much as an ultimate allegiance—takes various forms, including a turning to the so-called rational and disembodied religious teachings of the East, the gravitation to charismatic embodiments of sublime truths, the embracing of Utopian ideologies and movements, and not the least the demand that organized religion cleanse itself.

The response of organized religion to the disaffection of youth more often than not is negative and defensive and not infrequently takes the form of youth ministries that are in fact calculated to re-enforce inappropriate dependencies.

Believe me, I know that well, and I simply ask you to believe it. The observation is in order here that American albeit a nation of believers is also a nation of spiritual illiterates.

There simply is no maturation from a religious point of view without radical exploration and experimentation, without a testing out of a vast array of realities and experiences.

The onset of adolescence invites organized religion to mediate the separation of youth from parents in a way that challenges levels of spiritual inquiry and religious learning previously neglected. This does indeed suggest that the clergy and religious educators should pay more attention to the communication of primary religious experience, including the teaching of classic Western spiritual disciplines and especially techniques of prayer and meditation.

Moreover, it suggests that the serious disciplines of biblical study and theological reflection be taught to the laity, and not reserved for seminary graduates.

The second stage of the ordeal is in a sense the other side of the coin, the more affirmative side of turning off, namely, turning on. I don't want to be altogether critical, but some of the cultural manifestations of turning on are indeed dangerous and do indeed result in significant derailment.

But there simply is no maturation from a religious point of view without radical exploration and experimentation, without a testing out of a vast array of realities and experiences. Incidentally, it is remarkable that there is no one here to discuss and interpret pop culture. I feel this even more than I feel the non-presence of youth of this age group. Pop culture is the prime mediator of the experience of youth, including forms of behavior that are not infrequently intentionally outrageous but also faithful, entertaining, sensitive, and sometimes edifying.

The volatility of adolescence, the highs and the lows, is all too familiar. I would like to have time to discuss this in depth from a theological point of view, since I'm convinced that a bona fide sense of transcendence, not to mention an expansion of consciousness, is dramatically and significantly experienced in these peaks and valleys that are all too frequently ridiculed by adults.

Let me make one final comment about turning on. The process is dynamic, and necessitates a rejection of the static, fixed truths, if you will, of the establishment. In religious terms, this means the codes and creeds are dismissed as irrelevant, which probably means inapplicable. There's a question in my mind as to whether today's generation of youth will ever accept those "establishment" truths in terms which previous generations have accepted them — as static guides to behavior and norms of conduct.

It's worth mentioning, incidentally, that youth will welcome adult mentors and guides in this process; indeed they will seek them out. What they will not accept is an authority figure representing parental or parietal interest in controlling or truncating experience.

I am terribly worried by the inclination of today's youth to "cop out," to eschew history as understood in its Western sense. This invites the state to command worship, either manifestly or latently.

The final stage of the ordeal is the one that interests and worries me the most, and that is the challenge of tuning in. There aren't many words that we could use to describe the dynamics of adolescent closure — if you wish to use that term — of the entry into adulthood. Clearly at this point our discussion becomes most value-laden.

We are speaking of the necessity of orienting the self to the society, a particularly difficult ordeal in an age when the self itself is not perceived as a fixed entity, but as a history and a process — when the society itself is changing at a constantly accelerating pace.

The problem is that youth must be poised for change. Protean man has arrived, and is here to stay, and if theological anthropology can't be comfortable with that fact, it's because it has not read the Bible. It has lost the sense that man is by definition a wanderer and a discoverer, both the subject and the agent of new creation.

Which brings me back to my subject. Somehow youth must discover and identify some sense, perhaps only a relative sense, of place and of purpose. No, not a life plan—God forbid!—but a sense of orientation to society that is compatible both with the gifts and the limitations or, if you will, the vulnerabilities of the individual.

Youth believes that organized religion is failing it in this regard, and in my opinion it is. But then again, I'm a religious eccentric, or eccentrically religious.

But I'm also inclined to think that religion is not being given a chance. Social planners have decided to organize religion in America. They have decided that it should be an adjunct to the family, and that the church should be primarily at the functional level a multi-service center. Incidentally, I run one, and to the degree that I run one, I'm not engaged in the far more difficult and important task of being a priest and a pastor, nor are thousands of other clergymen in similar situations.

I want to conclude by reading from an essay by Robert Bellah, who in my view is the most cogent and incisive observer of the American religious scene. He says much better than I could what I really want to say:

> It is in society that one's individual life history and history as collective experience intercept. History is the proving ground for both personal values and social values.
>
> Given structures, personal and social, may prove inadequate in the face of the contingencies and the catastrophes of history. In history reality is encountered as judgment and no finite structure is ever entirely adequate to that encounter.
>
> Since history reveals the inadequacies of every empirical society, it becomes clear that society much more than the individual is the final repository of transcendence. Rather, every society itself is forced to appeal to some higher jurisdiction to justify itself, not entirely on its adequate performance but through its commitment to unrealized goals or values.

I will end by saying that I am terribly worried by the inclination of today's youth to "cop out," to eschew history as understood in its Western sense. This invites the state to command worship, either manifestly or latently. The only antidote that I know is to cherish and to keep alive the biblical mythos that has shaped Western civilization and, in fact, informs even secular humanism.

With that, I would like to raise some questions: What do you see as the role of organized religion with respect to social policy and planning? How can the clergy, conventional clergy, be drawn into policy and planning, especially concerning this age group? What is the role of the clergy as mentors and guides concerning youth? And finally, what should be the role of organized religion in setting boundaries?

Discussion

Merrell Clark: I'd like to comment on something you said at the very beginning of your remarks. I am more impressed by the towering influence of organized religion in this country than I am by the loss of its efficacy. For example, as powerful as we believe prime-time television to be, there is nothing you can do in this country that will draw as many people out of their homes at one time than an 11 a.m. Sunday morning church service. More than 40 percent of the American people are in one place at that one time.

Religion is the only institution we have that provides a touchstone for the entire life span. It brings all generations together, and relates them to one another in ways that are not possible in any other kind of institutional setting. It's the only kind of institution given absolute freedom by our Constitution to be what it will be. It's the central repository of our value systems, and it's the best forecaster of our future institutions.

Just as in the eighteenth century we saw the emergence of schools and colleges and universities, today we see in the churches the emergence of self-help groups, of child care centers, of many kinds of human organizations which will ensure over the decades ahead that we will meet the needs of our human family and our society. Too often we look to public finances, public institutions and public policy to provide for those human needs.

Cannon: That's one of the central dilemmas of our time, and I'm of two minds about it. There are enormous pressures on churches to provide those services, and I think they do it fairly well. However, we pay an enormous price for that. Our priests and ministers have become spiritually illiterate. They may be good therapists, but as spiritual guides—gurus—forget it.

Robert Aldrich: John, what do you see as the role of women in organized religion?

Cannon: I am an eccentric religious, and some of the things I say get me into a lot trouble, but let me say quite candidly that the church is sexist. It is re-enforcing the oppression of women. It's still limiting and defining their roles in sexist terms, and I think this is going to be the next big revolution. It's going to be internal. It's not something that can come from outside. It has to come from within the church. I think it's the enterprise that will engage us most seriously over the next ten years.

Willard Wirtz: John, I'd like to try to answer your question about what turns people off about organized religion. What I can't take is that song "Onward Christian Soldiers." Maybe it's because I hate war. I also believe in contraception, and I don't see why the established churches should oppose it, especially at a time when overpopulation is such a big problem.

Cannon: The Unitarian Universalists have done a wonderful job in revising some of the traditional songs, and particularly "Onward Christian Soldiers." They have also developed and have used for about a decade now what I think is still the best model for education in sexuality both for parents and children. It's still about ten years ahead of its time, and I commend it to you. I've been through it as a father, and really it's incredible.

Sidney Werkman: There are many things that I'd like to comment on, but our time is limited so I'll just bring up one. In much of religion the teachings about sexuality do not square with the realities of adolescence. There is no way for young people to deal with these teachings except through hypocrisy. Premarital chastity, for example, is a very tough thing for young people to accept.

Cannon: It would be hard to verify this, but I think in fact that churches do as much as any social agency in helping young people to deal with their sexuality. I can recall my own adolescence in a small, puritanical town, where we stopped Sunday School altogether. We would eat coffee and doughnuts and talk about sex. It was enormously liberating and that's happening all over the country. Also, pastoral practice is quite different from traditional teaching and I think kids catch on to that fairly soon. Am I right, Ernie?

Ernest Bartell: Oh, yes. I belong to the church that's generally regarded as the model of the great monolith and all of that, and yet, having grown up in it, I never was overwhelmed by that monolithic aspect, because there was always the pastoral dimension, and some of your experiences were the same as those I went through as a teenager. Now maybe being partly Italian to begin with, I've got the Italian viewpoint. Italians know how to handle the church very well.

Seriously, though, I've always seen the church as an institution that's conservative in the very best sense of the word. Human institutions all have their failings, but nonetheless, it's hard to live without an institution that preserves a kind of continuity with the past. The value of the church as an institution has been that it provides a framework within which you can rebel and still not have to drop off the deep end, and go absolutely crazy in the process. I don't want to give that up too easily.

I've certainly seen colleagues who have been badly treated in the church by excesses of conformity, but I've also seen a great deal of ferment. The Second Vatican Council that Pope John called seemed to the outside world to be quite earth-shaking—a new breath of fresh air. In fact, what it really did was tend to canonize a lot of the discussion that had been going on up to that point—ferment that was finally going to have to be dealt with institutionally and dealt with in the Council.

Harold Visotsky: I'm concerned about the stage at which young people really want a dialogue and whether that dialogue can be open enough in organized religion so that they don't have to give up and drop out. If there are inconsistencies between what the pastor says and what is taught in the classroom, young people pick them up very quickly. They may discard the value system along with the dichotomies. That's what worries me about the institution of the church. It is those inconsistencies that bring about massive rejection.

Cannon: To date it hasn't been as massive as you might suppose, but I agree with you that it will be. There's no doubt in my mind but that there will be massive repudiation of the established organized religions in this country, unless there is radical reform much sooner than I expect there will be.

The thing that worries me even more, however, is the enormous power—the massive success, if you will—of the fringe evangelical and revivalist groups, which appeal to the desire for action. Some of them can be dangerous.

Cults

Harold Visotsky
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A phenomenon of the last decade has been the surfacing of the dozens of Eastern religious cults and movements attracting thousands of American youths searching for truth, structure, relationships, brotherhood, and authority.

This surge of cults in the United States began in the late 60's and became highly visible as a social phenomenon in the early 70's. In 1978, cults came to our critical attention as a result of the mass suicides and murders at the People's Temple commune in Jonestown, Guyana.

It is estimated that two to three million young adults in the United States have had varying contacts with groups and cults. These contacts have resulted in their leaving home, dropping out of school, leaving jobs, and breaking their continuing relationships with their family, spouses and even children. A good article by Margaret Thaler Singer, (*Psychology Today,* January 1979), lists a variety of reasons for these phenomena. Dr. Singer, who is a member of the Department of Psychology at the University of California Berkeley, has studied, with her colleagues, the young people and their characteristics.

The term cult has been applied to various groups who are off the beaten track of traditional religions. Many of these groups have made exploratory excursions into non-Western philosophical practices. There are intense relationships between group members and those managing the group, and a particularly intense relationship between the followers and a powerful idea or leader. The well-known groups include the Unification Church of the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, the Children of God, the Krishna Consciousness Movement, the Divine Light Mission, the Church of Scientology, and the People's Temple. Lesserknown cults include The Way International, The Love Family, and there is even one called the Bo and Peep cult.

In interviewing cult members and ex-cult members, one is struck by a number of similarities, including:

- The pre-cult personality problem and family relationships of the members
- The methodology of the group's recruitment
- The indoctrination procedures

There are a variety of reasons why young Americans are turning to Oriental and cult-like religions. The participants tend to be young, in their late teens or early twenties, but there are some cults that are now working rather intensively with early high school youngsters. It seems, from a sociological point of view, that the Eastern religious movements are made up almost exclusively of white, educated, middle- and upper-class young people. Most have at least begun college, although some have dropped out after a year or two. The men and women seem to join in equal numbers, but the men control the leadership structure. The young people come from all religious denominations with relatively more from liberal Protestant and Reformed Jewish backgrounds than the proportion of these groups in the general population would suggest.

Most of the young people who join cults are looking for warmth, affection, and close ties.

The cults supply ready-made friendships and ready-made decisions about careers, dating, sex and marriage, and they outline a clear "meaning of life." In return they demand total obedience to cult commands. There is constant exhortation and training to arrive at exalted spiritual states, altered consciousness states, and automatic submission to directives. There are long hours of prayer, chanting or meditation, and lengthy repetitive lectures, day and night. The exclusion of family and other outside contacts, rigorous moral judgment of the unconverted outside world, restriction of sexual behavior are all geared to increasing the follower's commitment to the goals of the group, and in most cases, to its powerful leader. Leaving a restricted community such as this can pose problems, particularly when one is aware that the reasons for joining the cult in the first place may have been due to a variety of emotional problems.

Dr. Marc Galanter, of the Albert Einstein College in New York, and several colleagues reported that some 39 percent of one cult's membership said they had serious emotional problems before their conversion, and 23 percent cited a serious drug problem in their past. Given this pattern, it seems that most of the members of these movements are looking for friendship. The reply most often heard from those actually living in religious communes told the story of loneliness, isolation, and the search for supportive community. They are looking for warmth, affection, and close ties. They did not find these at work, or at school, in churches, or even in their homes. They do seem to find them, at least for a while, in the communities and in the communes.

Another reason, cited by Harvey Cox, a member of the Harvard School of Divinity, is the search for a kind of immediacy. Cult members are looking for ways to experience life directly without intervention by ideas and concepts. Some of the young people move and drift from movement to movement, looking for an encounter with a meaningful life experience—perhaps an encounter with God or simply with "life" or "nature." The Neo-Oriental movements all include instruction in some form of spiritual discipline. Members are taught the primary techniques of prayer or chanting, contemplation and meditation. The teachers rely not only on words, but also on techniques. Ideas are kept at a minimum; repetition and direct exposure to repetition seem to be the common pattern.

Some are rejecting what they consider to be the effete, corrupt, or worn-out religious traditions of the West.

A third reason why young people join cults is that many of them are looking for authority. They have turned to the East to find truth, to be able to believe a message or a teaching that they can trust. They join these groups as refugees from uncertainty and doubt. Their trust in the leader, or guru, seems to be infinite. The quest for authority results from a wide range of factors documented by dozens of sociologists. It may stem from a disillusionment with conventional moral codes, the erosion of traditional authority, or the emerging of "over-choice." This is a term which Alvin Toffler used in his book *Future Shock*; it referred to the fact that people are in a condition of choice fatigue. Too many choices, alternatives, complicated arrangements seem to confuse and overwhelm them. They hunger for authority that will simplify, straighten out, assume something, or somebody who will make their choices fewer and less arduous.

A fourth reason that a small number of people seem to turn to these religions is because it is "natural." They are talking about "natural" in the sense of pureness, simplicity, and honesty. It is a deliberate response, rejecting what they consider to be the effete, corrupt, or worn-out religious traditions of the West. They see in Eastern spirituality a kind of unspoiled purity. In contrast to the Western faith, the East seems artless, simple, and fresh. Many of these young people can tell why they turn away from Western religion more clearly than why they turn toward Eastern religion. They look upon Western religion as corrupt. "It is nothing but technology, power and rationalization," they say. "It is corrupted to its core by power and money; it has no contact with nature, feeling or spontaneity. Western religion has invalidated itself; now only the East is possible. The Oriental peoples have never been ruined by machines and science, and they have kept close to their ancestors' simplicity." The mysterious Orient is what they are seeking. Those who yearn for what they call an Oriental approach are opting for an archaic rather than a historical way of life.

The cultists claim that they have found peace, happiness, love, and mental stability in their groups.

This inner seeking is reflected in a less malignant way by what we can call the decade of narcissism, which many of us are involved in —a turning inward, a search for health through biorhythm systems, through jogging, through some type of regaining a pattern which will keep us intact in this fragmenting, stressful world.

Now, I would like to turn for a moment to the process of indoctrination. What is there about this indoctrination pattern that can explain the series of events that have occurred within cults and have at times horrified our country? What can account for the murder of a U.S. Congressman and three newsmen, to be followed by the mass suicide-murder of more than 900 followers of Jim Jones's People's Temple in the jungle of Guyana? What explanation is there for the families who are horrified by the changes they have witnessed in their children—changes such as leaving home, shaving their heads, changing their names, signing over their money and possessions to a group leader, denouncing their families, suing their families, and attacking their families as agents of Satan's world? The cultists claim that they have found peace, happiness, love, and mental stability in their groups, have freely chosen their forms of worship, and are entitled to the full protection of the law under the First Amendment of our Constitution.

The techniques utilized by cults are very similar overall, but each one seems to have worked out its particular style. All of the groups appear to have worked out ways of gaining access to what they would consider to be susceptible individuals. Those who are recruited seem to be divided into two rather distinct groups. The first is composed of seekers. These seem to be schizophrenics with chronic symptoms or borderline personalities. It is quite clear that the existence of emotional or personality problems is one reason for becoming involved in the cults. Most mental health professionals consider only this reason at the present. This is an oversight, resulting perhaps from a superficial look at the groups. These inductees involve themselves in order to feel better because they are uncomfortable with the outside world and themselves. Such motivated conversions are restitutive in that the seekers are trying to restore themselves to some symbolism of comfort in a fresh or false reality. We also see this attempt at restituting in the so-called secondary symptoms of schizophrenia and other forms of mental illness as the effort of troubled or damaged individuals to put together a new, simplified mental world and style of reasoning. They do this to compensate for their terrible perception of the world and their personal vulnerability. In some studies, approximately 58 percent of the inductees seem to be found in such groups. This, to me, seems a little bit high, but it may well be within the ball park.

The purpose of indoctrination is to bring to complete subjugation the mind of the individual who is a candidate.

The remaining inductees were not ill or damaged in the sense of a mental illness; they were apparently normal developing young people, going through the usual crisis of development on the way to becoming adults. They joined for a number of reasons. Many of them were facing, as I said earlier, the pains of separation from their families, the normal depressions, the complexity of outer reality, which is a part of early college life, and they were seeking some form of adaptive response to their internal pain.

The purpose of indoctrination is to bring to complete subjugation the mind of the individual who is a candidate. The first event is the gaining of access to these potential converts. This is raised to a high art by all of the successful cults. Some have printed manuals describing where to approach prospects, exactly what type of initial pressure to put on each of them, and what the odds are that they will acquire a certain number of converts from a given amount of pressure, well applied. The general openness of manners of this age group adds to the ease of access. Once such a prospect has agreed to investigate the rather simple propositions expressed by representatives of the cult, he or she is brought into the next and highly sophisticated activities of the conversion process.

From the first, intense group pressures — lectures, lies, and other interpersonal pressures unexpected by the individual — are brought to bear. Singing, chanting, a constant barrage of the kinds of rhetoric which catch the young idealistic minds are constantly played. So intense is this that individuals who are under such pressure and are susceptible, tend to enter a state of narrowed attention, especially as they are more and more deprived of their ordinary frames of reference and of sleep. This condition must be described as a trance or a trancelike state. From that time there is a relative or complete loss of one's own mind and will, which are then placed into the hands of the group or the individuals who have the direct contact with the individual inductee. Once in this state of passive narrowed attention, willingness to be influenced is achieved; the true work of conversion or-thought reform begins in earnest. This is always a program of unbelievable intensity.

The victims are induced rapidly to give up all familiar and past loved objects—parents, siblings, home, city. They are physically and emotionally moved to as foreign an environment as is possible to imagine.

During this, the cults step up their ideological reform pressures by showering attention and affection on inductees — sometimes called "love bombing" — by a change of diet, and by the introduction of elements of guilt and terror. The question of supernatural pressures that one must face in the future are brought out more and more explicitly and concretely. Many promises are made of redemption or safety, in the certainty that the world will soon end, at which time there will be enormous rewards to believers, terrible punishments to nonbelievers. The threats may be implicit, but are sometimes increasingly physical and explicit.

Preaching is constant from all sides, supervision is absolute, and privacy of body or mind may not be allowed for days or weeks into the future. All relationships with other people are organized and stereotyped, and no chance is given for idiosyncratic expression. The victims are induced rapidly to give up all familiar and past loved objects — parents, siblings, home, city. They are physically and emotionally moved to as foreign an environment as is possible to imagine. Thus, it becomes increasingly hard for them to reconstruct in imagination what they have experienced some time in the past. Reality becomes the present, and it includes elements of the supernatural, magical, terrifying thoughts which have been expressed constantly all around. There is no base for reality testing. I could go on, but the process is intense and repetitive. I have a collection of speeches that are read over and over again by the Rev. Moon groups.

There's a tremendous commitment to a leader who's all-knowing, all-powerful, and never wrong.

There are number of reactions that are important in terms of those individuals who have left the cult and have a particular spectrum of problems and difficulties. Many of them are of an emotional nature. It is reported that it takes anywhere from six to eighteen months to get their lives functioning again at levels commensurate with their histories and talents. Symptoms vary, but among them is depression. A second is loneliness. A third is indecisiveness. A fourth is slipping into altered-consciousness states, then a blurring of mental acuity. A fifth is uncritical passivity. A sixth is fear of the cult. A seventh is what we call the "fishbowl effect," that is, the constant watchfulness of family or friends who are on the alert for any signs of difficulties with real life that will send the person back. The eighth is the agony of explaining why one joined the cult. The ninth is guilt, and the tenth is perplexity about altruism. After these come problems with money and the feeling of being "elite" no more.

It seems to me that the uncritical willingness, even eagerness, of young people to join cults should be a matter of great concern to all of us, not only because it's so pervasive among the age group we are discussing, but also because these cults represent a "solution" to many of the problems that beset young people, including some of the problems we have been talking about at this conference.

Discussion

John Schweppe: Are the techniques used by these cults somewhat akin to those that were used in the Nazi youth movement and in Maoist China?

Visotsky: In some respects yes, but not in others. What you see in the cults is more like the organized brainwashing that went on in the Korean War.

I would say that the techniques used by the cults have at least three major elements. One has to do with fatigue — that is, keeping people awake for long periods of time in order to get an altered state of consciousness. The second has to do with repetition of doctrine, over and over and over again, whether it be through chanting or through lectures. And the third has to do with altered nutrition. The nutrition is seriously altered to weaken the resistance of young people.

The relationship to the techniques you asked about is that in the cults there's a tremendous commitment to a leader who's all-knowing, all-powerful and never wrong.

Leonard Duhl: What is the dividing line between cults and other religious or self-help groups? I've run into some that I wouldn't call cults.

Visotsky: You have to take a look at the prime motive. Most of the cults are more interested in power and money than in helping people. Many of them start out by saying, "We want to help you," but there seems to be a drift away from that the longer the cult operates. A prime example is Synanon, which started out as a program to help drug abusers. Many programs in the United States modeled themselves after Synanon. It really was a high-class, well-thought-out, succcessful program. Then it changed in a way that was quite frightening. It turned violent. It hired lawyers to sue anybody who criticized it. It has managed to drive several small corporations out of business, and it has taken over real estate and property by literally driving out of the community elements that it felt would be inconsistent with its primary goals. Now it spends very little time on helping people who have problems with drugs or alcohol.

There's also another distinction, and it lies in what happens to the young people who join cults. I'm referring now to the sudden and drastic alteration of their value systems, including abandonment of academic careers and career goals and other changes that are relatively sudden and catastrophic.

I mean sudden, like in three to six weeks. There is a loss of cognitive flexibility and adaptability. When you ask them questions, they give you stereotyped answers.

There's also a great deal of regression of behavior, sometimes to almost a childlike level. Many of the youngsters really do very well soliciting contributions at the airport. They approach people very well. Then you see them sitting on the curb waiting for the mini-bus to pick them up because they have their hundred dollars, and they're sucking their thumb. They're looking into space. They seem to have regressed.

Duhl: I was struck by what you said about the eagerness of some young people to join cults. Maybe there's a lesson in that for us. Maybe we need some new pattern of governance that will permit us to be both individualistic and to belong, and to be able to move back and forth. There are very few organizations that I know of that could serve as models. Maybe we can create one that will give us a sense of wholeness and at the same time permit a certain amount of individuality.

John Cannon: It's obvious to me that in some sense the attraction of youth to cults is a judgment on organized religious institutions. Do you see any way in which the liberal, mainline religious groups from which many of these people are drawn can relate to their teenagers differently, so as to meet the need that's there?

Visotsky: Yes. Let me begin my answer with an analogy. Don King talked about the mutation of certain microbial organisms through the pervasive use of Tetracycline and other types of chemicals. Cults are highly mutational, too. We can fight them in a number of different ways, but I don't think that's the answer.

The answer is a competing system which is relevant to youth and relevant to our own value system. What I'm worried about is that we're not designing that competing system. All we're trying to do is shut the cults off. We're not going to shut them off, ever. They have an immense capacity to be adaptive. Their lawyers can tie up our lawyers. They do it every day. We're bogging down in the courts. We can't even get them on the docket. They have had more deprogrammers brought up on kidnapping charges than we have had *them* brought up on kidnapping charges. So the point I'm trying to make is that we'd better come up with a competing system, a system of values, a system that the kids can relate to.

Cannon: May I interject an observation on that point? In the late 60's, the so-called liberal, mainline religions as well as the liberal Jewish groups began what has been ever since an accelerated withdrawal from campuses throughout the country of what had been traditional campus ministries, because of financial constraints and because of the fellow-traveling style of campus ministries during the 60's. That has been a matter of great concern to me, because I agree with you.

Duhl: Our problem is that most of our alternatives are very narrow alternatives. The religious organizations are fairly narrow. We haven't had any holistic organizations. Our real social innovation can come if there are broadly based psychological, social and spiritually oriented alternative institutions. I also believe that there should be freedom of exit and entry, so that you can belong if you want to, but you can also move to something else without anybody going out after you.

There is one other point I want to make, and that is that young people today are searching for a kind of spirituality that goes beyond what the churches are talking about, and they think that cults are the answer.

Visotsky: I don't disagree with you, but there's a joker in the deck. It's part of the pathology. Some of the kids who join cults are borderline schizophrenics who are looking for a refuge. They do a lot better in cults than the ones we've turned out of institutions into a hostile community that rips them off. So when you talk about holistic groups, don't forget that cults are holistic. They find a place for the borderline schizophrenics. They find a job for them. The job is meaningful. They provide a sense of security. That's the joker. I sometimes think I wouldn't have any objection to Reverend Moon if he'd take all of my sick kids, instead of taking the healthy ones.

Sheila Kamerman: I have two questions. First, is there any indication that kids who are part of this cult movement will outgrow it? That is, does age make a difference? And second, since kids who join cults are a very small group, how much study has there been of those kids who don't join cults, and find alternatives? What have been their solutions?

Visotsky: Some youngsters do outgrow their attraction to cults, and a lot more are dropped by the cults themselves because they really become too much of a burden. The cults, like other groups in our society, do their own share of dumping. If they get a very sick youngster, they'll dump him off at one of the state hospitals or see that he gets outside of the group and doesn't return.

Many of the other youngsters with problems—those who don't join cults—form groups of their own or join groups like Alcoholics Anonymous. We had a bull session at Northwestern designed for a small group of people to answer questions about life styles. We started with fifteen kids and it went up to 400. They were asking such questions as, "If you try heroin, will you get hooked?" "If you join a cult, who should you call to get you out?" Kids like that really need a validator, someone to validate what they're going to do. They don't need a director.

Juvenile Crime

William E. Threlkeld
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I will discuss some trends and patterns of juvenile crime as well as some problems faced by young people in the age group we are concerned about here. The figures and trends I will cite are from Denver, but through my discussions and association with juvenile officers of major jurisdictions, I have discovered that these trends and figures will not differ much from those in other cities across the country.

I agree we need to approach the subject of this age group in a broad context. I also know we need to deal with the major underlying issues rather than isolated immediate problems. However, I am in the business of dealing with delinquency problems, so I will discuss the source of juvenile crime as well as some of the things that might affect it.

The most disturbing trend we have seen among young people is that toward violence. Crimes of violence, while not increasing in number (except for homicide), are increasing in severity.

First, understand that all young people do not involve themselves in crime or delinquent behavior. Of the 45 million persons in this age group, only about 2.5 million will come to the attention of law enforcement as delinquents. Nonetheless, that is a great number and creates large problems for society. More than 50 percent of the Class I felonies — murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, larceny, and auto theft — are committed by juveniles under the age of 18 years. Probably another 30 percent of these felonies are committed by people 18 through

25 years of age. These figures indicate that the young people we have been talking about are the criminals of our society.

Let us now turn to trends in juvenile crime. We must first understand that we are now only dealing with those youths up to the age of 18. The statistics in the accompanying table do not exclude youths between 10 and 14, but those from 14 through 18 are, by far, the largest number of problem youths.

Denver Juvenile Arrest Trend
1969 through 1978

	1969	1978	Percent Change
Murder	5	10	100.0%
Manslaughter	1	3	200.0%
Rape	18	19	5.6%
Robbery	108	134	24.1%
Aggravated Assault	201	139	-30.8%
Burglary	901	1,103	22.4%
Larceny	1,784	2,144	20.2%
Auto Theft	869	662	-23.8%
Other Assaults	388	494	27.3%
Arson	62	42	-32.3%
Forgery	10	22	120.0%
Fraud	32	8	-75.0%
Stolen Property	11	25	127.3%
Vandalism	522	650	24.5%
Concealed Weapons	144	134	-6.9%
Prostitution	11	78	609.1%
Sex Offenses	51	40	-21.6%
Narcotic Law Violations	308	280	-9.1%
Liquor Law Violations	66	117	77.3%
Intoxication	223	0	-100.0%
Disorderly Conduct	377	309	-18.0%
Vagrancy	18	9	-50.0%
Driving While Intoxicated	10	105	950.0%
Loitering and Curfew Violations	784	433	-44.8%
Runaways	1,401	1,086	-22.5%
Traffic Violations	189	86	-54.5%
All Other Offenses	1,876	1,344	-28.1%
TOTAL	10,370	9,476	-8.6%

The most disturbing trend we have recognized is that toward violence. Crimes of violence, while not increasing in number (except for homicide), are increasing in severity. In the past, a youth might involve himself in armed robbery; now it escalates to aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, with the senseless shooting or beating of the victim more and more being a fact of the crimes which are committed by youths. Many people who have done in-depth psychological studies of these young criminals attribute this alarming trend to TV violence.

More and more we see a trend toward more than one youth in the family being involved in delinquency. In the past, generally only one child would become involved in delinquency; now we see two or more children in the same family involved.

Juvenile prostitution has increased dramatically. No programs exist to help these young girls, and no answers seem to be forthcoming from the people who have studied the problem.

Our attention is also drawn to a disturbing rate of gang activity, not as we knew it in the 40's and 50's, but, nevertheless, gang or group involvement in delinquent acts. This involvement differs from our past experience in that there seems to be no true dedication to "protection of turf," nor do there seem to be defined leaders and subleaders in the group. Instead, the leader seems to be that individual most accomplished in the delinquent act the group undertakes, and will change with the involvement in different types of crime. As an example, the youngster who seems to know most about burglary will lead the group in a burglary, while one who is most accomplished in theft will be the leader if that is their undertaking.

In the past ten years, juvenile prostitution has increased dramatically. Arrests for this act doubled in 1978 over 1977. Based on figures to date, they will undoubtedly double again in 1979. This is particularly a problem that society has not addressed. No programs exist to help these young girls and no answers seem to be forthcoming from the people who have studied this problem. Of all crimes that involve both adults and youths this is, undoubtedly, the most heinous in that the pimp coerces, convinces or cons the juvenile into a life of prostitution. As Dr. Visotsky pointed out, the recruiters for cults are very accomplished in their business; the pimp is, unquestionably, the master of the trade. He can recognize a confused, troubled girl and, within a matter of a few minutes, will have started her on a way of life which will destroy her self-respect and set her as an outcast to the rest of society.

There has been a sharp increase in the use of alcohol, but a decrease in the use of hard drugs.

Denver has had a decrease in juvenile arrests over the past ten years. This does not indicate a decrease in juvenile delinquency, it indicates an increase in juvenile understanding. We now do things for children other than arrest them. We have developed programs to cope with youths and provide alternate solutions other than detention.

Sexual abuse is especially troubling.

Another quite different trend, which is truly frightening, and is certainly escalating, is that of child abuse. While better reporting of such incidents is much of the reason for the increase, the number of reported cases continues to rise and can really be explained only by the fact that people are more violent toward each other, and toward children. Child abuse and neglect involve the age group of 14 through 24, both as victim and as perpetrator, to a far greater degree than any other age. While physical abuse is not so great at the ages above 15, sexual abuse certainly is.

A large percentage of the abusers of small children fall into the new-parent range below the age of 25. Sexual abuse is especially troubling, because most girls think that because it occurs at home it is normal. When the young girl discovers it is not normal she very often does not know how to handle the problem, believing it is her fault — and to report it will cause trouble not only for her, but for the entire family. The result is a young girl very mixed up, often troubled and unable to cope for the rest of her life.

Child abuse has a self-repeating aspect to its nature. As Dr. Henry Kemp of the National Center for Child Abuse has stated: "If you were abused, you will abuse." This is true to an alarming degree. It appears to be a vicious chain that drastically needs to be broken.

All of these problems of delinquency and abuse are a tremendous financial drain on society. The cost of supporting the juvenile justice system is huge and uses a great many of society's resources that are needed elsewhere. Very few new approaches have been tried and, of those that have been tried, only a few have met with any success. I would like to offer one possible program which just might help. I do not expect the results to be immediate, but I sincerely believe they would be well worth the expenditures which, taken in the scope of the cost of today's existing problems, would be very, very small. I submit this idea to you because most of you are in the business of education and it is from there, I think, the help must come.

Let me explain first why I believe education is the answer. In the early 70's, when the drug scene seemed close to overwhelming us, drug education was started. Enforcement did not lower the indiscriminate use of drugs; facts and information did. While drug education still is not as widely and extensively presented as it should be, it has still shown remarkable success. When young people came to understand drugs and their danger, there was a rapid decline in their use. I believe this is also possible with delinquency and abuse.

The schools simply have not kept pace with the needs of society, and particularly the needs of youth.

My proposal is simply this: Through the use of structured, mandatory classes in the subjects of delinquency and abuse, I feel young people can better understand the impact of these incidents on society, not just the cost and the suffering to the victim but the cost to society and the cost to the perpetrator in terms of the loss of self-respect and self-esteem. The courses I have in mind would explore and discuss crime and delinquent behavior honestly and openly, not necessarily to elicit more reporting, but to promote a better understanding of them and, hopefully, teach our young people that they are not normal and not acceptable in the kind of society they want.

I, frankly, see this sort of education being best done, at the present, by those school counselors whom we have previously talked about. For the most part, they have an understanding of the problem and would only need to perfect their delivery. Sex education should be included in these classes.

In my opinion, these classes should be required and should start at the junior high school level and continue through high school. Without being overly critical, I would like to point out that the schools simply have not kept pace with the needs of society and, particularly, the needs of youth. I feel that this type of curriculum would support those important family values we all agree are essential to society and would help prepare young people for a better life.

Discussion

Paul Bohannan: I agree with what Bill says about the need for better education, but I don't think it belongs in the schools. They're not equipped to do the job. What we really need is more backup institutions to do the jobs that are not done by the family or the schools or the other institutions which sometimes can't do what society says they're supposed to do.

Leonard Duhl: I'm very concerned. We're beginning to talk about human services organizations again, forgetting that the big problem is in society itself. So the real issue is something way beyond what any of us are talking about. How do you redesign society so that it offers a meaningful role to these people?

Threlkeld: Do you want to redesign it or do you want to return it to what it used to be? We did not have these kinds of problems when we had communities — when everybody in the community knew little Johnnie and when he stepped out of line any one of a number of people would be glad to help him back.

Duhl: I don't think we can go back to the old communities, but the question is can we move to a new kind of community in the next few years which will take care of all these kinds of functions and make a place for people to really be part of the whole?

June Christmas: That sounds like Utopia.

Sheila Kamerman: This is a multifaceted situation that we're discussing and, obviously, different types of support systems, different types of interventions, and different types of policies have to be developed in response to different kinds of needs. But let's not forget the fact that for the kids in this age group who are under 18, the school is the most important non-family institution they are exposed to. So, if we're talking about developing support services for young people within a formal institution, the school is a critical place to begin. That doesn't negate the fact that other types of approaches have to be developed for older youth.

The second comment that I would like to make is that we have to recognize that one of the problems in getting some of these programs into the schools is political. One thing that has not been adequately addressed in this conference is how to implement any of our recommendations. Indeed, implementation is a critical aspect for all policy and program development.

The issue is not just to come up with some nice-sounding plan, policy, or program, but how to get political support for having these implemented. This is a very, very difficult problem and it seems harder right now than it has ever been before. I hope at some point between now and the time we close that we address the issue of constituency-building around some of the kinds of policies that we think are significant — and the whole question of political feasibility at a time when we seem to be moving in a very conservative direction.

A. J. Kelso: I'd like to raise two questions that occurred to me while listening to this discussion. The first is have we already extended beyond our biological capability of adapting to the problems that we're addressing? Have we already placed so many stresses on individuals and institutions that any policy we might come up with would take us beyond our biological capacity to adapt to it? Is what we're looking at the kind of stress, or the kind of result of stress, that the human being is no longer able to address in an effective personal way? If we are, then we're addressing something that ultimately means extinction of life as we've known it. If we've already gone beyond our biological capability, we're just wasting our time.

Another question which it seems to me worth raising at the moment is not what policies are going to be adopted, what solutions need to be found, but what is it that you and I can do as individual human beings in our own spheres of influence that might address these issues in some effective way? It's very easy for us to make the problems so remote that there isn't a damned thing we can do about them as individuals. I'm interested in what we can do as individuals in our own spheres of influence, in our own lives. And I don't mean offering courses in sex education. What I mean is what does Jack Kelso have to do to make a difference in helping to ameliorate some of the problems we're talking about?

Careers and Vocations

Willard Wirtz
Partner, Wirtz and Gentry, Washington, D.C.

I am going to speak from notes, partly because I've reached that stage in life when I find it wiser to speak even to my wife only from notes for fear of saying too much or too little, but mostly because what I have to say here is closely linked with things that have already been said, and I'd like to note those interlinkages.

I should warn you that I cannot speak with the same certainty Phil Blumstein expressed. Phil prefaced his extraordinarily illuminating remarks by asserting a belief in science, in observables, not in wishes. I can't proceed on the same firm basis.

Indeed, I'm prompted to think of those three haunting questions of T. S. Eliot's: "Where is the wisdom we have lost in information? Where is the understanding we have lost in knowledge? Where is the life we have lost in living?" I can't find the answers to those questions if I proceed only from observables.

With those two warnings out of the way, let me turn to my assigned topic. In discussing careers and vocations, I'll be talking particularly in the next few minutes about the 16-to-21-year age group, not only because that's the group for which figures are most readily available, but also because for my purpose it is the group that merits particular attention.

Four things need to be noted about their vocational activities. The first is a sharp increase in the participation rate of the 16-to-21-year old group so far as vocational activity is concerned. We hear a great deal about youth unemployment figures going up. It's equally true, and no paradox, that the employment figures are also going up. There is a sharp increase, as Arthur Norton noted, in the extent to which kids in school are also working, and in the extent to which young women are entering the labor force.

Second, there is a very marked shifting of youth from jobs in the production sector to those in the private service sector, which also has been remarked on, and from jobs in large establishments to jobs in smaller establishments. Moreover, among large employers in the manufacturing sector — that group upon which we relied very heavily for youth employment in the 60's — the general practice has developed of no longer hiring males under the age of 21, which is a very sharp shift.

Third, fewer and fewer of youth jobs are now on career ladders. More and more of what the 16-to-21-year olds are doing would be described in common jargon as "dead-end" jobs. Another related characteristic is that there's a very high turnover as they move rapidly and frequently from one of these jobs to another.

Fourth, so far as the 21-to-24 year age group is concerned — that's the older part of the age group we're discussing — there is a parallel development in the increasing percentage of jobs that don't make the maximum use of the individual's education and talents. This is called "underemployment."

Now I've given you no statistics, nor do I mean to, partly to emphasize what is in my judgment the virtual uselessness of the available employment and unemployment statistics as far as youth are concerned.

There were six years during which I bore personal responsibility for the release of the unemployment figures the first Friday of every month at precisely 10 a.m. Throughout that whole period I would be constantly reminded of the line in "The Man from La Mancha," just after Don Quixote is finished singing about the impossible dream: "Facts are enemies to the truth."

When you pick up any set of figures based on the current national reports of youth employment and youth unemployment, keep in mind that they have been developed as part of an economic indicator; the definitions have little relationship to the truth as far as youth are concerned, and are almost useless as far as working out an administrative program.

With those four specifics, I turn to one other aspect of the employment/unemployment situation which has been referred to earlier in this conference — the oversupply situation resulting from the baby boom. Sheila Kamerman and Al Kahn have suggested that the converse of this is a new labor shortage or undersupply situation starting in about 1985 and going on up to 1990.

Al made my position very difficult by referring to the "false alarm" of the early 1960's as a lesson prompting humility among those of us of apocalyptic tendencies who see a more serious problem ahead. I take a different view, and I hope we'll have an opportunity to talk about it later.

The prospect I see now for the 1980's is one of an aggravation of what we have called the "oversupply" situation. I think that situation may well get worse rather than better.

It seems to me that the bearers of good news from the demographers forget the fact that their reports are based only on a head count; they take insufficient account of several other developments. One is the increasing competition these kids are going to have from women, from seniors, and from adults in general at a time when the unemployment rate nationally is 6 to 7 percent. They're going to feel that crunch increasingly, I believe.

> **There's a particular temptation when we address the problems of this age group to do our thinking in mollycoddle terms; we would be much better off to think about them in broader terms — as societal concerns.**

I have left out a more arguable point — the effects of machines rapidly getting as much education as these kids have. The other thing that's left out in the head count, it seems to me, is the realization of the fact that what we're talking about here is about the education of the people involved as well as their numbers.

The demand for developed talent has been going up in this society, and it keeps pushing up the supply curve. I venture the though that the developed talent supply curve has already crossed the developed talent demand curve.

The subject, unfortunately, cannot be talked about publicly in the political forum because what I'm saying in an oversimplified way is that as things go nowadays, there is not enough for young people to do and there's not going to be, given the present situation.

And so, in general, I suggest — as a basis for proceeding to a consideration of programmatics — a picture of the career and vocational aspects of 14-to-24 year olds' activities that includes some structural elements which warrant some different manipulative pathologies, but second, which involve a much deeper question, putting it oversimply, of whether there's going to be enough for this age group to do. And, of course, that question requires the consideration of much more radical surgery.

Now about the program possibilities. My discussion of them will be divided into two parts. The first will assume the present economic realities; the second will take on what has been called "the Utopian purpose" of redesigning the society.

Even accepting the overall context of present realities, there's unquestionably a good deal that can be done to provide young people with what Sid Werkman called "sensible careers." That's *our* concern as well as theirs. There's a particular temptation when we address the problems of this age group to do our thinking in mollycoddle terms; we would be better off to think about them in broader terms — as societal concerns.

It seems increasingly clear that in our search for new ways of dealing with the career and vocational problems of youth we are going to have to look more to the local community rather than the federal government. I think we've probably reached very close to the limit of federal support.

What would have been my essential point about careers for young people has already emerged as the unifying theme and certainly the key good sense of this seminar, which is that the first essential step in moving toward new programs is the establishment of procedures and structures through which specific right answers are most likely to evolve.

The establishment of those procedures is itself an action program, and a tough and demanding one. Several of the speakers at this conference have emphasized that. I'd like to add three thoughts of my own about this process. First, it seems increasingly clear that we're going to have to look more to the local community for the development of the new processes and structures which we need. I don't think it's going to come at the federal level alone. I don't think it's going to come at the state level, and Bob Aldrich properly reminded us that even a large city presents problems that are very hard to meet.

I think we've probably reached very close to the limit of federal support as far as this particular area is concerned. I believe it's more than a matter of succumbing to the Proposition 13 philosophy. I think it's primarily a matter of there not being a breathless immediacy about it, of there being no sufficiently noisy crisis involved in what we're talking about here to expect very much more as far as the federal government is concerned. There are just too many other demands.

I think the principal reason we have to look to the community for the processes and structures we need is that it is only at the local level that people in general can acutally participate in the handling of their own affairs.

At the state and federal levels, they are merely represented. We are at the point in the history of government in this country where a vast majority are fed up with representative government. People have come to identify it with corruption of one kind or another. The only antidote I know to that is to give them an opportunity to participate, and it is only at the local community level that this can be done. It is particularly only at the local community level that the members of this particular age group can participate in the handling of their own affairs. Right now they can do nothing but march on Washington.

My guess is that this conference can be replicated effectively much more readily at the local community level than at the federal government level and that we can expect more from the interplay of the disciplines locally than we can federally.

Now I come to the point Jack Kelso raised when he asked whether we'd gone beyond the biological capacity of individuals, and the traditional institutions, the family, the school and the church, to handle these problems. My answer, of course, is a resounding no, at least in the case of individuals and very much in the case of the institutions. I don't think the problem is overload. I think it's under-use, as far as the individual is concerned.

Then Jack asked what we, as individuals, could do about some of the problems we have been discussing. I would like to answer that in what I hope are not maudlin terms, although they involve the recollection of a conversation I had some fifteen years ago with my father, then not at all well. We were watching on a Sunday afternoon on television the Mormon Tabernacle Choir. When the program was over, he said, "You know, that means quite a lot to me." I asked why. "Well," he said, "if one member of that choir stopped singing, I wouldn't notice the difference and I don't think anybody else would. Similarly, too, if two or three dropped out. If a quarter of them stopped singing, then I'd notice the difference in the quality, and if a half did, I certainly would. Then, eventually, only one would be singing and that would be all the difference in the world—between a choir and a solo. And finally, if the last person stopped, the loss in numerical terms would be no greater than that which occurred when the first person stopped, but it would dramatize the fact that the individual does make a difference, even though it can't always be noted."

The second point I will try to add involves what I think is the importance of developing new forms of effective collaboration between established institutions, which can be done at the local level but not possibly at the federal level. The Department of Labor and the Department of HEW are only four blocks apart, but you have to go around the world to get from one to the other.

The programs developed for 14-to-24 year olds would almost of necessity, if they are to be effective, have to be broadened out into programs meeting the parallel needs of other age groups.

Len Duhl has noted that networks do not make communities. I agree thoroughly and completely. I guess I would urge very strongly that the implementation of the sense of community in an institutionalized society depends on the development of new working relationships between these various traditional institutions. I think it's appropriate to note that this problem of inter-institutional collaboration is particularly important as far as this age group we're talking about is concerned, and indeed, I suspect that this is equally true of the transitions from one age group to another. We're terribly bad at handling the transitions, because so many of them fall in "no-person's land," between the turfs of established institutions.

I also want to suggest that the problems developed for 14-to-24-year olds would almost of necessity, if they are to be effective, have to be broadened out into programs meeting the parallel needs of other age groups. I would make this argument first in terms of equity. For example, I think the reaction of most people my age is that if you talk all that much about the problems of the youth maybe you better start talking about my problems at the same time. They are at least comparable problems. But it's also a matter of pragmatic politics. I think what we're talking about depends on the development of a coalition constituency which we don't have as of right now. For example, I see the decline in educational appropriations as relating very directly to the sharp decline in the number of people who have children of school age. As that number of taxpayers and voters goes down, there's less support for education. Maybe the obvious answer is the development of a concept of continuing education so that more people in the community have a self-interest, if you will, in the process rather than only a derived interest, and they don't need to think necessarily of somebody else's children.

The most commonly suggested way of dealing with youth unemployment would be to exempt young people from the minimum wage law. I might be in favor of that if someone could devise an exemption that did not have the consequence of taking Peter's job and giving it to Paul's son or daughter.

Before leaving the subject of structures, I ought to mention the National Manpower Institute, which is engaged in the development of community education work councils. This is an attempt to implement some of these things that I've been talking about here. It has been a remarkably successful enterprise. It grew out of a previous catastrophe in which we tried to develop a citizen-involvement network. That was too broad. Instead of that we've tried to take a narrower focus — the relationship of education and work — and have found there a degree of local community interest and inter-institutional collaboration which I can only commend very strongly.

I come now to specific program possibilities. My time is running out, so I've got to go through them almost on a checklist basis.

First, the commonest suggestion is to establish an exemption to the minimum wage law. In the country at large, if a referendum were held, there would be an overwhelming majority who would say that the way to create more jobs for young people is by exempting them from the minimum wage law. I might be in favor of that if someone could devise an exemption which did not have the consequence of taking Peter's job and giving it to Paul's son or daughter. The point is that the exemption would help with the youth unemployment problem by worsening the adult unemployment problem.

Second, Helen Washburn and Jack Darley talked about counseling and guidance. We ought to talk a lot more about that, especially about the possibility of an expanded counseling and guidance function that would be community based instead of school based.

There's a great shortage of adequately trained counselors and guidance people in the schools in this country, but there is a surplus of such people in every community. The organization of a community-wide system of counseling and guidance opens up the prospect of organizing an opportunity inventory for every community, a placement function, and most particularly, a follow-up function which starts when the individual gets a job. Failure to follow up is one of the worst weaknesses in many guidance and counseling systems.

It seems to me that we can draw on the tenets and history of democracy to make as good an argument to a child about the importance of work as the Chinese do.

My next suggestion is one that I would call, for the lack of a shorter title, better mobilization of the available private service sector opportunities. Here I'm including such things as taking care of somebody's yard, mowing lawns, or working at MacDonald's. We call those dead-end jobs, but I would like to see that expression stricken from the vocabulary. Almost everything I did between the ages of 15 through 25 was a dead-end job, and some of the things I've done since were dead-end jobs. The attitude that has grown up about dead-end jobs seems to me absurd.

This brings me to the important matter of changing the attitudes of youth toward work. John Schweppe brought that subject up in an interesting way when he referred to the China experience. I was there a year ago. What they have done in the development of work attitudes leaves only the question of whether we couldn't do the same thing here, without the enslavement of the mind which extends to political indoctrination. Those kids really want to work, and I refuse to think that there's something about Communists that gives them a monopoly on the development of the attitude toward work that those kids have. To put it more affirmatively, it seems to me that we can draw on the tenets and the history of democracy to make as good an argument to a child about the importance of work as they do with communism.

There was an earlier reference to a youth service program. I would call it a *voluntary* youth service program, because you just can't sell the "mandatory" idea at this point. I'd also leave out the word "national," because it seems to me that any such program, to avoid the dangers which both June and Len have pointed out, must be community based and must involve a large degree of local discretion. If it is unidirectional, or if it becomes an elite corps of one kind or another — if either of those things happens it will not have been worth it. I would also emphasize that it's service we're talking about, and not employment in the traditional sense, because there is a great deal to be done in the communities in the name of what we now call public service and it is not going to be done by traditional employment.

A one-with-one guidance and counseling program would not be too costly, and it would meet the adolescent's greatest concern: "Doesn't anybody give a damn about me?"

My fifth programmatic suggestion is that we must pay attention to June's concern about not cheating the hard-core disadvantaged group. It's not just a matter of not cheating them, but also a matter of trying to minimize the horrible cost to the community of not doing enough about that group. So we've got to have some kind of program that meets the special needs of the disadvantaged. Our discussions of mentorship may contain the elements of an answer.

Incidentally, I think mentorship is a bad word. People don't understand what it means. I'd call it a "one with one" program. I think the validity of this approach comes from doing some arithmetic. There are about 45 million young people in the age group we're discussing. Only about eight or nine percent are what you'd call hard core, out of school, out of work, in trouble. That's a manageable figure. John Schweppe asked very properly about the cost. I would put it at $2,500 a head, to do something about them on an essentially mentorship, one-with-one basis. That kind of approach would be feasible, and it would meet Sid Werkman's point that the adolescent's greatest concern is, "Doesn't anybody give a damn about me?"

I'd start with the names and addresses of the hard-core group in any particular community and then work out a federal program administered at the local level. I'd divide that $2,500 in half. I think we could assume that the federal government — the national taxpayers — should put up about $1,250 a year. The other half would be reimbursement for in-kind services to the public and private sectors of local communities. That's about $2 billion a year in federal funds, which I would simply transfer from the present programs designed to meet the needs of this age group and pay it out to the local communities.

If there were more time I'd tell you about the success of our Wheeling, West Virginia, Community Work Council, working along precisely those same lines. About once a month, a group of 12 to 15 representatives of various community organizations sit down and start with the names and addresses of the hard-core disadvantaged youths and they simply divide up the responsibility for helping them. They always find some institution in the community which is willing to take on the responsibility for helping each kid.

My sixth programmatic suggestion is also something that we're already working on. For the moment we're calling it a "community-based lifelong communications learning curriculum." Let me simply note the elements that are involved in that awful mouthful of words. It's community based rather than school based. Communications rather than writing; and learning rather than education. It's an attempt to respond to the very strong feeling in the community today — I think well founded — that what these kids need most is the ability to communicate, to write if you will, and if we're talking about basics that's the one on which we ought to concentrate.

But you don't learn writing just in school. You also learn it in the home, and in the community as a whole. It's a lifelong process.

The sooner we start using the word "learning" in place of "education," the better off we're going to be, because education is an institutionalized term. It vests the school with some responsibilities which only the community as a whole can exercise. If you once start trying to work out the role of the family, the school, the employer and so forth in developing the learning of writing, you will be far ahead.

Let me mention two little specifics of the Wheeling program. One would be a requirement that no examination involve more than 50 percent objective answers. Why? How can these kids be expected to learn how to write when they're going to be graded and credentialed on the basis of which box they put an X into? That's self-defeating, because it doesn't require any writing! A second requirement would be that every applicant for any job has to sit down on the spot and write one paragraph of prose, or if it's a particularly important job, four lines of poetry.

Finally, I'd like to say a few words about another programmatic possibility that has already been mentioned — the idea of redesigning our society. Not because of time pressures, but because of the limitations of my own understanding and knowledge, I'll get through this very briefly by asserting three propositions, which you may accept or not.

The first is that this is critically yet only superficially a matter of developing a new economics. A model is already available to us in Chapter V of E. F. Schumacher's book, unfortunately entitled *Small Is Beautiful*, which it isn't in this country. The economics he talks about puts people in first place instead of someplace else down the line. It's an economics which says that our needs are limitless, that our human resources are limitless, and the two have got to be matched up.

I am totally persuaded that the only effective instrument for basic change in this country is education . . . an education which is as fully committed to the teaching of values as it is to the teaching of facts.

It seems to me the economists commit a fraud on the public by leading us to assume that economics is necessarily confined to the parameters and perimeters of the grossest national product in history. I know nothing which confines economics as an abstraction to this particular framework. I know nothing which justifies an index that excludes all the services women perform at home. I think, and with all humility — a humility born of ignorance — that any given economics is only a form of rationalizing whatever happens to be the current political orthodoxy.

So my second proposition would be that what we need is a new politics. This need is more basic than the need for a new economics. The new politics would be based on the value judgments which have been repeatedly expressed throughout this seminar. I reject the notion that such a politics is impractical and impossible. I think of Antigone's rebuke to her sister's timidity: "Until we have tried and failed, we haven't failed."

I think the new politics will have to evolve at the grass roots level, because that's where people can accomplish something. I have difficulty with the fact that as things now stand, the judiciary has become the principal agency of change as far as the government is concerned. If you look back over the major social changes of the last twenty years, you find that the judiciary has been the principal institutional instrument for change. Now that's a kind of horrifying thing, because I think the reason for it is that the judiciary is furthest insulated from public opinion, and if you reach that conclusion your faith in democratic tenets is in serious trouble.

Somehow or other, we've got to change people's minds rather than rely on remote institutions like the judiciary. Most of us have grown up thinking that education's role is to conserve, and that the role of politics is to change, but I am totally persuaded, after having spent my life about half and half between those two disciplines, that the only effective instrument for basic change in this country is education.

It would be presumptuous of me in this group to try to identify the proper elements of a new education. At the risk of oversimplification, let me say merely that what I have in mind is an education as fully committed to the teaching of values as to the teaching of facts.

If these propositions seem to depend too much on faith and to have too little support in either experience or reason, I can only say, in conclusion, two things.

First, I think youth's vocational and career prospects, and whether they will contribute to a sense of worth rather than to an infecting questioning of life's integrity, probably depends on reordering the current irrational realities.

Finally, I recognize that as I get older it seems more intellectually satisfying, when reason and experience don't carry me as far as I think I have to go, to proceed the rest of the way on faith — if only in the attainable integrity of the human opportunity.

Discussion

Robert Aldrich: For many years I have been of the opinion that the study of the human life span ought to be a life science, and after hearing what you just expressed I'm more and more of that opinion. It could well be a part of the new education you mentioned. I agree with you that it very definitely has to be offered at the grass roots level — in the elementary schools, and in the family. We have to address the parents, the children, and the grandparents — different generations — with the same topics, at the same time.

Wirtz: Thank you. Let me say that twenty years ago I would have scoffed at the notion that you could rely on what was going to happen at the local community level. I was completely convinced that it takes the leadership of the national government to do something of this sort. I've changed my mind totally and completely.

Aldrich: I think many of us are beginning to recognize the hazards of federal grants. Having served, as you have, but not for as many years, as head of a federal agency, I also have developed some second thoughts about them. The more I look at them now, the more dangerous I think they are.

I think that the opportunities have never been better for private resources, whether they're large or small, to seek out points of leverage in a community that has thought through what it wants to try to do and needs $10,000 or perhaps more to move from just a concept to some pilot work. Hundreds and hundreds of foundations, to say nothing of the industrial and manufacturing companies who have money to give to this sort of thing at the grass roots level, would be willing to help.

Wirtz: That goes a little too far for me, Bob, but only a little bit. We're basically in agreement, but when you referred to a reliance on corporate sources, I think we've got to make a judgment as to whether we think the expenses of these things should be borne by consumers or by taxpayers, because when we talk about shifting the burden to private employers, it gives me pause. We're already at a serious disadvantage in some international competitive markets, and I think we should go easy about transferring the cost of social programs from the taxpayer to the consumer.

As far as the federal government is concerned, it would be very easy for me to suggest cutting back on federal grants except for the fact that there are disparities between the situations in various communities which we've got to level out. So it isn't that I would cut down the level of federal expenditures. I wouldn't, and I guess if I could do something about it, I would increase it some. It is rather that I would carry the process of decentralization further than it has been carried even in the last ten years.

Decentralization makes no sense in my book if it means only transferring the responsibility and authority from federal politicians and bureaucrats — those being two groups of which I'm a card-carrying member — to local bureaucrats and politicians. The point of decentralization is that it can get us back into the area where people in large numbers *participate*. Therefore, it seems to me the answer is to transfer these funds to local communities with no more strings attached than necessary to meet the minimal demands of fiscal responsibility.

Aldrich: That's precisely where I stand. I won't continue this any further, except to say that for about seven or eight years I have been working with political scientists in helping to educate small, rural towns on how to recruit and hold a competent medical and nursing staff. It has been very successful, and so far we have not had to ask for a single outside grant. The interesting thing is that the money is in the community. The lead time is about 18 months until you really see results.

June Christmas: I was very much touched and stimulated by many things that you said, Willard, but a couple of questions occurred to me. Not questions, really, but troublesome thoughts.

The first has to do with your reference to China. One of the things that I was impressed with in both China and Cuba was that what made people willing to do the kind of work that even for their countries would be considered menial work and seem to enjoy it, was a sense that they belonged to the society and that they were a part of it, and that what they did in some way would affect what happened in that society.

Even in a place like Cuba there was a very strong feeling among people on the local level that they mattered — that their vote, their work, and their participation was part of a common goal, a national goal.

I don't think that we have that in our country. We don't have generally shared values that are important enough to make most people really feel that what they do is going to be valued ultimately. I see that as a real problem. Maybe ultimately, as John Cannon said when he spoke of people searching for something to believe in, maybe there will be some way to get there, but I don't see us getting there yet.

My second troublesome thought is that having experimented as a local bureaucrat with ways of enabling people to be involved in our city-wide and neighborhood mental hygiene committees and councils, what we found in some instances was that at the local level people are not always interested in the fine, humanistic ideals you spoke about.

They act out of self-interest. For example, they will decide not to allow a halfway house in their neighborhood, or not to have open hiring in their particular agency. If we had let those grass-roots decisions stand, we would have moved the community away from humanistic goals. How do you deal with this?

Wirtz: I have two answers. One, I think the experience you mentioned is partly a reflection of the fact that in certain situations the bad people are more active than the good people. That's an oversimplification. My second answer is that I think you could get a working nucleus of good people. These are soft answers, but I feel a little better about them for having participated in the attempts through the community education work councils to develop local leadership. I think we've got to find some way to develop that leadership at the local community level.

Sidney Werkman: Have you discovered any inventions or transmittable ideas from your community education work councils that perhaps other communities could profit from?

Wirtz: Yes, we have. Through the support of the federal government and some private foundations, we have made arrangements to permit not only the development of a consortium of these communities but also the development now of quite a literature about their experience. The extent of the interest manifested by other communities has got to be significant. We find it everywhere.

Sheila Kamerman: At the risk of running counter to the tide, and in the face of your experience with the community education work councils, I'm going to disagree with you about community-level participation. The reality is that most people don't really want to participate. For example, parent participation in child-care programs is very poor. Some parents don't have time to participate, and others don't want to.

Harold Visotsky: There's also another problem. The federal government tends to co-opt local programs that prove successful. Look at what happened to Saul Alinsky's Woodlawn project, for example.

Meeting the Educational Needs of Young People

Alvin C. Eurich
President, The Academy for Educational Development

I can think of no better way of beginning than by raising once more a question that has been raised many times in the past, is still being asked, and will continue to be asked in the future: "What *is* education?"

Many thoughtful answers to this question have been expressed, going all the way back to Plato. We have heard a few at this conference. But there have also been many pompous answers, long on bombast but short on substance. It was in response to some of these answers that Gertrude Stein gave us a few of her own thoughts about education, in a column published by the *New York Herald Tribune* on March 16, 1935. Let me quote a few excerpts:

> Education is thought about and as it is thought about it is being done it is being done in the way it is thought about, which is not true of almost anything. Almost anything is not done in the way it is thought about but education is it is done in the way it is thought about and that is the reason so much of it is done in New England and Switzerland. There is an extraordinary amount of it done in New England and Switzerland.
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> In New England they have done it they do do it they will do it and they do it in every way in which education can be thought about.
>
> I find education everywhere and in New England it is everywhere, it is thought about everywhere in America everywhere but only in New England is it done as much as it is thought about. And that is saying a very great deal. They do it so much in New England that they even do it more than it is thought about.

Later on in the same column, Gertrude Stein said she thought education does not make very much difference, but I disagree with her on that point.

More seriously, Edward Gibbon wrote in his autobiography, "Every man who rises above the common level has received two educations: the first from his teachers; the second, more personal and important, from himself."

And, about a century later, Cardinal Newman said about the same thing: that, no matter how much a faculty can do for its students, it is nothing compared with what the student can do for himself.

There's a great difference, as Ed Pellegrino pointed out, between schooling and education, and I want to develop that distinction a little further and really show the complexity of the problem of educating a person.

We generally assume that what we teach is retained, but, actually, only a small part is retained in the long run.

Suppose we represent a school by a circle that encompasses everything that goes on in the school—all subjects taught, the relationships between teachers and students, the library, laboratories, and so on. One student really experiences just a very little bit of what goes on inschool. But then when you think broadly of education, which is essentially what is taught, the individual student covers very little of what is actually taught. And when we go on to learning, very little of that which is taught is actually learned by the student. Finally, we go to the end result, which is what means the most, and that is what's retained from this process in skills, knowledge, ideas and so on. We generally assume that what we teach is retained, but, actually, only a small part is retained in the long run.

Some years ago when I was teaching educational psychology at the University of Minnesota, I had classes of several hundred students and I was curious as to how much they retained. After spending several years developing a comprehensive examination, one year I gave that examination at the beginning of the course and again at the end. I also gave it to a group of the same students the following September and again in June. All the students made some progress during the course. Then there was some loss during the period between June and September, but, by the following June, the retention was only about ten percent. We've all experienced that ourselves in courses that we've taken. As we look back to some courses, we don't even remember the name of the teacher.

The second point I want to make is that the program offered by the school is only a small part of the total educational process. Take, for example, television. We don't know the extent to which television is contributing to education today. We do have some figures on the amount of time spent with television, and they show that the average high school graduate has spent 15,000 hours looking at television. And by the time he's finished high school, he's spent only 11,000 hours in school. In other words, he has spent more time looking at television than the total time he has spent in school. We don't know what the effect of television has been, but obviously it has become a very major part of the education of students.

In addition, of course, we must consider the educational influence of the family. Now with that complexity, we can recognize how difficult it is to determine where to put our finger on the educational process in order to have some effect on the development of the individual. I don't mean to be discouraging, but we need to look at the whole process when we're talking about education.

All the experimental work that has been done on the student-teacher ratio over the past 75 years adds up to one conclusion—that the ratio makes no difference in the learning.

In the process of formal education, we perpetuate a number of myths, some of which have been with us for centuries. Take, for example, the teacher-student ratio. This has been all-important for many many years in our budgets for colleges and universities and for our local school systems.

A rule of thumb is that, in elementary schools, we should have one teacher for 30 pupils; in high school, one teacher for 25 students; in colleges and universities, one teacher for not more than 13 students. I think we ought to just reverse this. We ought to have a smaller ratio for elementary school children and a very large one for university students.

European universities have paid no attention to student-teacher ratios. In fact, in most of the German universities there's only one professor for every department and he has assistants. It doesn't make any difference how many students he has, he is *the professor*. We've ignored that European tradition.

When we look at the experimental work that has been done on student-teacher ratios over the past 75 years, it all adds up to one conclusion—that the ratio makes no difference in the learning. But, of course, we pay no attention to that at all. In education we can carry on experiment after experiment, but if we don't believe the results, we don't put them into practice.

The American ideal for many years has been "a student on one end of a pine log and Mark Hopkins on the other." But that is only part of what President Garfield said. A fuller statement reads: "If I could be taken back into my boyhood days and had all the libraries and apparatus of the university, with ordinary routine professors offered me on the one hand, and on the other a great luminous rich-souled man, such as Dr. Hopkins was twenty years ago, in a tent in the woods alone, I would say, 'Give me Dr. Hopkins for my college course rather than any university with routine professors.' " We, as educators, forgot what Garfield said about "routine professors" and just summarized it in terms of a student on one end of a log and Mark Hopkins on the other.

The late Charles Johnson, who was President of Fisk University for many years, summed it up in another way. He said: "Small classes make it possible to transmit mediocrity in an intimate environment."

Now, we might ask, where did this idea of a fixed teacher-student ratio come from? I was curious about that for many years but couldn't find any reference to it. One day I was lecturing at the University of Michigan about quality in education and, after my lecture, one individual in the group asked this question: "But you haven't said anything about the student-teacher ratio in relation to quality in education." I said, "No, I have not deliberately because I haven't found any evidence that indicates that the teacher-student ratio makes any difference whatsoever." Then I said I was curious as to where the teacher-student ratio idea came from. Well, one of the deans at the University of Michigan spoke up and said: "I'm not wholly sure of this but I think it comes from the Talmud." I was so curious about it that, after I left the room, I called the great Talmudic scholar, Dr. Samuel Belkin, President of Yeshiva University, and said: "I want to ask you a question that I've been looking for an answer to for years. Is it true that the teacher-student ratio is recorded in the Talmud?" He said, "Oh, yes." "Well," I said, "can you give me the reference?" "I'll do better than that," he replied. "Where are you?" When I told him I was in Ann Arbor, he said, "I'll send you a telegram with the exact quotation."

A few hours later I received a telegram with the exact quotation from the Talmud, the authoritative body of Jewish tradition: "Twenty-five students are to be enrolled in one class. If there are twenty-five to forty, an assistant must be obtained. Above forty, two teachers are to be engaged."

That particular rule was recorded before we had books to read, before we had any other means of communication other than the teacher speaking to a group of students. And yet, with the vast range of communication opportunities we have available today, we have rigidly adhered to that formula, thinking there's no other way to teach a class except in a small group.

Another myth about education is that the number of years spent in school determines a student's educational attainment. We all know how ridiculous that is, but we still cling to it.

We've made major changes in our educational system over the years, but I'm not sure all of them represent progress or improvement. That's still an open question.

A third myth, which I mentioned earlier, is our assumption that what we teach is learned, whether it's subject matter or a skill. We overlook the fact that many students learn very little in listening to a teacher, whereas other students learn a great deal. Very few superior teachers are effective with every student in every class, and very few of the poorest teachers are not effective with any. So the class becomes a situation where, even though there may be twenty-five or a hundred students, it's still a person-to-person relationship, which we generally ignore.

A fourth myth is that students don't know what is taught until it is taught. I think if we developed the habit of giving examinations at the beginning of a course, we would find that many students had already acquired the content in other ways.

We've made major changes in our educational system over the years, but I'm not sure that all of them represent progress or improvement. That's still an open question.

First, we have greatly expanded the educational opportunities for youth, essentially in the past century. A hundred years ago, attending secondary school was regarded as a privilege. Most of our secondary school students went to private schools instead of public schools. In fact, in the state of New York, it took one hundred years from the time the first public high school was established until every community in the state had one or more. That was a relatively slow transition. We had private academies that eventually went out of existence.

With the establishment of public high schools education became a right, and then in the early part of this century it was made compulsory. So we went through three stages — a privilege, a right, and then compulsory education up to the age of sixteen.

In higher education, we've greatly extended the opportunities. A prime example is the City University of New York. For many years, City University accepted only about the top 7 percent of high school graduates. From that it went to open admission. That changed the University considerably. We still don't know the effect of open admission upon the learning of students.

From 1963 to 1968, President Johnson persuaded Congress to appropriate more money for education in a five-year period than had been appropriated by the federal government in our entire history prior to 1963.

In addition to making higher education available to more students — and really as part of that process — we have appropriated enormous sums of money for education in recent years. Let's take what has happened with appropriations from the federal government.

I happened to serve on President Truman's Commission on Higher Education and later on President Kennedy's Task Force on Education. In both cases we appealed for more federal funds for education. We didn't have much success. But then President Johnson came along with his Great Society, and, without any commission or task force, he persuaded Congress to appropriate more money for education in a five-year period, from 1963 to 1968, than had been appropriated by the federal government in our entire history prior to 1963. The decade of the 1960's was a period of building, a period of expansion. As a result, we have a very elaborate school system — great college and university buildings, high school buildings, elementary school buildings. Now we're confronted with the problem of closing many of these buildings. We're in a new period where we're closing hundreds of elementary schools and high schools, and colleges are going bankrupt because they can't be sustained on the basis of their income.

Another major change that has taken place in education is that we have greatly expanded our in-school and out-of-school learning resources through technological inventions of one kind or another, including radio, tapes, television, and now computers.

We have also developed new types of institutions, such as the Open University in England, which, although opposed by all the regular universities, was established by a separate act of Parliament. It offers instruction through television, radio, written materials, send-outs, and small conference groups, and it is now the largest university in England. In the United States, we have something like it in the University of Mid-America, which covers about 11 or 12 states in the Midwest, with headquarters at the University of Nebraska. It now has approximately 10,000 students learning by television and getting their credits by examinations from the old established universities.

In New York, we have the Empire State College which is similar to the University of Mid-America. At the community college level, we have Miami-Dade Community College in Florida, which has an enrollment of approximately 50,000 students, more than half of whom are older students taking work over television or in classes set up in apartment houses in Miami.

We've also changed teacher education. We've changed our teachers' colleges into general purpose institutions. I had an interesting personal experience in connection with that. A little over a quarter of a century ago, I was urging that teachers' colleges be changed or be abolished because we ought to be much more concerned with the substance of teaching rather than spending so much time on methods of teaching. I was burned in effigy on a teachers' college campus in Kansas for making those statements. Today we have very few teachers' colleges left. I don't know whether they've actually changed their program, or whether they just changed their name.

Well, these are some of the major changes that have taken place in education. But how did these changes come about? Essentially, they did not come about through the work of educators. They came about wholly because of other pressures. All we have to do is to look at our system of higher education today and see how it developed.

First of all, the liberal arts colleges of Colonial days were established to provide liberal or general education for ministers, doctors, and lawyers — a complete departure from European education. In European universities, students upon entering went on with professional work. The universities assumed that all liberal or general education was completed by the end of the secondary education. But we, in contrast, established the liberal arts college, and it's still unique in the world today.

But we were an agricultural economy and liberal arts colleges were not serving our agricultural economy. What did we do? We established new institutions, namely the land grant colleges. They were looked down upon by liberal arts colleges because they were degrading higher education. In fact, most of them were called "cow colleges" by the people in liberal arts institutions. But they were meeting an important need.

Neither the liberal arts colleges nor the land grant colleges were preparing teachers, and superintendents of schools became concerned about this. They first established county normal courses, and then some of these became two-year normal schools. Then these became four-year teachers' colleges, growing up wholly outside of the rest of our educational system, which was I think a very unfortunate development.

The whole system of higher education in this country has grown by establishing new institutions to meet new needs, rather than by adapting existing institutions.

With rapid advances in science and technology came the need for better teaching and research in science. Not much was being done in our regular institutions, other than the experimental work in agriculture by the land grant colleges.

The first scientific laboratory was established at Yale by Professor Silliman. He was laughed at by the other professors. Imagine bringing playthings into the classroom! Laboratory equipment indeed! It was only after we established institutions like MIT, for example, that science became respectable in all institutions, although it had been growing up gradually. But it eventually gained a very great deal of respect and was incorporated in our college and university curricula.

In more recent years, we reached the point where most of our youth were finishing high school and there were no jobs for them, so junior colleges—or community colleges—were established in order to provide additional education for these young people.

My point is that our whole system of higher education in this country has grown by establishing new institutions to meet new needs, rather than by adapting existing institutions.

The courts and legislative bodies have brought about other major changes in our educational system. Although parents have always exercised an influence over school affairs, parental pressures have become increasingly important in recent years, in community after community throughout the country.

Another outside force, a more recent one, has been the unions and professional organizations of one kind or another. They have been particularly important in setting pay scales, fringe benefits, teaching hours and so on.

Schools and colleges have not adapted to the individual differences among their students, nor have they adjusted their programs to the tremendous knowledge explosion.

Before closing, I would like to mention some of the major problems confronting education today.

- First is the financial problem. I've talked to many college presidents throughout the country in the last year, and frequently when talking with them have raised this question: "What is your major problem today?" The universal answer is retrenchment, reallocation of limited resources, establishing priorities, and eliminating parts of the program. This is a very, very difficult period.
- The second major problem is that schools and colleges have not adapted to individual differences among their students. Psychologists have emphasized individual differences for the last fifty years or more, but we've hardly made a dent in the way we handle these differences in the classroom.
- Third, we have not adjusted college and university programs to the tremendous knowledge explosion. Confronted with this knowledge explosion, which is probably the greatest revolution that we've had, we've merely added courses rather than rethinking our whole edu-

cational system in terms of what the new knowledge means for the education of students.

- Next, schools and colleges are not using effectively the modern means of communication. And yet, as we look at it, all of education is communication. It doesn't matter where you put your finger on it, whether it's in the classroom between the teacher and student, it's communication; whether it's the textbook material, it's communication; whether it's in administration between the teacher and the administrator, it's communication. Whether it's a matter of getting support for the school, it's still communication. Yet, in our educational system, we have virtually ignored the new and effective means of communication now available to us. That's one reason why television gets more attention, more hours, from our youth than the schools.
- Fifth, our current system of preparing and upgrading teachers is inadequate to meet current needs.
- Sixth, we've not adequately adjusted to integration.
- Seventh, we do not recognize that schools now provide only a small part of a student's total education, so we don't coordinate what we do in school with what's going on outside of school. We don't look at it in terms of the whole, the total process in relation to the individual.
- And, eighth, although there is a definite trend toward more and more career education, we are not coordinating education with the real world of work.

This leads me to my final observation. We need to adjust our entire education system to meet the needs of each individual in our day.

Thomas Carlyle expressed exceptionally well the ultimate aim of all education when he wrote: "Let each become all he is capable of being."

We don't know fully how to achieve this. There are no rules of thumb. What Justice Cardozo said about the legal process applies equally to education. When he was a young lawyer, Cardozo wrote that he thought the practice of law was a matter of learning the rules ar applying them. The older and more experienced he became, he observed, the more he discovered that the legal process is a creative one, in which principles that have served their day expire and new principles are born.

(Editor's note: Mr. Eurich's remarks were discussed along with the remarks that follow.)

Ferment and Experimentation in Education

Rev. Ernest J. Bartell, C.S.C.
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Post-Secondary Education

The big question Al Eurich left us to wrestle with is whether our institutions of higher education can meet the challenges of the future by internal evolution, or whether we need a whole new system.

What I will try to do is point out some of the opportunities that face our colleges and universities today in coping with what they see as a problem of institutional survival; then I will try to pay some attention to some of the constraints and the limitations that hinder their activity, and then let's see if the potential looks good or not.

I think there is no question that whether we have reform or revolution we're still going to have institutional education in this country. Several of the speakers at this conference have emphasized that education is finally the answer. People who have been deprived of educational opportunities have come to that conclusion very quickly, with a lot less deliberation than we have engaged in.

We all know that one of the major problems colleges and universities will face in the decade ahead is declining enrollment. I would like to make a comment or two about the possibility of compensating for that with additional participation in higher education from the age cohort we are discussing. Obviously, we don't have 100 percent participation now. People think that there is perhaps an opportunity for much greater participation by the minority cohort during the 80's.

Unfortunately, the current statistics suggest that the participation rate is not increasing among blacks and Hispanics. Despite all of the effort we've made, we're not experiencing an increase in the percentages of blacks and Hispanics going on to college. So I'm not sure at the moment that this is a very optimistic solution.

Many argue that the adult participation in postsecondary education has just about reached its peak, so those institutions that think this is the answer are likely to be disillusioned.

I do think that what we're really going to see is a great deal of competition among institutions for the available supply of students. This competition is going to force institutions into more differentiation of identity if they're going to survive. That differentiation will be up to them, of course, and it can take place in a variety of ways, including differentiation of clients served. As Al Eurich pointed out, we haven't done a good job yet of developing educational programs for nontraditional students.

Institutional definition based upon career orientation versus liberal education is futile.

Some institutions will, I think, clearly make it their business to develop new forms of higher education. Parsons and Platt did a study of the post-1960 period in higher education—after all the experimental programs of the late 60's — and they found that by and large the majority of our colleges were still dominated heavily by traditional academic models.

I define the traditional academic model as one dominated by the disciplines and the professions that educate the faculty for our institutions, as opposed to models that are created to meet the needs of the particular student served. Even in the colleges, not to mention the universities, this model continues to be structured along disciplinary lines, with all the values of the individual disciplines being particularly dominant in translating the work of the faculty into education for the students.

When I say that competition is going to demand a new definition of institutional mission, I don't mean the catalog definition. Many institutions in recent years have come out with new statements of purpose and mission. When you read them and try to identify in the grossest terms what type of institution is behind them—is it a four-year college, is it a research university, is it public, is it private, is it small, is it large? — you can't tell the difference. Somehow they all merge in glowing rhetorical statements about doing everything for everybody, with little about educational realities of the institution.

I think myself that institutional definition based upon career orientation versus liberal education is futile. Vocationalism has a certain immediacy, I suppose, in response to contemporary economic concerns and the current groping of education administrators to attract students, but as Al has pointed out, the development of higher education in this country has always had a career orientation. The original liberal arts institutions were established to train people for a career, and so were the land grant colleges, the teachers' colleges, and institutes of technology. Even today, most undergraduate colleges are really prep schools for graduate schools, and the principal purpose of graduate schools is to prepare people for academic careers.

One task often not accomplished effectively in general education courses is development of multicultural awareness.

We are seeing, however, an increase in concern about core curriculum and general education, as a reaction to the vocationalism of the last few years. (You've probably seen Ernie Boyer's book on the core curriculum, and you've probably heard about Henry Rosovsky's great effort at Harvard to develop a new core curriculum.) Despite differences, there is an emerging consensus, I think, that somehow the core curriculum or general educational component of a student's education must integrate useful verbal, analytic and methodological skills with fundamental personal, social and moral issues of human nature, history and culture.

One task often not accomplished effectively in general education courses is development of multicultural awareness. Traditional classroom approaches may simply be too dull. Fortunately, the legitimate arrival of experiential learning has made it possible for students to take time out, as part of their structured educational program, to experience another culture, domestic or foreign, at first hand.

Experiential learning goes beyond conventional undergraduate programs that combine internship experience and classroom instruction. It means finding a way to incorporate a student's life experience into his formal education. There have been some attempts, especially for older students, to evaluate and academically accredit life and work experience in our credential-conscious society. However, I believe it's more significant to find a way to build that experience into a formal education program. This requires some kind of mentoring link between formal education and the outer world of experience. People who can build these bridges will help both the institution and the students. Peer-group mentoring is a very real possibility here.

One of the challenges still remaining for institutions that want to identify with new clienteles is how to design general education for people who come from backgrounds different from those of the traditional college-bound population.

There's a growing concern, in addition, for more effective integration of values and beliefs into general education. Part of the difficulty stems from the value-free training that faculties themselves have had in their own disciplines. Nevertheless, I think there's an increasing awareness that colleges and universities must deal with both value education and commitment, perhaps because of the failure of other institutions in society to do it.

One of the challenges still remaining for institutions that want to identify with new clienteles is how to design general education for people who come from backgrounds different from those of the traditional college-bound population. This problem, for example, extends to minorities, to adult women coming in and out of the work force, and to an increasing number of part-time students. It's an interesting demographic fact that more than 50 percent of the enrollment in higher education now is part time. How to design coherent general education for people who can devote only a limited amount of time to course content is very difficult. However, there are some good examples.

Some of the programs in the Southwest for first generation Mexican-American students have been very successful. They bring together faculty and counseling staff and financial aid people—all the auxiliary service people—and they use a team approach in dealing with the needs of the individual student. This simple method of pulling together the resources of rather small institutions has reduced dropout rates by as much as seventy percent. Pressures against perseverance abound in that constituency. There is often not much family support for young people leaving home and going off to college, because of the economic necessity for their labor in agriculture. In addition, the student is confronted at college with an unfamiliar Anglo environment, so the high dropout rate is understandable.

The legitimacy of affective learning or noncognitive learning is another area of inquiry and experimentation for developmental learning. Simply, the intellect does not operate in a vacuum. Obviously, it operates in a biological, emotional and social system that must be taken into account.

In some institutions — traditional as well as nontraditional — there has been increasing collaboration between the faculty and the so-called auxiliary service people. Traditional faculties do not always look upon people who come up through the auxiliary service ranks as peers and professionals, but in some successful experiments they are collaborating in the teaching of courses, often in subjects that relate to the student's own personal life.

Unfortunately, innovative collaborative activities are often carried on outside the mainstream of the university.

We talked earlier about sex education for teenagers, but the subject is obviously not exhausted in high school. When I was a student at Notre Dame, Father Hesburgh, who was President even back then, addressed something called "The Marriage Institute." In the course of the address he recited for us a long list of characteristics that we should look for in a life partner. The list was great, but perhaps that's why I never got married. I never found a woman who met those standards. Today's students rightly expect to approach a subject like marriage from a variety of viewpoints, and to receive the assistance of experts, mentors and role models in and out of the classroom.

Moreover, collaboration extends beyond campus segments. In serving new clienteles, there is increased collaboration between educational institutions and other agencies. FIPSE is currently sponsoring a program to induce colleges and universities to work with prime sponsors in the community to provide educational opportunities for CETA clients that go beyond short-term manpower training. We're trying to get colleges and universities to look at CETA youth not just as a source of subsidized labor on campus — which colleges have already discovered, in their cost-cutting efforts — but as clients for their service. Unfortunately, I have to say that very often innovative collaborative activities are carried on outside the mainstream of the university. Unfortunately, they either take place in the continuing education division or in other community-relations segments in higher education that don't always have much credibility and clout among the dominant personnel on the campus, both faculty and administration, who determine effective policy for the institution. Continuing education in the past was often seen as a form of advertising or good will in the community. It became a money-maker when it was discovered that faculty are willing to moonlight for a few extra pennies to offer whatever educational smorgasbord will sell. Continuing education today finally is evolving into a more integrated, coherent type of program for different groups of adults and community people, offered in collaboration with community institutions.

At FIPSE we have also found ourselves helping museums, libraries, and other community-based organizations to do educational jobs for postsecondary clients. For example, we are trying to get the traditional museums that normally serve a very limited segment of society — relatively highly educated people who troop their kids through the museums on weekends instead of taking them to ball games — we're trying to get these museums to use the artifacts of the museum as learning resources for the community. We're doing that through a voucher system whereby community-based groups are given grants in the form of vouchers which they can give to a museum that develops a program that responds to their needs. It has worked quite successfully with a coalition of museums in the New York area.

I don't want to duplicate what Al Eurich said about the use of the new technologies in higher education, but I do have a few caveats.

First, to the extent that the new technologies are successful, they will assist individualized learning. One of the problems at the postsecondary level up until now has been that both the hardware and the software were relatively centralized and not easily adaptable for individual student use. That has been particularly true of cable TV and computer centers. They have not been conducive, either educationally or economically, to the development of a diversity of programs to meet diverse needs of different students.

But the newer technologies, including mini-computers, video disks, videotapes and so on, are much more flexible and much less costly.

They might finally make possible the technological breakthrough in postsecondary education that we've all been waiting for over the past twenty years.

What I fear is that some of the novelty of the techology may increase the attractiveness of information-transmitting type activities to the detriment of the more fundamental learning activities — especially those that happen when good teacher meets good student.

One area of experimentation which has not been uniformly successful but which must continue to be addressed is the area of assessment — assessment of programs, and assessment of students' performance. Unfortunately, it is not easy to assess the outcomes of educational programs, especially those that are non-quantitative, using the quantitative assessment techniques that are now being developed. As more and more life and work experience is incorporated into educational programs, the task of assessing individual student performance, of measuring individual competence, especially in arts and humanities, becomes increasingly complex. The costs of such assessment can partially offset the savings typically associated with credit for nontraditional educational experience.

The introduction of experimental programs for the disadvantaged learner, even in institutions on the fringe of conventional higher education, is having an important impact on the traditional mainstream learning.

Now let me say a word or two about credentialing. In the early days of FIPSE, the hope was that support for the right projects could downgrade the importance of the credential in our society, and induce people to look more productively at the underlying quality of education.

I'd have to say that the possibilities of one small organization doing that are about zero. We live in a credential-conscious society, and some of the experiments in the colleges and universities to substitute portfolios of student work for grading as a more comprehensive statement of the student's development have not proved to be operationally acceptable. I'm afraid that present methods of credentialing are here to stay until we can find a better and more efficient way to do it.

June Christmas has told us, and properly so, that in any program for addressing the problems of youth we mustn't cheat the disadvantaged.

I would like to go a step further. There is growing evidence that the introduction of experimental programs for the disadvantaged learner, even in institutions on the fringe of conventional higher education, is having an important impact on the traditional mainstream learning. I think we owe a debt of gratitude to the minorities and to women for improvements in education now reaching the mainstream.

One example has been the creation of alternative colleges within large systems. Some far-reaching experimental ideas are incorporated into these models, such as the downgrading of competition as a motivator in student performance by creating an alternative kind of learning community, a task that can demand new roles for the faculty. In the program up at Stony Brook run by Pat Hill, faculty members enroll as students in interdisciplinary courses taught by their peers.

Some of these experiments have a great deal of promise. On the other hand, I cannot say that under the current financial situation there is likely to be much proliferation of totally separate experimental colleges within large systems, so the problem still remains one of creating more individualized learning opportunities for students in the very large institutions, because the vast majority of students are now enrolled in large institutions.

On some campuses, winning an award as the "best teacher of the year" is a good way to lose points in the competition for tenure.

There are additional institutional constraints that are likely to retard educational improvement. One concerns faculty. Part of the problem is the familiar role of tenure. However, a more fundamental issue concerns the preparation of faculties for academic careers, taking us back to the goals of graduate schools in developing and cloning their own faculties, in preparing people to be professionals in disciplines without much emphasis on the teaching roles that they're going to have to play. Most of the students coming out of the graduate schools during the current job shortage are likely to be placed, if at all, in institutions where the teaching role is the predominant one. Increasingly, with the survival of the institutions so dependent on undergraduate enrollment, the teaching role is becoming dominant.

And yet, there's very little emphasis on teaching at the graduate school level, and often inadequate recognition of it in the process of hiring and promotion. Young faculty members thus begin with mixed signals. Some are anxious and eager to fill the teaching void in their training, but they also know that the reward structure within the institutions of education is tilted in favor of research rather than teaching. In the quiet closets of rank and tenure committees, promotion and tenure are based on professional performance, with a conservative inclination to favor the person who has had a few articles published, even if those articles will never be remembered by anyone. On some campuses, winning an award as the "best teacher of the year" is a good way to lose points in the competition for tenure.

I think the loss of individual cultural roots in homogenized preparation for competition in the academic meritocracy can be a real hindrance to an educational mission that requires empathy and sympathy with the needs of nontraditional students, but this problem may only reflect the biases of status in the larger society.

The governance of traditional institutions is often not responsive to contemporary needs. The increased democratization within traditional institutions, with additional layers of collegial bodies, has not necessarily resulted in more effective education. To jaded administrators faculty senates have often evolved into little more than therapeutic sandboxes for vocalizing dissatisfaction and for killing educational initiatives that might threaten established interests on campus.

The roles of faculty and administration during a period of financial stringency can become increasingly antagonistic. The increased application of labor law in higher education doesn't always help. Finally, the craft guild mentality of the professions and disciplines in clinging to their own prerogatives can produce institutional paralysis in educational innovation.

Ultimately, the fear is that constraints such as these, plus the now familiar financial problems of higher education, may lead to conservatism throughout the entire system of higher education — to an inertia that centers on institutional survival rather than student learning. We can only hope that good people will not be deterred from creative responses to educational needs because of hardening of institutional arteries.

Discussion

Leonard Duhl: I'm really very grateful for what I think was a magnificent diagnosis by both of you, because the problems you described are very similar to the problems we see in health and in a lot of other areas.

What I'm concerned about is what Bill Wirtz talked about yesterday, and that is that despite our diagnoses and despite the fact that we talk about the complexity of the problem and all the issues, we haven't really designed the social architecture that will enable us to cope with change.

Even in education, social processes and social architecture are not considered very relevant subjects to teach. So that the very people who are talking about the processes of change really know very little about those processes.

The amount of money that we can get for either research or teaching on change processes and institutional processes and organizational processes and all the things Bill brought together yesterday, is very minimal.

A lot of the faculty members working in the universities trying to change governance know nothing about governance. They're still stuck in their subject matter, and they're still stuck with holding on to their bureaucracies and their prerogatives. When you start talking about social change, they think you're some kind of a nut. They say that that isn't even a relevant subject to discuss.

This is also true of almost every field. In the field of health — and there are a lot of us here who have had this experience — the minute you talk about social change you're considered second rate because you're an administrator or you're a process person or a policy person. You're not dealing with real things.

I think from what we have been saying here that the tools for building the kind of social architecture Bill mentioned are available to us. Our problem is, how do we put those tools together? We've had the dialogue here and we've had the diagnosis, but we haven't gone that next step of how do you turn what we're talking about into real action. I think that's where we're always stuck.

Alfred Kahn: I want to add another element to the complexity facing adequate reform, but first I want to express my appreciation for the two presentations. I certainly was inspired by them. The other dimension I wanted to add is that in our society education is a passport to status. It's a rather important passport, and the fact that it is a passport complicates the concern with content and with access.

The new Christopher Jencks *et al.* volume, *Who Gets Ahead?*, not yet published, but being reported in the magazines, suggests that education is a different kind of passport for blacks and for whites. It does not take them to the same countries, so to speak, but education is an important passport for both, and it is a passport whether or not there is much retention of content. Going to school and learning have independent impacts.

The mere fact that education is a passport complicates the effort to reform it. I don't think that is adequately understood by people who are concerned with educational reform.

Robert Aldrich: I'd like to sound once more a theme that was sounded earlier. I think there are some built-in hazards in the whole federal granting system, even though it was quite properly pointed out that they're necessary.

It seems to me that one of the things that has replaced the classical role of the professor, which was to teach and to do scholarly work, has been a preoccupation with grantsmanship.

If you do a time-motion analysis of how faculty members spend their time and for what objectives, you're going to find that getting grants is a major concern, and that this has more to do with their prestige among their peers and also the administration than any other single thing they do, except maybe win the Nobel Prize.

This has not received the emphasis that I think it deserves. I don't think that grantsmanship is something to be thrown out, but it needs to be looked at and analyzed to see what it is doing to higher education.

I just wanted to say that again because, having been on both sides of that particular fence myself, I have developed some rather strong feelings about devising a more sophisticated way of using grants to prosper education, to prosper research, and also to coordinate these activities in terms of what is best for the students and the faculty.

Paul Bohannan: I would like to underscore what Bob just said. I teach a graduate course in which the assignment is a first draft of a research application that can be sent to any granting agency.

For ten years at Northwestern University I tried to get that course through the curriculum committee, and I was told it had no academic merit. It was a required course for people in the anthropology department there, and we taught it under one of those blanket numbers called "problems in anthropology."

The other observation I would like to make has to do with the whole matter of social structures. During the past twenty years, in the interest of consolidation, the number of school districts in this country was reduced from about 120,000 to about 16,000. This had two significant results. One was to throw the whole relationship between the community and the school into a cocked hat, and the other — even more significant — was to create with the bigness a complexity of social structures in the schools that the students have to deal with. It's this complexity, as much as anything else, that's the problem in our schools, because it takes so much time for the student to learn the system and how to manipulate it. So we have to keep in mind the fact that the social structure of the schools has an important bearing on the whole matter.

That brings me to the last point I want to make. School at all age grades is the place where one's lifetime networks are laid down, and I think it's terribly important that these networks be maintained, because the networks may be the most important thing you get out of the school. Where you go to school depends on who, twenty years later, you can call up on the telephone and say: "Look, I've got a problem and I'd like your help with it."

John Schweppe: I'd like to cite two examples, out of my own experience, of how difficult it is to get new ideas accepted in higher education. One relates to an effort I made two years ago to try to get the life cycle into the medical school curriculum. Outside the department of psychiatry and one or two others, there was little if any interest. The chairmen of the departments were quite reluctant to do anything other than cover the life cycle in maybe three or four lectures in the introductory course to medicine, which was given as a general course that included a potpourri of everything.

Second, I've tried to pick out ten of what I consider the most pressing problems in the medical field — problems like cardiovascular disease, pulmonary diseases, osteoarthritis, and other diseases that have a very high incidence, and use the team approach in teaching them. The comments that came back from the dean and other people were to the effect that this would disrupt the departmental design, and they can't be taught in an interdisciplinary fashion.

I hope that sometime in the future a student entering college can cut across the boundaries of the traditional disciplines and, with the help of his advisors, work on ten or twelve of the most pressing problems that his advisors consider appropriate for him to study. In other words, the structuring of his education would be according to what he individually wants and needs, rather than what is prescribed by the college.

I also want to say that I think the computer is just great for teaching certain types of sequences, but it falls flatter than hell when it comes to inspiring an individual. One of the most important things I experienced in college was the human element in teaching. I still remember the great teachers I had.

Alvin Eurich: I frequently think that the best teachers on college and university campuses are the athletic coach, the music teacher, and the art teacher, because they all start from where the student is at the time. They know where he is and they try to head him in the right direction. Too many other teachers only cover material.

Sidney Werkman: I think one of the greatest dangers of the various kinds of structural changes that are going on in higher education is that they will destroy the excitement and thrill of learning.

John Cannon: What has happened to the involvement of students in decision making and particularly in the shaping of the curriculum?

Bartell: It's a salt and pepper situation. In the late 60's there was a lot of pressure by students—and it didn't always have much to do with the love of learning — to get into the governance of colleges and universities. They won token representation on every committee in the institution, sometimes from boards of trustees all the way to determining the menu at the departmental Christmas party. But their interest and that of their successors in such matters didn't last. In fact, on many campuses now it is difficult finding students to fill those slots. In the heavier slots the students often found themselves overwhelmed by their fellow committee members from faculty and administration. I've been on search committees for deans and presidents that included student representatives, and I've not seen a student participate very constructively, because it's just something they're not prepared for.

On the other hand, students are still very active in curricular affairs, often forcing development of better advisory systems. In fact, some institutions have few rigid curricular requirements; they depend instead on an advisor and a student working together to design his or her curriculum. Brown University is a prime example.

Merrell Clark: I'm intrigued by the extent to which some of our major proprietary schools are providing a broad range of liberal arts and sciences in addition to specialized training. What is the future of these education-for-profit institutions?

Bartell: Back in the early 70's, there was a very deliberate attempt to legitimize proprietary educational institutions. The thought was that they would provide good competition for the rest. There were some good ones, and some bad ones, but there hasn't been as much development of proprietary education for the public as might have been expected. Some of them got out of the business. They found it didn't pay. Also, the consumer movement in education is growing, so there's going to be more public sophistication in the educational market.

Eurich: On the question of private and public funds for higher education, it interests me to see how little support comes from philanthropy. For last year, the total expenditure for higher education in the United States was $48.5 billion. Of that, 63 percent came from government, 35 percent came from direct charges, and only 3 percent from philanthropy. So philanthropy really plays a very small part in the support of higher education.

Third World Perspective

Aklilu Habte
Director, Education Department, The World Bank

My remarks will be very brief, but I hope they will add a new dimension to our discussion, because most of the world's young people live outside the United States. In spite of this fact, very little attention is paid in the United States to the international dimensions of education. Very little is taught here about other peoples and other cultures. That is indeed unfortunate.

In a world that seems to be in a constant state of crisis, I cannot stress too strongly the importance of improving international understanding, not only at the government level but, most importantly, at the person-to-person level. Mutual understanding and trust are more indispensable in today's world than at any other period of human history.

The importance of a people-to-people exchange, particularly one which involves living and working and travelling in another culture for three months to a year, cannot be overestimated.

The crisis seems to arise because of man, and the solution also rests with man. The approach cannot be mechanical, because people are not mechanical. It is therefore essential that we spend time and money to learn about each other's history, culture, languages, and development problems. In this respect the Peace Corps program is worth remembering. It has provided an opportunity for thousands of U.S. citizens to learn about other cultures and work with other people. I would like to see it expanded. Two or more years of service in the Peace Corps, in another culture, would provide rich and valuable experiences to the volunteers and would be of great service to this country when the volunteers returned and participated in their own nation-building process.

There are other endeavors and activities which encourage young people to travel and live in other countries, and these too should be expanded. However, this kind of experience should not be restricted to a small segment of the population, or to any specific, exclusivist age group. The importance of a people-to-people exchange, particularly one which involves living and working and travelling in another culture for three months to a year, cannot be overestimated.

For young people of this country, as well as older ones, it would be helpful to understand the broad characteristics of their counterparts in the Third World countries. For example:

- There are far more young people 14 to 24 years of age in developing countries, as a proportion of the total population, than in this country. Third World countries in general have a younger population than developed countries, and the implications of that are highly significant.
- People in developing countries do not have anywhere near as much to eat as their counterparts in the developed countries. It is worth remembering the shocking truth that nearly two-thirds of all the world's people live on the equivalent of thirty cents a day.
- Young people in developing countries have much less opportunity—and in many cases no opportunity at all—to go to school. As a result, millions of them are still illiterate and destined to remain so for years to come. The disparity between the sexes is even more worrisome: there are two or three times more boys in school than girls.
- Even the limited number of children who are fortunate enough to go to school suffer from the handicaps of irrelevant education, inferior physical facilities, untrained teachers, very few or no teaching materials, and a style of teaching that encourages nothing but memorization and repetition.
- A disproportionate number of children who begin their schooling in grade one end up outside of the classroom. This is doubly tragic, because it is wasteful of the resources that society has invested in their education and wasteful of their own human potential. For example, of every 100 students enrolled in grade one in 17 low-income countries in 1965, only 33 reached grade five. In 1970 the figure was 36. The situation is a little bit better if we include middle-income

countries. Of 100 students enrolled in grade one in 1965, only 38 reached, but did not complete, grade five. In 1970 the figure was 46. The situation is even worse in the higher grades.

- The millions of unschooled children of today are the millions of adult illiterates of tomorrow, and their lifestyle is not likely to be very happy.
- Millions of young people in the Third World countries — both schooled and unschooled — are without jobs. The mismatch between what takes place in the classroom and the job market needs no elaboration. The underutilization of human resources—the one thing Third World countries have in abundance — is becoming a vicious cycle in development efforts. We are all familiar with the unemployment situation in Third World countries from our own experiences and the analyses made by the International Labor Organization and other agencies.

The problems of youth in Third World countries clearly dwarf those of youth in the United States —in magnitude, complexity, and urgency.

- The health conditions of youth in the Third World countries are dramatically and substantially inferior to those of young people in the developed countries. Life expectancy is low, and the death rate among children under five years of age is very high. In several of the poorer countries, nearly 50 per cent of the children die during the first year of life. And for those who survive beyond that age, their life expectancy is considerably less than that of their counterparts in developed countries. It is estimated that life expectancy at birth in sub-Saharan Africa is only 43 years, in Asia 53 years, and in Latin America about 59 years. By contrast, it is estimated that life expectancy in Western Europe and North America is about 72 years.

From the illustrations I have cited, and from others that abound in the statistics gathered by world organizations, it is obvious that the problems of youth in Third World countries clearly dwarf those of youth in the United States — in magnitude, complexity, and urgency. I emphasize this as a matter of deep concern not only to those of us gathered around this table but to all of the people in the United States. Just as it is somewhat inequitable for a tiny minority in any country to enjoy wealth and abundance in the midst of the poverty, ignorance, ill-health and illiteracy that are characteristic of the majority, this also applies to nations.

Let me turn now to the role of the family in Third World countries. There, as in the industrialized countries, the family is a very important unit in society. It is a matter of regret that the role of the family is waning in importance in industrialized societies, and I hope that this does not happen in the Third World countries.

I believe that the family should be the dominant unit in any society. In several Third World countries the head of the family, usually the father, plays a central role in the affairs of the family even long after the sons or daughters no longer live with their parents. There are, for instance, certain areas in which I as a grown-up do not question the wisdom and authority of my father.

Grandparents are taken care of by their sons and daughters as a matter of routine and duty. In this respect I find nursing homes horrible in developed societies. The previous practice of keeping parents at home or as close to home as possible seems to me to be more humane.

The sociopolitical atmosphere in Third World countries seems to contribute to unsettling the minds of many young people. It is important to understand some of the factors that contribute to or influence this state of affairs. For example:

- Several Third World countries are still in the process of establishing and experimenting with the style of government and political order they want to live under.
- In several countries this is constrained by the colonial heritage, which did not take into account traditional values and forms of living and associating together.
- The big-power rivalry — Western style democracy versus Moscow style socialism—keeps on waxing and waning in popularity, extending its influence in international meetings and other arenas.
- The emergence of dictators, power-mongers, self-serving cliques and the military—all controlling the mass media and so controlling the life of the people—these and other situations contribute to the unsettled situation and the frustrations of young minds.
- Such political situations, coupled with the educational, cultural, and development problems I have mentioned, often erupt into serious and ugly confrontations between the young and the current authorities and establishments.

Let me conclude by stressing that the problems of youth in Third World countries are tremendous. Imaginative and innovative use of youth at the secondary and tertiary level for the benefit of the less fortunate mass of people — for example, in literacy campaigns as was done in Cuba, in road construction, in consciousness-raising among the peasants — these are areas that need further exploration.

But in the last analysis, development efforts must aim at self-reliance and the equitable distribution of resources at the national and international level. In this sense the New International Economic Order assumes importance and significance. If we are interested in world harmony, in peace and justice to each and all, some restructuring and redistribution of the world's resources becomes a necessity towards which all of us should strive.

Discussion

Paul Bohannan: I would like to say thank you for dragging us into the real world, because what you described *is* the real world. The real world is out there in the developing countries, whether we like it or not. That's where most of the world's people live. Therefore, it seems to me that anybody interested in studying our own culture must be cross-cultural. We must not only be cross-cultural in our analysis, but we must all get cross-cultural experiences. They're really not difficult to come by, and they are not frightening.

There's one more thing I would like to add. When we create our theories and our analyses, we must not collect from the English language and our own culture the categories of comparison we use to look at other countries in the world.

It is very very easy to take problems from our own country, from our own disciplines, and then go out and gather data about them from other countries. This is like putting parakeets into pigeonholes. They don't fit.

What we really have to do when we go to the Communist world, to the Third World, to any other world we can find, is to see how people *there* organize the processes of being human. We can then use those sets of experiences as core data to help us understand *our own* view of our culture.

If my discipline does nothing else, it says that in order to understand yourself you have to understand what you are not. Therefore, we've got to begin with this understanding of what we are not on a worldwide scale. Only if we do that we can begin to understand the whole process of human development.

Leonard Duhl: We have another interesting problem, too. We tend to project the future out of our own past. We tend to think that the best way to look at the future is to look at those parts of our own culture and other cultures that we can impinge upon. We forget that our own culture, and other cultures, are constantly changing. Our future, and the future of the rest of the world, may well lie in the sharing of resources and the sharing of people.

This is why Paul's point is tremendously important for us. Most of the people I know who are projecting the future and social plans for the world are projecting out of the present. They're projecting out of the current dialogue and the current concepts, ignoring the fact that there are other conceptual models and other realities.

Interestingly enough, the age group we're talking about here may be much better prepared to understand other cultures and other realities than we are, partly because they're wandering around the world very freely. Also, they are rejecting some of the realities that Americans have been emphasizing for a long time and they're leaving themselves open to the idea that other realities exist. The Peace Corps was a good experience, but we haven't had enough experiences like it.

Alfred Kahn: I would like to introduce some political realities. As someone pointed out quite correctly the other day, if you're enamored of grass roots participation, you have to realize that grass roots communities are very often the most parochial in the world.

I think you also ought to recognize that we're in a period of great nationalism, chauvinism, and racialism throughout the world and that the world political realities are not at all consonant with the values we have talked about here.

The Western welfare states are moving to policies of non-mercantilism that are becoming dominant in their economies. They are moving away from the assumption of interdependence. The African and Asian nations, in their concern with resources, are becoming racially aggressive and chauvinistic. The European welfare states are, within themselves, nationalistic. Within the major countries of the West, there are regionalisms which are tearing them apart.

So I'd like to make clear that although the values and the goals we have been talking about are imbued with the hope for a new future that is most attractive, I think that the realities make me say: "Don't expect that to be the picture tomorrow."

June Christmas: As I listened to Aklilu speak about interdependence, I realized how little in this country we really believe in an interdependent world. We even ignore the statistics about the number of people there are in the rest of the world. I'm reminded that when I came back from Sweden a few years ago, I mentioned that I had been to Parliament and had heard a very exciting debate on the New International Economic Order. I mentioned this to an economist teaching at Columbia University, a well-known person, and I said I wanted to learn more about this New International Economic Order. He said, "What do you mean? What is that?" This person was an advisor to state and federal governments, and he knew very little about what was going on in the rest of the world. That makes you a little pessimistic.

Aklilu Habte: That raises a very interesting question. What do the nations of the world do to make their people aware of others? I'm afraid that the United States doesn't do all it should.

John Cannon: How receptive would Third World countries be at this point to significant entry of our youth, whether through the Peace Corps or some type of exchange?

Duhl: Having spent a lot of time at international meetings, I think I can comment on that. Most of what goes on there is conversations like the one we're having around this table. They're very Western and they're very high-level intellectual discussions. But the kids who travel on their own, meeting people and living on a relatively low subsistence level, may do more good than those of us who go back and forth to all the international meetings.

Cannon: I certainly agree with that, Len, but are there significant numbers of our young people who are getting this kind of global experience?

Duhl: The numbers are small, but compared to 20 years ago, they're gigantic.

Habte: In answer to your question, John, I would like to say that most Third World countries would be very receptive to American youth. I visited Botswana and Kenya not long ago, and I found a large number of American youths in both countries. They were very well received.

Jack Darley: As you know, I'm quite interested in the Peace Corps. Can you tell us a little bit about the impact of the Peace Corps on Ethiopia, where there were a large number of volunteers back in 1963?

Habte: Yes. They contributed enormously to the tremendous expansion of secondary education in rural areas, especially at the junior high school level. In a matter of five years, junior high school enrollment increased from less than 8 or 10 thousand students to more than 80,000 students.

Darley: Does this mean that they created an educational opportunity that had not existed?

Habte: Absolutely.

Darley: How could the Peace Corps, having only 300 or so volunteers there for a period of two years, do that?

Habte: Simply because they were willing to go to areas where other volunteers wouldn't go.

Darley: So that the kids from the United States were willing to move into areas where your own Indian colleagues and your own Ethiopian colleagues would not go?

Habte: That's right.

Darley: Well that's something we can be proud of. Even though there was chaos wherever we went, something did happen.

Sheila Kamerman: I want to go back to the earlier comments about the need to internationalize education. It's something that I support very strongly, but I think that we shouldn't forget how much of it is already occurring in the area of informal education in our society. First of all, the number of young people who actually travel may be relatively small, but they underscore the fact that this is an experience that was limited to a very small elite group before World War II. Don't underestimate the significance of what's happening now among young people in terms of the availability of airplane travel and the low fares for kids. It's a very important element in internationalizing education.

A second element is the growing importance of television and the availability on television of all sorts of special programs dealing with other cultures and other countries.

The third element is, quite frankly, the professional international experience, and by all means don't underestimate that. The amount of learning which has occurred in a variety of professional disciplines as a consequence of exposure to other countries and other individuals working in the field in other countries and other cultures has been enormous. I can see the results in my own field.

Finally, there's the pop culture which several people mentioned. I don't think there are any of us who have not experienced the homogeneity of American pop culture throughout the world. I've heard

American rock music every place from Peking to Hong Kong, throughout Eastern Europe and Latin America — almost *ad nauseam*, I must admit. But the fact is, that very often I have been approached by young people all over the world, wherever I have been, with a lot of curiousity about experience in other kinds of countries. So my guess is that despite the inadequacies of our formal educational system, far more is already occurring outside that system than we recognize, and we shouldn't underestimate it.

Habte: I agree, but there is not much systematic education about other peoples and other cultures.

Robert Aldrich: We probably can learn more from the Third World countries than they can from us.

Habte: That may be true, but many of the Third World people expect leadership from the United States.

Priorities for the Future

John Scanlon
Conference Reporter

One of the major assignments the conference participants received on the opening day was to come up with recommendations for research and action programs that might be useful in helping society do a better job of meeting the needs of young people, and in helping young people themselves cope more effectively with the stresses and strains of growing up.

The conference participants took this assignment to heart. During the five days they spent together, they came up with scores of ideas, suggestions, and recommendations. Some were made as part of their prepared remarks, and others grew out of the discussion. Some were expressed as hopes and wishes rather than as formal recommendations, and a few of these were Utopian in nature. Others were not explicit, but were inherent in remarks made about the shortcomings of society and social institutions.

Many of the recommendations were not new, but were regarded as of sufficient importance to merit reiteration. A few of them were contradictory, because on some issues there was no unanimity. But all of them were thoughtful, and to the point. Most of them have been reported in earlier sections of this report, in the context within which they were made, but for the sake of convenience they are summarized here, according to the areas of concern to which they were addressed.

Education

The conference participants were almost unanimous in their belief that in the long run, more and better education is the best approach to the task of helping young people.

The consensus was that parents, educators, clergymen and policy makers need to be educated in how to deal with the needs, hopes, aspirations and concerns of youth, and that young people themselves need a better education in how to cope with the realities of life.

The importance of education was articulated in various ways. John Cannon expressed it this way: "Lord God, give us a better understanding of life." Aklilu Habte said that peace in the world depends to a large extent on helping the peoples of the earth come to a better understanding of each other. Edmund Pellegrino maintained that the greatest contribution our educational institutions can make to the welfare of young people is to help them meet the challenge of fashioning a personal identity.

There was also general agreement that our formal educational system is not as effective as it ought to be. The need for more and better education for young people, for parents, for policy makers and even for educators themselves, was mentioned time and time again. It cropped up in the discussion of drugs, health, sexuality, values, belief systems, cults, nurturing, mentoring, careers and vocations, guidance and counseling, religion, education, and international relations.

Edmund Pellegrino charged that one of the greatest weaknesses of our educational system is that it fails to teach a set of values. Several of the other participants agreed with him on this point.

June Christmas indicted the schools for their failure to prepare young people for the realities of life. She said the schools are not helping young people to choose a vocation, and they are not helping them to learn the skills they will need when they enter the work force.

William Threlkeld stressed the need for high school courses about the damage that youthful crime does not only to society but also to the offender. Helen Washburn said that the reward system in education is "completely out of whack"—that creative teachers and administrators do not get adequate recognition. Ernest Bartell and Robert Aldrich agreed. Bartell pointed out that research is more highly valued than teaching at the college level, and Aldrich maintained that too many college professors are preoccupied with "grantsmanship."

Mass education in school and college also came under attack on the ground that students get "lost" in large institutions and soon develop the feeling, as one participant put it, that "no one gives a damn" about them.

Willard Wirtz recommended more stress on continuing education, not only for its own sake but also as a means of involving more people in the solution of educational problems.

John Schweppe argued for more emphasis in medical education on the study of the human life cycle, the characteristics of each stage, the transitions between stages, and the relationships between the biomedical and social factors that influence behavior at each stage.

Aklilu Habte emphasized the necessity of teaching about other peoples and other cultures.

Paul Bohannan pointed to the need for what he called "backup" institutions that would perform the tasks that are assigned to parents or schools when the parents or the schools cannot or will not carry out those tasks. June Christmas agreed, citing as one example the need for multiservice centers where young people can find help for a wide range of problems like drugs, alcohol, jobs, and troublesome parents.

Alvin Eurich and other speakers pointed out that formal education is only a small part of the total education young people receive, and that more attention needs to be paid to the total educational environment. As an example, he cited statistics to show that by the time a student has finished high school he or she has spent more time watching television than in listening to teachers in the classroom. Other speakers stressed the importance of mentoring. Mr. Eurich and Ernest Bartell made several specific recommendations for improving formal education.

William Threlkeld argued that "education is so important that we can't let the educators make all the decisions about what is to be taught," and Leonard Duhl maintained that "we are entering a period where we need to develop an entirely new way of looking at reality." He said that young people are constantly searching for alternative ways of looking at life, and that their quest should be encouraged.

Historical Perspective

John Demos said there is a growing belief among scholars that there is a life-cycle stage called "youth" between adolescence and maturity, and that this stage deserves a lot more attention than it has received.

Leonard Duhl cited the need for more research on the adolescent experience of blacks, Chicanos, American Indians, and other minorities in American society. June Christmas agreed, saying there was a need for more information about the historical effects of slavery on present-day black adolescents.

Demographic Data

June Christmas pointed out that aggregate statistics often conceal more than they reveal, particularly those aggregates that lump white and blacks together. "We need to tease out the ethnicity," she said, "because some differences between whites and blacks are highly significant."

Donald King suggested a longitudinal study of the 1.1 million unmarried people who are living together to find out whether the divorce rate among those who eventually married was lower or higher than that for young people who had not lived together before marriage.

Youth as Individuals and as Family Members

Sheila Kamerman maintained that research scholars and policy makers tend to look at young people only as individuals, and not as members of families. "We need to raise some different kinds of questions about youth than we have in the past," she said. She went on to list some of these questions, including the question of what happens to the level of family income when young people leave the family they grew up in and strike out on their own, and the question of what impact the growing trend toward both parents working has on young people. She also pointed out the need for better data on how well the family is performing its role as the principal agency for socializing youth.

Robert Aldrich said there was a need for more information about adolescents growing up in single-parent families.

June Christmas emphasized the need for helping young people to establish better relationships not only to one another but also with their parents and other adults.

Guidance and Counseling

Most of the participants agreed that schools and colleges do not do a very good job with guidance and counseling. Helen Washburn and Jack Darley made a number of specific recommendations for improving upon what is being done.

Willard Wirtz said that guidance and counseling should be done on a community-wide basis rather than being limited to the schools, and he went on to say that each community should develop an "opportunity inventory" for young people.

Several of the participants recommended that the traditional high school guidance and counseling system be supplemented by the use of mentors—older people in the community whose experience and insights would be helpful to young people in dealing with a wide range of personal problems.

Youth Policy

Alfred Kahn stressed the need for reform of the present policy framework for dealing with youth, and for the formation of a new policy that would view young people as an asset to society rather than a problem. "We have to develop a new kind of agenda," he said. "How can we expect youth to be responsible unless we treat them as responsible individuals?"

Margaret Hastings, one of the auditors, pointed out that policy requires consensus and commitment. "Those are what we really need," she said. Sheila Kamerman agreed. "The problem is how to get political support for what we want to do," she said. "It's a problem of constituency building."

Willard Wirtz and others argued that youth policy should originate at the community level, because it is there that young people can participate most effectively in the formulation of policies dealing with their needs and concerns.

Robert Aldrich said the United States could learn a lot from the Canadian experience in developing a national youth policy. One of the secrets of the Canadian success, he said, was active participation by young people in the formulation of youth policy at all levels of government.

John Schweppe suggested that one element of a national youth policy should be the requirement that all young people, at the age of 21 or 22, be required to devote a year to some kind of national service, either military service or community service of the type performed by the Civilian Conservation Corps in the 1930's.

Willard Wirtz agreed that some sort of national service program might be a good idea but he warned that it would have to be voluntary and that it should have within it some mechanism for persuading young people that work is worthwhile. He also said that although such a program would have to be partly funded by the federal government, part of the cost should be defrayed by those who benefited from the work that was performed, and that the administration of the program should be vested in local communities rather than in the federal government. "People participation, the key to the success of such a program, is only possible at the local level," he remarked.

Federal Intervention

Several of the participants expressed apprehension about the growing intervention of the federal government in community affairs. The consensus seemed to be that youth programs originating at the community level should be administered locally, even if federal funding is necessary to get them off the ground.

Health

Donald King said there was a great need to educate young people about the dangers involved in the excessive use of prescription drugs and other agents that are used as "uppers and downers." He also said that much more needs to be known about substances that contaminate the environment, but he warned that there is a danger of overregulation with respect to some contaminants which have not been demonstrated to be dangerous. "We can't eliminate all of them," he said. "We're going to have to live with some of them."

Edmund Pellegrino agreed with Dr. King about educating the young to the dangers of certain prescription drugs. "We've got to do something about this incurable itch to take a pill," he remarked.

Robert Aldrich argued that there is a need for more and better courses in personal hygiene in the schools. June Christmas agreed, adding that she would go beyond that to include the promotion of healthful ways of living.

Leonard Duhl said he thought medicine ought to pay more attention to Oriental ideas about self-healing. "Doctors diagnose and prescribe," he said, "but they do not involve themselves in the healing process."

Sexuality

Sidney Werkman said he thought adolescents should have the opportunity to develop their own sexuality without outside interference. "We need to give adolescents a better chance to find themselves," he argued.

Philip Blumstein agreed. "Sexuality is a malleable thing," he said. "We have to be prepared to accept the fact that it unfolds during a lifetime."

With respect to sex roles, Dr. Blumstein said he thought men should be encouraged to develop expressiveness, even though this is generally regarded as a female quality. He also said society ought to come up with new ways of helping homosexuals deal with their situation and with public reactions toward it.

Cults

Harold Visotsky maintained that society's most effective response to cults is not to try to abolish them but rather to come up with competing groups that will fill the needs that cults are now serving, in a manner consistent with socially accepted values.

The Third World

Aklilu Habte found our educational system wanting with respect to teaching about other peoples and other cultures. He also recommended what he called "a people exchange," with the requirement that every visitor must live at least one year with a local family.

Paul Bohannan agreed, saying it was not enough for social scientists to study other cultures; they must also live in them in order to really understand them.

The Good Society

Early in the conference, Leonard Duhl and Alfred Kahn ventured the opinion that what was really needed in dealing with the problems and concerns of youth was a public debate on "the good society." Several other speakers, notably Dr. Pellegrino, agreed with this suggestion, and there was considerable discussion about it.

Robert Aldrich called for a national dialogue similar to that which laid the foundations for youth policy in Canada.

Willard Wirtz said he agreed with all of these comments. "I'm in favor of redesigning this society," he said. "I think it's our last best hope. What it will require is a new politics, a new economics, and a new set of values."

A. J. Kelso emphasized that the task of building the good society must begin with each individual person.

Appendix A

Conference Participants

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Appendix B

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